Opinion
C/A 8:23-cv-00650-HMH-KFM
05-08-2023
Armando Despaigne Zulveta, Plaintiff, v. Park National Bank, Park National Corporation, Anderson County Library System, Anderson County Sheriff's Office, Defendants.[1]
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald, United States Magistrate Judge.
The plaintiff, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action seeking to have a state court judgment vacated. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on February 15, 2023 (doc. 1). By orders filed February 28, 2023, March 29, 2023, and April 11,2023, the plaintiff was given a specific time frame in which to bring his case into proper form for judicial screening (docs. 7; 12; 15). The plaintiff complied with the court's orders, and the case is now in proper form for judicial screening. Upon review of the plaintiff's complaint, the undersigned recommends it be dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a non-prisoner, filed this action seeking to have a state court judgment vacated (doc. 1). Of note, the plaintiff's complaint appears to involve dissatisfaction with proceedings in the Anderson County Court of Common Pleas at Case Number 2022-CP-04-00328 (hereinafter, the “Anderson Case”). Anderson County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Anderson/ PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (enter the plaintiff's name and 2022CP0400328) (last visited May 8, 2023). In that case, on June 3, 2022, the Honorable J. Cordell Maddox, Jr., entered an order granting Park National Bank's motion to dismiss based upon insufficient service and failure to state a claim for relief. Id. The plaintiff appealed, but failed to perfect his appeal so his appeal was dismissed on June 3, 2022. Id.; see Zulveta v. Park Nat'l Bank, C/A No. 2022-000635 (S.C. Ct. App. June 3, 2022). After his appeal was dismissed, on August 11, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion in the Anderson Case seeking to vacate the judgment, which remains pending at this time. See Anderson County Public Index (enter the plaintiff's name and 2022CP0400328) (last visited May 8, 2023).
Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice . . . is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
The plaintiff purports to file this action as a motion for reconsideration of an order entered by the Pickens County Court of Common Pleas - although he later references the Anderson Case (doc. 1 at 1-2). The plaintiff alleges that the defendants engaged in fraud to obtain the outcome of the Anderson Case (id. at 2). The plaintiff alleges diversity jurisdiction (id. at 3).
The plaintiff alleges that he was denied access to the court in the Anderson Case proceedings because he was not allowed to speak at a hearing or have a fair trial (id. at 4). Because of this, the plaintiff alleges that the judgment in the Anderson Case should be void and that Judge Maddox should have recused himself because he engaged in ex parte conversations with the defendants during the hearing (id. at 5, 8-9, 10-11). The plaintiff alleges that during the hearing in the Anderson Case, Park National Bank's attorney intentionally spoke quietly so that the plaintiff wouldn't be able to hear what was going on (id. at 5-6). The plaintiff further contends that he was not provided copies of items filed in the Anderson Case (id. at 6-7). The plaintiff also alleges that Park National Bank's attorney made legal arguments based on false representations of the law (id. at 11-14). For relief, the plaintiff seeks to have the judgment entered in the Anderson Case vacated based upon fraud on the court (id. at 7-8, 15-16).
APPLICABLE LAW & ANALYSIS
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a Defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize that courts must have the authority to control litigation before them.” Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Since federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, there is no presumption that the court has jurisdiction. Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 337 (1895)). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” Bulldog Trucking, 147 F.3d at 352; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
There are two types of federal jurisdiction: federal question jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. Federal question jurisdiction arises when the case arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Diversity jurisdiction, on the other hand, is conferred upon the Court when a suit is between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Here, the plaintiff alleges diversity jurisdiction (doc. 1 at 3). However, even presuming, arguendo, that diversity jurisdiction exists in this action, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to dismissal.
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional and may be raised by the Court sua sponte. Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003). “[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies . . . when the loser in state court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court's decision itself.” Davani v. Va. Dep'tof Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006). As noted above, on June 3, 2022, Judge Maddox entered an order dismissing the Anderson Case, and on August 11, 2022 - after unsuccessfully appealing that order - the plaintiff filed a motion in the Anderson Case seeking to have that order reconsidered under Rule 60. See Anderson County Public Index (enter the plaintiff's name and 2022CP0400328) (last visited May 8, 2023). In the instant matter, the plaintiff also seeks to vacate the order entered in the Anderson Case (see generally doc. 1). It is well-settled, however, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to bar the exercise of federal jurisdiction even when a challenge to state court decisions or rulings concerns federal constitutional issues; instead, only the United States Supreme Court may review those state-court decisions. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476-82 (a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts because such review can be conducted only by the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1257); Davani, 434 F.3d at 719 (explaining how the expansive interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was limited by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)); see also Dukes v. Stone, C/A No. 3:08-cv-505-PMD-JRM, 2009 WL 398079, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2009) (explaining that only the United States Supreme Court is empowered with appellate authority to reverse or modify a state court judgment).
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine gets its name from two cases decided by the United States Supreme Court finding that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments where the district court is requested to review and reject those judgments. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
The doctrine applies even if the state court litigation has not reached a state's highest court. See Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 892-93 & nn.3-4 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (providing that a federal court must accord full faith and credit to a state court judgment); Robart Wood & Wire Prods. Corp. v. Namaco Indus., 797 F.2d 176, 178 (4th Cir. 1986). As such, because the plaintiff seeks an order from this court vacating an order entered in the Anderson Case, the instant action is subject to summary dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending the complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 49 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”).
The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).