Relying principally on our opinion in Zullo, petitioner, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 371 (1994), Skandha argues that the parole board (board) lost jurisdiction of him by unreasonably delaying the revocation of his parole. That opinion has no precedential value, because the Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review and issued an opinion of its own. Zullo, petitioner, 420 Mass. 872, 876-877 (1995). Before addressing the import of that case, we first lay out the following background facts, which appear to be uncontested.

Recently, the Supreme Judicial Court recently stated that, in the context of determining the fairness of the revocation of a defendant's parole, one consideration is "the extent to which the parolee reasonably relied on the inaction of the enforcing authorities." In re Zullo, 653 N.E.2d 150, 152, 420 Mass. 872, 876 (Mass. 1995). As noted above, Camilo could not reasonably have relied on the inaction of the enforcing authorities.

Other factors that courts have considered relevant to the analysis include the following: the State's diligence in attempting to serve the arrest warrant; the reasons behind the State's delay in executing the warrant; the conduct of the probation violator in frustrating or impeding service of the warrant (e.g., if he absconded from the jurisdiction or concealed his identity to avoid detection); whether the probation violator's whereabouts were known or readily ascertainable; and any actual prejudice suffered by the probation violator as a result of the delay (e.g., if the delay prejudiced his ability to defend against the petition for revocation). See United States v. Fisher, 895 F.2d 208, 210-11 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Lee, 941 F.2d 571, 573 (7th Cir. 1991); State v. Flemming, 907 P.2d 496, 501 (Ariz. 1995); Barker, 479 N.W.2d at 278-79; State v. Bennett, 138 P.3d 1284, 1287-88 (Kan.App. 2006); Langley, 711 So. 2d at 669, 670; In re Zullo, 653 N.E.2d 150, 152 (Mass. 1995); People ex rel. Flores v. Dalsheim, 413 N.Y.S.2d 188, 193 (N.Y.App.Div. 2 Dept. 1979); Kahl, 814 P.2d at 1153-54. ¶ 35 We agree that all of these factors are relevant in determining whether due process was satisfied, i.e., whether the State executed the arrest warrant and brought the defendant before the court without unreasonable delay.

Chalifoux v. Commissioner of Correction, 375 Mass. 424, 427 (1978). See Zullo, petitioner, 420 Mass. 872, 876 (1995). Cf. Commonwealth v. Hayes, supra at 17.

Therefore, the Commonwealth waived any jurisdiction over him, the defendant contends, citingCommonwealth v. Sawicki, 369 Mass. 377 (1975), Zullo, petitioner, 420 Mass. 872 (1995), and Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 921 (1999). In Sawicki and Mitchell, the issue before the court was whether a delay in revoking or extending probation because of a probation violation was unreasonable; and in Zullo, whether the parole board's delay in serving a parole revocation warrant was unreasonable.

Compare the markedly shorter intervals of time questioned or reckoned as excessive in the Sawicki and Ward cases. See also the remarks in Zullo, petitioner, 420 Mass. 872, 875-876 (1995) (a parole revocation case parallel to Sawicki on probation revocation). Our case is the opposite of the situation supposed in Commonwealth v. Baillargeon, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 16, 20 (1989), where

When the plaintiff's "from and after" sentences on the new crimes were suspended, the plain language of the statute made the effective date of service of the parole violation warrant the same date as his guilty pleas because he was, in effect, convicted of crimes on that day, and the sentences which were imposed on those convictions effectively expired as a result of their suspension on the same day. Cf. Zullo, petitioner, 420 Mass. 872, 874 (1995). Notwithstanding that the plaintiff may not receive credit for his preconviction confinement in view of his sentences being suspended, that confinement may have been a factor in the judge's decision to suspend the sentences and, therefore, does not constitute "dead time."

The lapse of an agency's statutory authority to take action due to belated notification has been upheld in other contexts. Commonwealth v. Mitchell 46 Mass.App.Ct. 921 (1999) citing Zullo, petitioner, 420 Mass. 872, 875-76 (1995) (finding lapse of time between notification and enforcement of parole violation caused loss of authority to revoke parole). The Registry could subject Coutinho to the provisions of Melanie's Law if it has current authority to revoke or suspend Coutinho's license.

Further, when a parolee is convicted of a new crime, service of the parole violation warrant is not effective until "the expiration of any additional sentences by parole or otherwise."Zullo, petitioner, 420 Mass. 872, 874 (1995); see also Harding v. State Board of Parole, 307 Mass. 217(1940) (prisoner whose parole had been revoked and upon whom there had been imposed, on a new charge, a sentence to confinement, was required to remain in confinement under the first sentence upon the termination of the second sentence); Kleczka v.Commonwealth, 350 Mass. 74, 75 (1966) (Board committed no error when it issued, but did not serve, a warrant revoking parole when the parolee was confined for an offense committed subsequent to his release on parole). If a prisoner furnishes bail on the new charges or is released on his own recognizance, then the Board can serve a parole revocation warrant and return the prisoner to custody as a parole violator.

Durham also contends that the Commonwealth lost jurisdiction over him because his whereabouts were either known or could be known with reasonable diligence, and he was available to be returned to custody. In re Zullo, 420 Mass. 872, 876-877 (1995) (reasonableness of executing parole revocation warrant to be decided on case-by-case basis taking into account the extent to which the parolee reasonably relied on the inaction of the enforcing authorities and the prejudice that delay in the attempted enforcement may have caused to parolee). The Commonwealth contends that, even if it acted negligently, which it denies, Durham's claim is barred by the statutory requirement that any action be brought within three years after the date upon which such a cause of action accrued.