Opinion
21 CV 4222 (VB)
08-04-2021
In Re AHMED HUSAIN ZUBAIR, Debtor, AHMED HUSAIN ZUBAIR, Appellant, KRISTA M. PREUSS, Appellee.
ORDER
Vincent L. Briccetti United States District Judge
By letter dated August 2, 2021, appellant, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, requests that Chief Judge Swain remove the undersigned from presiding over both of his pending bankruptcy appeals and assign a different judge to preside over these appeals. The Court construes this letter as a motion for the Court to recuse itself. (Doc. #19). For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) states that a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Section 455 also enumerates additional bases for recusal, including, when the judge “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.” Id. § 455(b).
Here, to the extent appellant contends that I should recuse myself because I cannot be fair and unbiased, that contention is rejected. At bottom, appellant appears to take issue with my having asked appellee's counsel whether a ruling in appellant's second-filed bankruptcy appeal (21 CV 4222) might moot the issues presented in his first-filed bankruptcy appeal (20 CV 8829). As the briefing in the second-filed appeal is not complete, I have not made any determination regarding the mootness of appellant's first-filed appeal. Before making a ruling in either of these appeals, I will carefully and impartially consider the arguments raised by both sides, and the applicable laws and rules, including arguments and laws regarding mootness.
I also note that appellant incorrectly asserts that during an initial conference held on June 10, 2021, 1 “cited [my] lack of knowledge of the roles, responsibilities and procedures in bankruptcy appeals.” (Doc. #19 at ECF 2). This is patently false. The Court merely instructed counsel for appellee that, given appellant's pro se status and the infrequency with which the Court handles pro se bankruptcy appeals, appellee's counsel should honor his obligations as a member of the Bar of this Court to assist the Court in any way possible. Moreover, my knowledge of procedures in the bankruptcy court, which are more than sufficient, are not relevant to recusal.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
Chambers will mail a copy of this Order to appellant.
SO ORDERED: