With respect to releases, the Indiana courts teach "that upholding releases serves an important public policy because it facilitates the orderly settlement of disputes." Zollman v. Geneva Leasing Associates, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 387, 392 (Ind.App. 2002), citing Prall v. Indiana Nat. Bank, 627 N.E.2d 1374, 1377 (Ind.App. 1994), in turn citing Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. Mygrant, 471 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. 1984). "If judges could interpret a release to mean something that is contrary to the plain language because one party intended for it to mean something else, then parties would be discouraged from signing releases because they could not have confidence that a court would enforce the release's plain language."
Our courts have consistently expressed their commitment to advancing the public policy supporting the enforcement of contracts. Zollman v. Geneva Leasing Assoc's Inc., 780 N.E.2d 387, 391 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002) (citing Trimble v. Ameritech Publ'g, Inc., 700 N.E.2d 1128, 1129 (Ind. 1998); Fresh Cut, Inc. v. Fazli, 650 N.E.2d 1126, 1129 (Ind. 1995); Candlelight Props. LLC v. MHC Operating Ltd. P'ship, 750 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001), trans. dismissed).
“Indiana courts have a lengthy tradition of recognizing and respecting the freedom to contract.” Zollman v. Geneva Leasing Assocs., Inc., 780 N.E.2d 387, 391 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002). “Therefore, as a general rule, the law allows competent adults the utmost liberty in entering into contracts that, when entered into freely and voluntarily, will be enforced by the courts.” Id.
Such releases are generally enforceable, see Dick Corp. v. Geiger, 783 N.E.2d 368, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) ("There is a very strong presumption of enforceability of contracts representing the freely bargained agreement of the parties." (citing Zollman v. Geneva Leasing Assoc's, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 387, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002))); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 346 cmt. a (1981) ("A duty to pay damages may be suspended or discharged by agreement or otherwise, and if it is discharged the claim for damages is extinguished."), and nothing before the Court suggests that the release contained in the Defendant's terms and conditions of service should not be enforced. The terms and conditions of service would have been seen by the Plaintiff during the course of the parties' business relationship, and accepting the terms and conditions of service was a prerequisite for submitting orders on the Defendant's online portal.
If, however, the contract is ambiguous and extrinsic evidence is admitted to resolve the ambiguity, its weighing should be left to the trier of fact, id. at 840–41, unless there is no genuine factual dispute presented by the record on summary judgment. Zollman v. Geneva Leasing Assocs., Inc. , 780 N.E.2d 387, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).The Contingent Payment Clause provides as follows :
Still, it would contravene the very purpose of releases "[i]f judges could interpret a release to mean something that is contrary to the plain language." Zollman v. Geneva Leasing Assocs., 780 N.E.2d 387, 393 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Estate of Spry v. Greg & Ken, Inc., 749 N.E.2d 1269, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). The Court can make no such interpretation, at least at this stage in the proceedings.
Under Indiana law, a release agreement is a contract by which a party's right to prosecute a cause of action against the other party to the contract is surrendered. Zollman v. Geneva Leasing Assocs., Inc., 780 N.E.2d 387, 392 (Ind.App. 2002). Under the terms of the Release and Settlement Agreement ("Release") between the parties here, the parties agreed to the following: (1) AuthorHouse had elected to cancel Sturgis' publication services contracts; (2) AuthorHouse was required to refund monies paid by Sturgis in the amount of $499.00; and (3) AuthorHouse was required to pay Sturgis $1,200.00 as royalties for books sold through applicable distribution channels. Paragraph No. 2 of the Release provided the release, which included unknown claims that could arise in the future:
The first issue is whether the trial court erred by concluding that Tyler was mentally incompetent to sign the Contract on February 8, 2005. Indiana law "allows competent adults the utmost liberty in entering into contracts that, when entered into freely and voluntarily, will be enforced by the courts." Zollman v. Geneva Leasing Associates, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 387, 392 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002); see also Trotter v. Nelson, 684 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (Ind. 1997) ("We recognize a very strong presumption of enforceability of contracts that represent the freely bargained agreement of the parties." (internal quotations omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Liggett v. Young, 877 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 2007).
Further, it is only where a contract is ambiguous and its interpretation requires extrinsic evidence that the fact finder must determine the facts upon which the contract rests. Zollman v. Geneva Leasing Assoc., Inc., 780 N.E.2d 387, 391-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). In this case, Paula points to the following provisions set forth in the settlement agreement that purportedly operate to release her from the claims brought by the appellees in this action:
See id. As a general rule, the law allows competent adults the utmost liberty in entering into contracts that, when entered into freely and voluntarily, will be enforced by the courts. Zollman v. Geneva Leasing Assocs., Inc., 780 N.E.2d 387, 392 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002). Here, the forum-selection clause clearly states that disputes between the seller and the customer must be litigated in Tennessee.