Opinion
Case No. 20070960-CA.
Filed April 3, 2008. Not For Official Publication
Appeal from the Third District, West Jordan, 030102340 The Honorable Terry L. Christiansen.
Stephen W. Brockbank, Saratoga Springs, Appellant Pro Se.
Jay V. Barney, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Greenwood, Thorne, and Billings.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Stephen W. Brockbank seeks to appeal the trial court's denial of a fee waiver for his appeal number 20070772-CA. This is before the court on its own motion for summary disposition.
Generally, appeals may be taken only from final orders and judgments.See Utah R. App. P. 3(a); Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, ¶ 9, 5 P.3d 649. Where an appeal is not properly taken, this court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal. See Bradbury, ¶ 8.
The trial court denied Brockbank's petition for a fee waiver based on the information in Brockbank's affidavit of impecuniosity. If Brockbank disagreed with that decision assessing fees, his remedy was provided by Utah statute. Under Utah Code section 78A-2-306, a trial court can consider whether to waive a court fee. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-306 (formerly § 78-7-39). If the court requires the fee, the litigant "may contest the fee assessment by filing a memorandum and supporting documentation with the court demonstrating inability to pay the fee."Id. § 78A-2-307 (formerly § 78-7-40). The trial court may then modify the fee assessment based on the new information or documentation.See id. Brockbank did not challenge the fee assessment in the trial court below, as provided by statute. Accordingly, the denial of the fee waiver is not a final, appealable order. As a result, this court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal and must dismiss it. See Bradbury, 2000 UT 50, ¶ 8.
Brockbank filed a motion for a fee waiver in this court in his appeal number 20070772-CA. This court denied the motion and noted that Brockbank could seek relief in the trial court. As a result, this court has not only steered Brockbank toward the proper relief but has also determined the matter on appeal here. Accordingly, this separate appeal from the denial of a waiver is not properly taken.
Furthermore, the appeal to which the waiver order relates has been dismissed, making this appeal moot.
Dismissed.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Presiding Judge, William A. Thorne Jr., Associate Presiding Judge, Judith M. Billings, Judge.