Opinion
2003-04766.
Decided April 12, 2004.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Lally, J.), entered April 18, 2003, which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Mintz Schaffer (Eugene Schaffer and Pollack, Pollack, Isaac DeCicco, New York, N.Y. [Brian J. Isaac] of counsel), for appellant.
Tromello, McDonnell Kehoe, Melville, N.Y. (A.G. Chancellor III of counsel), for respondent.
Before: GLORIA GOLDSTEIN, J.P., HOWARD MILLER, THOMAS A. ADAMS, BARRY A. COZIER, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Based on the evidence presented by the defendant in support of its motion, which indicated that a storm was in progress at the time of the plaintiff's accident, the defendant met its burden of establishing that it did not have a reasonably sufficient time to remedy the allegedly dangerous icy condition ( see Pelliccio v. TCW Realty Fund VIA Holding Co., 291 A.D.2d 388; DeMasi v. Radbro Realty, 261 A.D.2d 354).
In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether she slipped on ice that was present from a previous storm ( see Dowden v. Long Is. R.R., 305 A.D.2d 631; Pepito v. City of New York, 262 A.D.2d 619, 620). Her assertion that the ice patch existed for a sufficiently long time to have provided constructive notice and a sufficient amount of time to remedy the condition can only be based upon speculation ( see Sellet v. United Artists Theaters, 251 A.D.2d 488, 489; Bertman v. Board of Mgrs. of Omni Ct. Condominium I, 233 A.D.2d 283).
Accordingly, the defendant's motion was properly granted.
GOLDSTEIN, J.P., H. MILLER, ADAMS and COZIER, JJ., concur.