Opinion
May 25, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Elliott Wilk, J.).
The trial court correctly determined, based in part upon its determination of credibility, that contributions of the wife's family to the purchase of the marital residence, the attribution of substantial income to the husband through various corporations and his secreting of income through such corporations and through his mother as nominee, and the husband's failure to be forthcoming both during trial and with respect to pretrial financial disclosure, all combined to warrant extinguishing his interest in the marital residence (compare, Davis v Davis, 175 A.D.2d 45, with Brandenburg v Brandenburg, 203 A.D.2d 138).
Our examination of this record establishes that the award of counsel fees to the wife was a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion (see, De Bernardo v De Bernardo, 180 A.D.2d 500, 502).
We agree with the trial court that the husband should have been solely responsible for repaying the wife's father for having purchased the lien resulting from a judgment against the husband and for paying, on the husband's behalf, the amount drawn by him on a letter of credit. However, affirmative relief directing such payment to the wife's father was inappropriate because that beneficiary had never subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the court (Kirk v Kirk, 177 A.D.2d 619; Adams v Adams, 129 A.D.2d 661, 662).
We have considered defendant's other contentions and find that they either do not warrant any change in the disposition or are without merit.
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Ellerin, Wallach and Asch, JJ.