Opinion
# 2011-041-029 Claim No. 117021 Motion No. M-79950
08-16-2011
ZENTENO v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Synopsis
Defendant is granted summary judgment dismissing claim based on DMV's ministerial negligence in erroneously reporting that claimant failed to answer traffic tickets where defendant owed claimant no special duty under negligence theory and where confinement was pursuant to privileged warrant-based arrest by a New York City employee. Case information
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ ¦UID: ¦2011-041-029 ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Claimant(s): ¦EDUARDO ZENTENO ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Claimant short name: ¦ZENTENO ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Footnote (claimant name)¦ ¦ ¦: ¦ ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Defendant(s): ¦THE STATE OF NEW YORK ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Footnote (defendant ¦Caption has been amended sua sponte to reflect the ¦ ¦name) : ¦only proper defendant. ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Third-party claimant(s):¦ ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Third-party defendant ¦ ¦ ¦(s): ¦ ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Claim number(s): ¦117021 ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Motion number(s): ¦M-79950 ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Cross-motion number(s): ¦ ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Judge: ¦FRANK P. MILANO ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Claimant's attorney: ¦ANDREW C. RISOLI, ESQ. ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦ ¦HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦New York State Attorney General ¦ ¦Defendant's attorney: ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦By: Joan Matalavage, Esq. ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦Assistant Attorney General ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Third-party defendant's ¦ ¦ ¦attorney: ¦ ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Signature date: ¦August 16, 2011 ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦City: ¦Albany ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Comments: ¦ ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Official citation: ¦ ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Appellate results: ¦ ¦ +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------¦ ¦See also (multicaptioned¦ ¦ ¦case) ¦ ¦ +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ Decision
Defendant moves for summary judgment in this action in which claimant seeks recovery for alleged wrongful confinement based upon defendant's purported negligence in erroneously recording and reporting that claimant's driver's license was suspended based upon claimant's failure to answer two traffic tickets. DMV's error led to claimant's arrest pursuant to warrant after a routine traffic stop.
The amended claim alleges that:
"Claimant was arrested and was incarcerated for allegedly driving without a license or a suspended license by order of the New York State Motor Vehicles Dept.
Their suspension was ordered in error resulting in claimant's incarceration for 2 days.
Copy of Dept. of Motor Vehicles letter attached. Claimant was falsely imprisoned."
At his deposition, claimant testified that the New York City police officer who arrested him told him that "I had a warrant for those tickets."
An affidavit from a New York State Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) employee, attached to defendant's motion papers, indicates that the suspension of claimant's license "probably was the result of a data entry error" by DMV.
"A motion for summary judgment should be entertained only after the moving party has established, by competent admissible evidence, that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . If the movant meets this initial burden, the opposing party is required to submit evidence which raises a material issue of fact to preclude an award of summary judgment" (Ware v Baxter Health Care Corp., 25 AD3d 863, 864 [3d Dept 2006]).
Once the moving party has satisfied this obligation, the burden shifts and the party opposing the motion must demonstrate by admissible evidence the existence of a factual issue (Svoboda v Our Lady of Lourdes Mem. Hosp., Inc., 31 AD3d 877 [3d Dept 2006]).
"In opposition to a motion for summary judgment a party must assemble and lay bare affirmative proof to establish that genuine material issues of fact exist. Only the existence of a bona fide issue raised by evidentiary fact rather than one based on conclusory or irrelevant allegations, will be sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment where the movant has made out a prima facie basis for the granting of the motion" (Archambault v Martinez, 120 AD2d 632, 632-633 [2d Dept 1986]). Further, "mere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient" to defeat a motion for summary judgment (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).
Claimant's false confinement claim lacks merit.
To establish that he was falsely confined, claimant must prove that "(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929; Krzyzak v Schaefer, 52 AD3d 979 [3d Dept 2008]).
Initially, the record shows that claimant was arrested and confined by the City of New York, not defendant.
With respect to whether a confinement is privileged, Holmberg v County of Albany (291 AD2d 610, 612 [3d Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 604 [2002]), instructs that: "Generally, where a facially valid order issued by a court with proper jurisdiction directs confinement, that confinement is privileged . . . and everyone connected with the matter is protected from liability for false imprisonment."
The record shows that claimant was confined pursuant to an apparently facially valid warrant based upon "two outstanding tickets." The fact that the two outstanding tickets upon which the warrant was based had been issued to claimant's father, with whom claimant shared a name and address, rather than claimant, does not alter the facial validity of the warrant. The confinement was, therefore, privileged.
Defendant asserts that it is immune from liability for its alleged negligence in erroneously recording and reporting that claimant had failed to answer two traffic tickets.
DMV's mandate to record and report driver's license information is clearly a governmental function. In McLean v City of New York (12 NY3d 194, 203 [2009]), the Court of Appeals recited the law as to when the state may be held liable for the negligent performance of a governmental function:
"Government action, if discretionary, may not be a basis for liability, while ministerial actions may be, but only if they violate a special duty owed to the plaintiff, apart from any duty to the public in general."
As the requirement to properly record and report driver's license information is a ministerial action, claimant is required to show that he was owed a special duty by defendant.
A "[special] duty is born of a special relationship between the [claimant] and the governmental entity. When such a relationship is shown--and it is [claimant's] burden to establish it--the government is under a duty to exercise reasonable care toward the [claimant]" (Pelaez v Seide, 2 NY3d 186, 198-199 [2004]). The Pelaez opinion explains that a "special relationship can be formed in three ways: (1) when the [defendant] violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons; (2) when it voluntarily assumes a duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty; or (3) when the [defendant] assumes positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant and dangerous safety violation" (Pelaez, 2 NY3d at 199-200 [2004).
The only possible manner in which claimant could seek to show a special relationship is through the "special duty" analysis of the first prong of the Pelaez test. The Court of Appeals, in Pelaez, explained, at p. 200, that:
"To form a special relationship through breach of a statutory duty, the governing statute must authorize a private right of action. One may be fairly implied when (1) the plaintiff is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) recognition of a private right of action would promote the legislative purpose of the governing statute; and (3) to do so would be consistent with the legislative scheme . . . If one of these prerequisites is lacking, the claim will fail."
The Pelaez decision cautioned that "[w]hile the existence of a special relationship depends on the facts, a plaintiff has a heavy burden in establishing such a relationship" and, consequently, courts have "dismissed most such claims as a matter of law" (Pelaez, 2 NY3d 186, 199 n 8).
The statutory duty of the DMV to record and report driver's license information, including license suspensions, is owed to the public at large and not, as suggested by claimant, to a particular class (licensed drivers).
Claimant has not shown the existence of "a special relationship through breach of a statutory duty" as contemplated by Pelaez. Claimant was thus owed no special duty by the DMV personnel who were allegedly negligent in ministerially, and erroneously, recording and reporting that claimant had failed to answer two traffic tickets.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. The claim is dismissed.
August 16, 2011
Albany, New York
FRANK P. MILANO
Judge of the Court of Claims
Papers Considered:
1. Defendant's Notice of Motion, filed May 25, 2011;
2. Affidavit of Joan Matalavage, sworn to May 25, 2011, and annexed exhibits;
3. Affidavit of Allison Murray, sworn to May 23, 2011;
4. Affirmation of Andrew C. Risoli, dated June 7, 2011;
5. Reply Affidavit of Joan Matalavage, sworn to June 23, 2011.