Opinion
No. CV 01 0510911-S
July 30, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Attorney James Ziogas, the third-party defendant, has moved to strike the first and third counts of the third-party complaint. The court holds that the first count of the complaint is legally sufficient as a pleading in indemnification. See Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694, 698, 694 A.2d 788 (1997). Specifically, the allegations of paragraphs seven, nine and eleven of the complaint adequately plead the second and fourth elements. The motion to strike the first count is denied.
The motion to strike was originally addressed to all three counts and to the request for "reasonable attorneys fees" in the prayer for relief. The Neumans, the third-party plaintiffs, have agreed to withdraw the second count and their request for attorneys fees. Both matters are noted withdrawn.
The court further holds that the third count, based on legal malpractice, is properly joined with the indemnification claim. This decision is based on the language of the impleader statute when read in conjunction with the rules for joinder of actions. Both actions arise out of the same transaction and the evidence and proof would be the same. The motion to strike the third count is also denied.
General Statutes § 52-102a; see also Practice Book § 10-11.
General Statutes § 52-97; see also Practice Book § 10-21.
See Ruby v. Chase Manhattan Bank, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. 505309 (March 25, 2002, Quinn, J.) (31 CT Page 8473-e Conn.L.Rptr. 683); Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Black, 40 Conn. Sup. 63, 65-66, 480 A.2d 614 (1984); Sun Care v. Long Ridge Nursing Rehabilitation Center, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Norwalk, Docket No. 144862 (April 27, 1999, Lewis, J.) ( 24 Conn.L.Rptr. 409) (action for professional negligence of attorneys allowed to be joined in third-party complaint when underlying action was based on breach of contract).
William P. Murray A judge of the Superior Court