Opinion
C/A 1:24-749-JD-SVH
02-15-2024
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges, United States Magistrate Judge.
Juan J. Hernandez Zapata (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, is an inmate in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Williamsburg, South Carolina (“FCI-Williamsburg”). He filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 224i. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(i)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss the petition in this case without requiring the respondent to file an answer.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Petitioner alleges he began serving his current federal sentence on October 7, 20i8, [ECF No. i at i], claiming he:
previously had his earned time credits applied to his projected
release date which reduced that date by 365 days giving petitioner a projected release date of 4-11-31. []Subsequently the Bureau of Prisons took away petitioner's earned time credits and reverted his projected release date to reflects a projected release date of 4-11-2032.Id. Petitioner claims he was told “that per the Southeast Regional Office pursuant to [18 U.S.C. §] 3632(E) because he was subject to deportation he could not have the time credits.” Id.
Petitioner asserts that he is not required to exhaust the BOP's administrative remedies because the issue before the court involves only statutory construction.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of this petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings for the United States District Court,the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and other habeas corpus statutes. Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
The Rules Governing Section 2254 are applicable to habeas actions brought under § 2241. See Rule 1(b).
B. Analysis
The petition is subject to summary dismissal for Petitioner's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Petitioner is required to exhaust his administrative remedies within the BOP before submitting a § 2241 petition in this case. Although § 2241 does not contain a statutory exhaustion requirement, courts consistently require prisoners to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to seeking habeas review under § 2241. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973) (requiring exhaustion in 28 U.S.C. § 2241 matter); McClung v. Shearin, 90 Fed.Appx. 444, 445 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Federal prisoners must exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing § 2241 petitions.”). This requirement of exhaustion allows prison officials to develop a factual record and “an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). A court may excuse an inmate's failure to exhaust upon a showing of cause and prejudice. McClung, 90 Fed.Appx. at 445. Here, Petitioner has failed to show any prejudice from requiring him to exhaust his administrative remedies, as his release is not prior to April 2031, by his own calculation. Because both cause and prejudice are required, the court need not look further. See Karsten v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 36 F.3d 8, 11 (4th Cir. 1994) (“If the first reason given is independently sufficient, then all those that follow are surplusage; thus, the strength of the first makes all the rest dicta.”).
Although Petitioner argues exhaustion is not required because the decision turns on statutory construction, he has cited to no case law from this circuit to support his argument. A review of cases in this district that have considered the issue reveals courts have required exhaustion. See e.g, Cruz v, Janson, No. 4:23-CV-01758-MGL, 2023 WL 6784422, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 13, 2023); Pierre v. Janson, No. CV 4:23-2216-JD-TER, 2023 WL 5021956, at *1 (D.S.C. May 31, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:23-2216-JD-TER, 2023 WL 5021951 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2023), affd, No. 23-6808, 2023 WL 6442921 (4th Cir. Oct. 3, 2023).
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
The undersigned recommends the petition be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).