Zakre v. Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale

30 Citing cases

  1. Syrnik v. Polones Constr. Corp.

    918 F. Supp. 2d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)   Cited 9 times
    Awarding the maximum amount of punitive damages under Title VII when there was truly reprehensible conduct and the punitive award is not grossly disproportionate to compensatory damages

    See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 428, 123 S.Ct. 1513. The punitive damages award cannot be compared in absolute terms to awards given in similar cases—because no two factors is alike—but must be compared by reference to the Gore factors. See Zakre v. Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, 541 F.Supp.2d 555, 566 (S.D.N.Y.2008). Title VII imposes a $300,000 cap on punitive damages.

  2. QUINBY v. WESTLB AG

    04 Civ. 7406 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2008)   Cited 24 times
    Finding a garden-variety claim when plaintiff felt stressed, shocked and devastated, and suffered from headaches, hives and welts

    When a court finds a verdict to be excessive, it may order a new trial, order a new trial limited to damages, or condition denial of a motion for a new trial on the plaintiff's accepting damages in a reduced amount. Zakre v. Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, 541 F. Supp. 2d 555, (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2008). A. Compensatory Damages

  3. Zakre v. Girozentrale

    03 Civ. 257 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 26, 2008)

    On February 8, 2008, this Court ruled on the parties' post-trial motions. See Zakre v. Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, 541 F. Supp. 2d 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). The Court granted Zakre's motion for attorney's fees and costs, denied her motion for reinstatement, and granted Nord/LB's motion for remittitur of the punitive damages or, in the alternative, for a new trial on that limited issue.

  4. Ruhling v. Newsday, Inc.

    CV 04-2430 (ARL) (E.D.N.Y. May. 13, 2008)   Cited 10 times
    In Ruhling v. Newsday, Inc., 2008 WL 2065811, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), the jury awarded the plaintiff $100,000.00 for compensatory damages.

    However, it is not among the powers of the trial court, where the jury has awarded excessive damages, simply to reduce the damages without offering the prevailing party the option of a new trial. Zakre v. Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, CV 03-257(RWS), 2008 WL 351662, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2008) (citing Vasbinder v. Scott, 976 F.2d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1992)). With these standards in mind, the court considers the defendant's motion.

  5. Mengelkamp v. Lake Metro. Hous. Auth.

    No. 12-4468 (6th Cir. Nov. 4, 2013)   Cited 20 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Rejecting defendant's argument on appeal that plaintiff's claim should have been evaluated according to the requirements of the participation clause because the complaint did not allege that plaintiff opposed any unlawful activity, but simply that plaintiff participated in investigations

    An employer does not have the requisite state of mind if it "discriminated with the distinct belief that its [alleged] discrimination is lawful, even if that belief is erroneous." Zakre v, Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, 541 F. Supp. 2d 555, 561 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8,2008) (quoting Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 538). However, "[e]gregious or outrageous acts may serve as evidence supporting an inference of such evil motive."

  6. Thomas v. Istar Financial, Inc.

    652 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010)   Cited 74 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a $1.6 million punitive damages award, in comparison to a $280,000 compensatory damages award, violates due process

    Although, again, the ratio of the jury's punitive damages award to this civil penalty does not render the award per se unconstitutional, the substantial size of the jury's punitive damages award as compared to the relevant civil fine indicates that the award was excessive. Lastly, we note that most of the bevy of cases cited by the parties for the proposition that the circumstances of this case require either a higher or lower award are inapposite. This is due either to differing factual circumstances or the existence of a statutory damages cap not present here. Cf. Zakre v. Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, 541 F.Supp.2d 555, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting, in employment discrimination case, that "[b]ecause Title VII has a cap on punitive damages, and the [New York State Human Rights Law] does not provide for punitive damages, there is not a large pool of relevant cases, those with punitive damages awards under the [NYCHRL]"); see generally TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 457, 113 S.Ct. 2711, 125 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993) (noting that "[b]ecause no two cases are truly identical, meaningful comparisons of such awards are difficult to make," and "[a]s an analytical approach to assessing a particular award . . . we are skeptical"). On balance, the moderate level of reprehensibility of iStar's conduct, the large compensatory damages award, and the relevant case law lead us to agree with the district court that the jury's original punitive damages award of $1.6 million was excessive.

  7. In re Bayside Prison Litigation

    331 F. App'x 987 (3d Cir. 2009)   Cited 11 times
    Holding $45,000 compensatory award "substantial" and vacating punitive damages award more than four times that amount

    Although we do not establish a maximum ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, we believe these precedents provide helpful guidance to district courts.See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Pub., 507 F.3d 470, 487 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[A] ratio in the range of 1:1 or 2:1 is all that due process will allow" where the compensatory damages award was already substantial-$366,939-and only one of the reprehensibility factors was present); Williams, 378 F.3d at 796-99 (reducing punitive damages award from an approximately 10:1 ratio to a 1:1 ratio because plaintiff received substantial compensatory damages-$600,000); Thomas, 508 F.Supp.2d at 263 ("[T]he Court believes the [3:1 to 4:1] ratio in this case is excessive because Thomas was awarded a very substantial amount in compensatory damages [$443,-500], making a punitive award equal to the compensatory damage award more appropriate."); Zakre v. Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, 541 F.Supp.2d 555, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (reducing a punitive damages award, where the ratio was 2:1, because compensatory damages were substantial 1.65 million). Judge Garth would hold that the maximum constitutional limit for punitive damages is a ratio of 1:1. He relies among other opinions on Justice Souter's recent opinion in Exxon Shipping v. Baker, ___U.S.___, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 171 L.Ed.2d 570 (2008), which establishes a 1:1 ratio, albeit in a maritime context.

  8. Jurinko v. Medical

    305 F. App'x 13 (3d Cir. 2008)   Cited 20 times
    Reducing punitive damages award to a 1:1 ratio where compensatory award was over $1.6 million

    See Bridgeport Music, Inc., 507 F.3d at 488, 490 ("[A] ratio of closer to 1:1 or 2:1 is all that due process can tolerate" where the compensatory damages award was already substantial — $366,939 — and the original award had a ratio of 9.5:1); Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 796-99 (8th Cir. 2004) (reduced punitive damages award from an approximately 10:1 ratio to a 1:1 ratio because plaintiff received substantial compensatory damages — $600,000); Slip-N-Slide Records, Inc. v. TVT Records, LLC, No. 05-21113-CIV, 2007 WL 3232274, at *30 (S.D.Fla. Oct.31, 2007) (affirming a punitive damages award, which had been reduced to reflect a 1:1 ratio by the District Court, because the "substantial [compensatory damages award of $2.3 million] mitigates against a punitive damages award that materially exceeds that same amount"); Zakre v. Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, 2008 WL 351662, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.8, 2008) (reducing a punitive damages award, where the ratio was 2:1, because compensatory damages were substantial — $1.65 million); Thomas v. iStar Fin., Inc., 508 F.Supp.2d 252, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[T]he Court believes the [3:1 to 4:1] ratio in this case is excessive because Thomas was awarded a very substantial amount in compensatory damages [$443,500], making a punitive award equal to the compensatory damage award more appropriate."); see also, Action Marine, Inc., 481 F.3d at 1317-23 (affirming a punitive damages award with a 5:1 ratio, based on a $3.2 compensatory damage award, in which there was physical, not just economic harm, as well as harm to many non-parties). In Boerner v. Brown Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2005), a jury awarded $4,025 million in compensatory damages and $15 million in punitive damages in favor of a smoker's husband, who sued Brown Williamson Tobacco for a design defect in its product.

  9. Jeanty v. City of New York

    18 Civ. 5920 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2021)   Cited 2 times

    However, expert testimony is not required; rather, a plaintiff's testimony as to the emotional harm he suffered, plus corroboration by testimony of witnesses and/or the objective circumstances of the violation, generally suffices. See Zakre v. Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, 541 F. Supp. 2d 555, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 78 N.Y.2d 207, 216 (1991)). In determining whether and to what extent Plaintiff is entitled to emotional distress damages, the Court considers, among other factors, amounts awarded in similar cases.

  10. Duarte v. St. Barnabas Hosp.

    341 F. Supp. 3d 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)   Cited 23 times
    Granting a remittitur of a compensatory damages award from $624,000 to $125,000 where the "[p]laintiff's vague and subjective complaints of insomnia, lower self-esteem, depression, anxiety, and stomach aches and headaches—unsupported by medical corroboration—establish[ed] no more than 'garden-variety' emotional distress"

    The cases cited by Plaintiff (Pltf. Opp. (Dkt. No. 170) at 37-38) involve conduct that is far more reprehensible. See, e.g., Zakre v. Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, 541 F.Supp.2d 555, 564-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("[When plaintiff] was terminated, she had one child in college and another approaching college, ... and she was the sole wage earner for the family.... In addition, there was [ ] extensive evidence of discrimination against women generally[,] ... [and] [c]omplaints about discrimination ... were dismissed."); Greenbaum, 67 F.Supp.2d at 269-70