Y.Y. v. State

6 Citing cases

  1. Bowser v. State

    No. 2220 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 8, 2020)

    Hence, we are not persuaded that such a claim constitutes an extraordinary situation allowing Bowser to pursue an interlocutory appeal. Bowser contends that the "right at issue in the present appeal is no less important" than the right to interlocutory review of the denial of a motion to enforce a plea agreement, which we found in Rios v. State, 186 Md. App. 354 (2009), and Y.Y. v. State, 205 Md. App. 724 (2012), to constitute an "extraordinary situation" requiring such review. But, in those cases, we explicitly stated that "the enforceability of alleged plea agreements is a proper basis for interlocutory appeals because of the strong public policy that favors the plea negotiation process."

  2. Brave Mar. Corp. v. Global Mktg. Sys., Inc.

    Civil No. JFM-15-1501 (D. Md. Oct. 30, 2015)

    The first is a Type I agreement, where parties have reached full agreement, "on all issues perceived to require negotiation," and the parties merely desire "more elaborate formalization of the agreement." Y.Y. v. State, 46 A.3d 1223, 1233 (Md. App. 2012) (citing Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The other is a "Type II" agreement, where the parties agree on the major terms of the contract while recognizing "the existence of open terms that remain to be negotiated."

  3. Branch v. State

    No. 1775-2023 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 15, 2024)

    It explained that the agreement did not expressly state when the appellant needed to complete a behavioral modification course or therapy. Citing Y.Y. v. State, 205 Md.App. 724, 744 (2012), the State contends that a reasonable time will be implied in the absence of an express time for performing a condition of an agreement. The State noted that more than eighteen months had passed between the entry and reopening of the stet, during which time the appellant failed to provide proof that he satisfied the condition.

  4. Edwards v. State

    No. 411 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 13, 2019)

    On review, in analyzing whether a plea agreement was formed "we are bound by the circuit court's findings of fact unless we conclude they are clearly erroneous." Y.Y. v. State, 205 Md. App. 724, 743 (2012). Here the initial offer made by the State was a guilty plea to first and second-degree assault with a 12-year sentence of incarceration.

  5. Belarmino v. State

    No. 168 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 10, 2017)

    The moving party bears the burden of proof with respect to a motion to enforce a plea agreement. Y.Y. v. State, 205 Md. App. 724, 743 (2012) ("[A]ppellant, as the party alleging the breach [of a plea agreement], has the burden of proof on all of his breach of contract claims.") (internal quotations omitted). With these principles in mind, we turn to the circumstances of the present appeal. After considering all of the evidence presented, the motions court ultimately denied the motion to enforce, finding that Belarmino had not proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a plea agreement.

  6. Roach v. State

    No. 2523 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 26, 2016)

    "[I]f a point germane to the appeal is not adequately raised in a party's brief, the court may, and ordinarily should, decline to address it." Abbott v. State, 190 Md. App. 595, 631-32 n.14 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Y.Y. v. State, 205 Md. App. 724, 736 n.9 (2012) (when an appellant's argument is unclear, this Court "will not consider the argument . . . further"); Md. Rule 8-504(a)(5)-(6). In section IV of his brief, entitled "The Circuit Court Should Have Granted Mr. Roach's Motions for Mistrial," Roach states, in subsection (C)(1): "Mr. Roach moved for a mistrial, because of the prejudice of Mr. Moore's absence.