Since a significantly different standard governed Judge Gonzalez's determination that the plaintiff's claims are time-barred, collateral estoppel is not applicable here. See, e.g., Leon v. Murphy, 988 F.2d 303, 308-309 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that state court determination of when claim accrued did not collaterally estop plaintiff from litigating when claim accrued under different federal law standard); Young v. United States, 518 F. Supp. 921, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that prior federal court judgment that consent form was inadequate under Iowa law did not collaterally estop same defendant from litigating whether same consent form was adequate under New York law or national standard) B. Drexel Bankruptcy Malpractice Claim

Res judicata and collateral estoppel should not apply in such a case. See Young v. United States, 518 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (determination under Iowa law did not bar relitigation of issue under New York law); cf Tomanio v. Board of Regents, 603 F, 2d 255, 258 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1979) ( res judicata does not bar plaintiff from bringing federal civil rights and constitutional claims in federal court after losing in state court on state claims arising out of same facts), rev'd on other grounds, 446 U.S. 478, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980). Additionally, as the court stated in Costello, "[t]he focus of that [former] litigation did not afford the legally requisite fair opportunity to consider the date selection that is critical here."