Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-518 SECTION "A"(3)
March 5, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are a Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc 29) and a Motion for Sanctions (Rec. Doc. 28) filed by defendant Galliano Marine Service, L.L.C., erroneously designated as Delta Towing, L.L.C. Plaintiff Lawrence M. Young opposes the motions. The motions, set for hearing on February 11, 2004, are before the Court on the briefs without oral argument. For the reasons that follow, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and the motion for sanctions is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lawrence M. Young ("Young")/ an African-American male, was initially hired by defendant Galliano Marine Service, L.L.C. ("Galliano") on May 24, 2001, in the capacity of relief captain. Young's status was later changed to mate, allegedly due to performance problems. Galliano asserts that Young needed additional training and was not able to operate all functions of the vessel in the position of captain, and consequently he would be better suited for the mate position. Over the course of the eight months that Young was in Galliano's employ, Young was repeatedly reassigned to several vessels. Galliano ultimately terminated Young's employment on January 2, 2000, allegedly due to performance problems. Def. Exh. L.
Young filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging racial discrimination. Def. Exh. M. In the charge, Young named various white employees who were not discharged despite their own poor work performance. The EEOC conducted an investigation and dismissed Young's charge stating that it was unable to conclude that the conduct alleged was unlawful. Def. Exh. R. Young then filed a civil complaint in this Court. Galliano now moves for summary judgment and argues that Young cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Assuming arguendo that Young can establish a prima facie case, Galliano argues that he nevertheless cannot establish that Galliano's reason for terminating him was a pretext for racial discrimination.
In opposition, Young continues to assert that Galliano terminated his employment because he is black. He also asserts that Galliano created a hosfile work environment because he was subjected to comments about his race. Young contends that Galliano knew of the treatment endured by Young but did nothing to remedy the situation. Young asserts that his claim of disparate treatment is evidenced by his replacement by a white male as well as the fact that white crew members who were involved in other accidents were not terminated.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standards
In determining whether a party is entitled to summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Littlefield v. Forney Indep. School Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911 (5th Cir. 1998); Tolson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 604, 608 (5th Cir. 1998)). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citingCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden, as an initial matter, of showing the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 So. Ct. at 2548). If the moving party fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied regardless of the nonmoving party's response. Id.
B. Disparate Treatment Claim
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the United States Supreme Court established a framework for the allocation of burdens and order of presentations of proof in an employment discrimination claim where plaintiff has no direct evidence of discrimination. The complaining party carries the initial burden under Title VII of establishing a prima facie case that the employer discriminated against: him because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. This burden is not onerous; in order to meet this standard, a plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he applied for an available position for which he was qualified but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to discrimination. Texas Dep't of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). The establishment of a prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the defendant unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). The prima facie case is established when the plaintiff shows that (1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) that he was qualified for the position sought; (3) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) someone outside the protected class was treated more favorably than he. Price v. Federal Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506).
If the plaintiff successfully meets this requirement, the burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's rejection. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The defendant is not required to persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons, but it must clearly set forth through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons why the plaintiff was rejected or someone else was preferred. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. If the defendant carries this burden, the presumption of discrimination is rebutted.
The plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion, so he must then have an opportunity to demonstrate that defendant's proffered reasons for plaintiff's rejection are pretext. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. The plaintiff may succeed in shouldering his ultimate burden that he has been the victim of intentional discrimination either by directly persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the defendant or indirectly by showing that the defendant's stated reasons for rejection are unworthy of credence.Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257 (citing Me Donnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-805). Though the burden of production is shifted under the controlling framework, the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuading the court that he "has been the victim of intentional discrimination." Id. at 508 (quoting Burdine 405 U.S. at 256). When a Title VII claim reaches the pretext stage, "the only question on summary judgment is whether there is a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question regarding discrimination." Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 355 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Haynes v. Pennzoil Co., 207 F.3d 296, 300 (5th Cir. 2000)).
Although Galliano argues to the contrary, Young unarguably has established a prima facie case under the controlling framework: He is African-American; he was hired by Galliano as a relief captain/mate so he was surely qualified; he suffered an adverse employment action, i.e., termination; and he was replaced by a white male. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework the burden now shifts to Galliano to come forward with a non-discriminatory reason for terminating Young.
Galliano asserts that it terminated Young due to poor work performance. Although the defendant's burden is not one of persuasion at this point, Galliano has submitted the affidavits of Albert Falgout, Alcide Adams, and Garrett Kelly. Defs. Exhs. G, J, K, respectively. Falgout was Operations Coordinator for Galliano and asserts that Young's incompetence resulted in damage to the M/V COVE EAGLE while Young served as captain of that vessel and that Young was observed violating safety regulations. Def. Exh. G. ¶¶ 6-7.
Alcide Adams states that he was captain aboard the MV DELTA TIDE while Young served as mate. Def. Exh. J ¶ 5. Adams states that he gave Young an unsatisfactory performance evaluation and submitted a disciplinary report when Young left the vessel without permission. Id. ¶¶ 8-12.
Garrett Kelley was captain aboard the M/V DELTA CADET, the vessel upon which Young served as mate until his discharge on January 2, 2002. Def. Exh. K ¶ 4. Kelley states that Young's performance aboard the vessel was unacceptable and did not meet company standards. Id. ¶ 6. Kelley states that he also filed a disciplinary report because Young was caught sleeping on watch on two occasions and improperly operated the vessel's winch. Id. ¶ 6, 11-12.
Based on the foregoing statements, Galliano has proffered sufficient evidence to rebut Young's prima facie case. Therefore, in order to avoid summary judgment, Young must point to some evidence to create a question of fact for the jury that race motivated his termination.
The only evidence offered by Young in opposition to Galliano's motion is his own affidavit in which he attests that he was referred to as a "nigger" on several occasions by supervisors who he does not name. Pla. Aff. ¶ 4. In his deposition Young clarified that the persons who allegedly used racial slurs against him were Phillip Trosclair, Carl Perez, and Miles Breaux. Pla. Depo. (Def. Exh. C) at 178. He also states that several white counterparts had accidents on their vessels but were not fired. Pla. Aff. ¶ 7.
Young also attached his various licenses in order to demonstrate that he was qualified for the mate position. Those licenses do nothing to suggest that Galliano terminated Young because he was black rather than for poor performance on the job.
The racial slurs alleged by Young, while deplorable if true, are insufficient to defeat Galliano's motion for summary judgment. In Patel v. Midland Memorial Hospital Medical Center, the Fifth Circuit recently reiterated that racial slurs in the workplace are insufficient evidence of discrimination by the employer unless they are proximate in time to the adverse employment decision, made by an individual with authority over the employment decision at issue, and related to the employment decision at issue. 298 F.3d 333, 343-44 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Rubinstein v. Admr's of Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2000)). Young offers nothing to demonstrate that any of these requirements are met. Thus, as a matter of law, the alleged racial slurs by co-workers are insufficient to create an issue of fact as to Galliano's true reason for terminating Young.
Young also fails to offer any support for his assertion that white counterparts received preferential treatment. The specific individuals named by Young are Charlie Purser, Tony Leverson, Raleigh Chabert, and Harold Plaisance. Def. Exh. M. Galliano submitted separation notices for all of these employees. Purser voluntarily resigned from employment on September 27, 2001, Def. Exh. N, Levron was fired or. May 19, 2002, Def. Exh. O, Chabert was laid off on January 8, 2002, Def. Exh. ?, and Plaisance was fired on October 18, 2001, Def. Exh. Q. Given that none of the named white counterparts remain Galliano's employ, and given that at least two of them were fired, Young's assertion that white counterparts received more favorable treatment is wholly unsupported by the evidence.
Young actually identified the individuals as Charlie LNU, "Peanut" FNU/LNU, Tony Levron, Captain Reily, and Harold LNU. Def. Exh. M. Galliano was able to identify all of the named employees except "Peanut."
Moreover, none of Young's complaints create questions of fact that Galliano terminated him due to his race. He complains that he was moved from vessel to vessel rather than receiving a permanent assignment but there is no evidence to suggest that race played a part in those transfers. Similarly, Young complains that other crew members were less than congenial towards him but again he offers no evidence that this conduct had anything to do with Galliano's decision to terminate him. In sum, Young has failed to rebut Galliano's proffered non-discriminatory reason for terminating him. Because Young has failed to create a question of fact for the jury, summary judgment is appropriate as to his claim that he was terminated due to racial animus.
C. Hosfile Work Environment Claim
In order to establish a prima facie case of racial harassment constituting hosfile work environment, the plaintiff must show that (1) the employee belongs to a protected group; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on race; (4) the harassment complained of affected a term, condition or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action.Celestine v. Petroleos De Venezuela, 266 F.3d 343, 353 (5th Cir. 2001). For harassment to affect a term, condition or privilege of employment, the conduct must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment," Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). In determining whether a claim of hosfile environment is actionable, the reviewing court must consider all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, the severity of the conduct, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Id. at 787-788 (citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). The above inquiries serve to ensure that Title VII does not become a "a general civility code," Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998), for it is well-settled that the mere utterance of "an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders-offensive feelings in an employee" does not sufficiently alter the terms and conditions of employment in a way that violates Title VII.Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 at 787 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir 1971)). Thus, only when the workplace is "permeated with `discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult' that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment" is Title VII violated. Nat'l Passenger Railroad Co. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. at 21)).
Young meets the first three criteria for establishing a hosfile environment claim in that he is African-American and claims that he was allegedly subjected to unwelcome comments about his race. He fails to establish, however, that the conduct complained of rises to the level sufficient to be deemed "severe and pervasive" in order to invoke the protections of Title VII. Young's allegations are limited to the three separate occasions in which Trosclair, Perez, and Breaux allegedly used the "N-word" in Young's presence. Young states that he is not sure exactly when these slurs occurred although they took place aboard the COVE EAGLE. Pla. Depo. (Def. Exh. C) at 178. In order to recover against an employer under Title VII the slurs must be of such a frequency and pervasiveness so as to alter the conditions of employment. Young alleges three slurs while aboard a single vessel over the eight month period that Galliano employed him. While any racial slur is unacceptable in the workplace, three isolated remarks over an eight month period simply do not rise to the level necessary for recovery under Title VII, See Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615 (5th Cir. 2000) (concluding that slurs spanning the entire three year period of employment were sufficient to avoid summary judgment).
Further, Young cannot establish that Galliano knew or should have known of the alleged harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. Young conclusorily states that Galliano knew of the discrimination, Pla. Aff. ¶ 11, but he admits that he failed to report the racial slurs as required by Galliano's workplace discrimination policy. Def. Exh. B. Instead Young asserts that he told Albert Falgoust, the operations coordinator. Def. Exh. C (Pla. Depo.) at 179. Young does not attempt to explain how his reporting the alleged slurs to Falgoust was sufficient to put Galliano on notice of any racial harassment.
In sum, Young has failed to create an issue of triable fact for his Title VII employment discrimination claims. Young made no arguments regarding his state law claims but Louisiana looks to federal law to decide employment discrimination cases. Johnson v. Louisiana, 351 F.3d 616, 619 (5th Cir. 2003)) (citing Plummer v. Marriott Corp., 654 So.2d 843, 848 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1995)). Therefore, Young's failure to create an issue of fact as to his federal claims also makes dismissal of his state law claims appropriate.
Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 29) filed by defendant Galliano Marine Service, L.L.C. should be and is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Sanctions (Rec. Doc. 28) should be and is hereby DENIED.