Opinion
WWMCV175007166S
03-09-2018
Kenton YOUNG v. THAMES VALLEY COUNCIL FOR COMMUNITY ACTION, INC. et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Cole-Chu, J.
The seven defendants in this case have moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint alleging employment discrimination on the ground that the plaintiff failed to obtain a release of jurisdiction from the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO). " [A] motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). " Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mark v. Neundorf, 147 Conn.App. 485, 489, 83 A.3d 685 (2014). " [T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter, jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003).
The defendants in this employment discrimination are the employer, Thames Valley Council for Community Action, Inc., and six of its employees, Deborah Monahan, Janine Dunn, Maraiah Popeleski, Janice Honvo, Tia Bettencourt, and Anthony Tran.
The Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., bars discrimination against an employee on the basis of race and color. See General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(1); see also § 46a-58(a). The CHRO is an agency created under the CFEPA. See § 46a-51. " Any person who has filed a complaint with the [CHRO] ... and who has obtained a release of jurisdiction ... may bring an action in the superior court ..." General Statutes § 46a-100. The plaintiff neither alleges nor provides evidence of a release of jurisdiction from the CHRO. However, the claimed basis for the present motion does not exist. This action is not brought under the CFEPA, but is an action for employment discrimination based on race, color, and retaliation for opposing discrimination based on race and color under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting discrimination based on race and color); 41 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (prohibiting retaliation for opposing discrimination proscribed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2[a] ). See Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 559, 864 A.2d 1 (2005) (interpretation of pleadings is a question of law for the court).
" Title VII requires that plaintiffs file timely a charge [of employment discrimination] with [the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ] ... If no civil suit is filed by the EEOC or its authorized agent within 180 days of the filing of the charge, then the EEOC must notify the plaintiff by letter ... After receiving such a ‘notice-of-right-to-sue’ letter, a plaintiff can bring a civil action against his or her employer." (Citations omitted.) Pietras v. Board of Fire Commissioners of Farmingville Fire District, 180 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1999). The plaintiff does not allege a notice of right to sue letter was issued by the EEOC. However, issuance of such a letter is not a requirement for this court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s Title VII claim. See Linde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., 147 Conn.App. 730, 744, 84 A.3d 895 (2014). A Title VII notice of right to sue letter is a condition to suit which condition is " subject to equitable tolling, estoppel and waiver." Id. ; see also Ortiz v. Prudential Insurance Co., supra, 94 F.Supp.2d 231 (" failure to obtain a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC is not a fatal jurisdictional bar to suit, [but] only a precondition to bringing a Title VII action that can be waived by the parties or the court" ).
" The [EEOC] [is] charged with the interpretation and enforcement of ... Title VII ..." Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates, P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1986), abrogated on other grounds by Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 123 S.Ct. 1673, 155 L.Ed.2d 615 (2003).
Although not raised as a ground for dismissal, individual employees cannot be held liable under Title VII. See Schaffer v. Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., 889 F.Supp. 41, 43-46 (D.Conn. 1995) (granting motion to dismiss). Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and may be raised by the court sua sponte. Keller v. Beckenstein, 305 Conn. 523, 531-32, 46 A.3d 102 (2012).
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the motion of the defendant employer, Thames Valley Council for Community Action, Inc., to dismiss and, sua sponte, dismisses this action as to the individual defendants Deborah Monahan, Janine Dunn, Maraiah Popeleski, Janice Honvo, Tia Bettencourt, and Anthony Tran.