Opinion
Prisoner Case No. 3:03CV2206(CFD).
July 31, 2006
RULING AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
The petitioner, Michael A. Young, filed this action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, while he was an inmate at the Osborn Correctional Institution in Somers, Connecticut. He now resides in Old Saybrook, Connecticut and is no longer incarcerated. Young challenges a 1990 Connecticut state court conviction in this action. For the reasons set forth below, the amended petition is dismissed.
On November 2, 1990, in the Connecticut Superior Court for the Judicial District of Rockville, Young pled guilty to one count of possession of marijuana and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. (See Am. Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus at 2.) The court sentenced Young to one year of imprisonment (execution suspended), two years' probation, and a $500.00 fine. (See id.) Young does not indicate whether he appealed that conviction, but does allege that he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court. Although that 1990 conviction is the subject of this habeas corpus action, it is necessary to recount other portions of Young's criminal record.
On October 20, 1995, in the Connecticut Superior Court for the Judicial District of Rockville, Young pled guilty to one count of possession of marijuana, two counts of assault in the third degree, one count of interfering with an officer, and one count of disorderly conduct. (See Young v. Strange, et al., Case No. 3:03cv2012 (AWT) (Am. Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus at 2.) On January 11, 1996, the Superior Court sentenced Young to three years of imprisonment (execution suspended after ten months), and three years' probation. (See id.) The 1990 conviction was apparently used to enhance that sentence as a prior drug conviction.
On April 11, 1996, in a different state criminal matter, the Connecticut Superior Court sentenced Young to a 44-month term of imprisonment. (See Am. Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus at 19.) At the time he filed the present petition, he was serving the 44-month sentence.
The Court need not consider the effect on the petition in this action caused by Young's discharge from incarceration on the 44-month sentence.
A prerequisite to filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court for relief from a state court conviction is that the petitioner be "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(3). "The first showing a [section] 2254 petitioner must make is that he is `in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.'" Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Cross, 532 U.S. 394, 401 (2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to require that the "petitioner be `in custody' under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed," Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491-92 (1989) (citations omitted), or under a consecutive sentence imposed at the same time as the conviction or sentence under attack. See Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39, 41 (1995).
In his response to this Court's order, Young states that his sentence pursuant to the November 1990 conviction expired on November 2, 1992. He no longer is in custody pursuant to the November 1990 conviction because the sentence imposed for that conviction was completed prior to his filing the present petition. As such, Young "cannot bring a federal habeas petition directed solely at th[at] conviction." Lackawanna County District Attorney, 531 U.S. at 401.
Young claims, though, that the "in custody" requirement is satisfied in this case because his 1990 conviction was used to directly enhance the 10-month state sentence imposed on him in January 1996 and to indirectly enhance the 44-month sentence he received in April 1996. In Maleng, the Supreme Court held that a habeas petitioner does not remain "in custody" under a conviction after the sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely because that conviction had been used to enhance a subsequent sentence. 490 U.S. at 493. The Court acknowledged, however, that the respondent had "satisfied the `in custody' requirement for federal habeas jurisdiction" because his 2254 petition "[could] be read as asserting a challenge to [his present sentences,] as enhanced by the allegedly invalid prior conviction." Id. at 493-94. Thus, a court may construe a § 2254 petition as "`asserting a challenge to [a present] sentence, as enhanced by [an] allegedly invalid prior conviction.'" Lackawanna County District Attorney, 531 U.S. at 401-02 (quoting Maleng, 490 U.S. at 493.)
The Court declines, however, to construe the petition here as a challenge to Young's 10-month sentence imposed in January 1996 as enhanced by the allegedly invalid November 1990 conviction. That is because Young filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court, Young v. Strange, Case No. 3:03cv2012(AWT), challenging that conviction and sentence. The court dismissed that petition because the petitioner was no longer in custody pursuant to the January 1996 sentence at the time he filed the petition.
In a habeas petition challenging that conviction and sentence, the petitioner acknowledged that he was discharged from that sentence in November 1997. (See Young, Case No. 3:03cv2012(AWT). (Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus at 4.)
The Court also declines to construe the petition as a challenge to his April, 1996 44-month sentence as enhanced by the allegedly invalid November 1990 conviction because the petitioner also filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court,Young v. Strange, Case No. 3:03cv1661 (CFD), challenging that conviction. The court dismissed that petition without prejudice to re-filing on the ground that the petitioner had not exhausted his state court remedies as to the claims in the petition. See id., slip op. at (D. Conn. 2004).
The petitioner has presented no evidence that he has exhausted his state court remedies as to the claims addressed to his 44-month sentence since that order.
Conclusion
The amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus [doc. # 6] is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability will not issue. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment and close this case.SO ORDERED.