This evidence is sufficient to rebut McGowan's entrapment defense and supports the finding that he was predisposed to sell cocaine. See Young v. State, 620 N.E.2d 21, 25 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993), trans. denied; Martin, 537 N.E.2d at 495. Nevertheless, McGowan argues there is no evidence to support a finding that he would have sold the cocaine if he had not been "contacted and prompted by Andry."
This election was prompted by a desire to keep from the jury prejudicial evidence of predisposition apparently involving prior drug incidents.").But see Young v. State (1993), Ind. App., 620 N.E.2d 21, trans. denied:
Cf. Henrichs v. State, 455 N.E.2d 599, 601 (Ind.1983) (appellant “used and understood terminology almost exclusively practiced in the illegal drug traffic trade”); Young v. State, 620 N.E.2d 21, 25 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (appellant used “eight balls” and “sixteenths” for quantities of cocaine and knew the prices for each), trans. denied. The State argues Ferge should not control the outcome herein because “[u]nlike Ferge, there was no evidence that [Griesemer] was in the habit of offering rides to strange women.”
The defense of entrapment is raised once there is evidence that police were involved in the criminal activity. Young v. State (1993), Ind. App., 620 N.E.2d 21, 24, trans. denied.
Factors that "indicate a predisposition to sell drugs include: knowledge of drug prices; knowledge of drug sources and suppliers; use and understanding of terminology of the drug market; solicitation of future drug sales; and multiple sales to undercover officers." Young v. State, 620 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). In this case, Bessler admitted to buying the drugs he sold to Detective Beetz from two different suppliers, and he negotiated the prices with Detective Beetz. Tr. p. 461, 486-88, 505-06.
In considering the proportionality of a sentence enhancement under the HSO statute, we consider the nature of the present offense and the nature of the prior offenses. See Roell v. State, 655 N.E.2d 599 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995) (noting that decisions interpreting the general habitual offender statute are applicable to issues arising under the HSO statute); Young v. State, 620 N.E.2d 21 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993) (considering proportionality claim under general habitual offender statute), trans. denied.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that he was denied a fair trial. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Wickliffe v. State (1988) Ind., 523 N.E.2d 1385; Lawrence v. State (1984) Ind., 464 N.E.2d 1291; Young v. State (1993) 2d Dist. Ind. App., 620 N.E.2d 21, 26, trans. denied, Brown v. State (1992) 2d Dist. Ind. App., 587 N.E.2d 693, 700. Prejudice exists when there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's defective performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.