Opinion
01 Civ. 4566 (GEL)
February 8, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Nancy Young, a citizen of New York, brought this personal injury action against Starbucks Coffee Company, a Washington corporation having its principal place of business in Seattle, Washington, in the Supreme Court of New York, Bronx County, on April 27, 2001, alleging that she was injured due to the negligence of Starbucks employees at a Starbucks coffee shop in Newport, Rhode Island. Starbucks removed the case to this Court, and now moves for a transfer of venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) to the District of Rhode Island. The motion is denied.
Federal law provides that "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a). Since the parties agree that this case could have been brought in the District of Rhode Island, where the alleged tort was committed, we need only determine whether the convenience of the parties and the interests of justice would be served by granting defendant's motion to transfer.
Decisions regarding transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) are left to the discretion of the transferor court. See Filmline (Cross-Country) Prod., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 865 F.2d 513, 520 (2d Cir. 1989). The burden of demonstrating the propriety of the transfer lies with the moving party, who must make a "clear-cut showing that a transfer is in the best interests of the litigation." Dwyer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 853 F. Supp. 690, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citations omitted) (quotations omitted). The factors that courts take into consideration include (1) the convenience of the witnesses; (2) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof, (3) the convenience of the parties; (4) the locus of the operative facts; (5) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) a forum's familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded the plaintiff's choice of forum; and (9) trial efficiency and the interest of justice, based on the totality of the circumstances. See Eskofot A/S v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Co., 872 F. Supp. 81, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
In the abstract, a strong argument for transfer can be made. "The core determination under section 1404(a) is the center of gravity of the litigation, a key test of which is the convenience of nonparty and party witnesses." Bionx Implants, Inc. v. Biomet, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8031, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 1999). Indeed, "[c]ourts routinely transfer cases when the principal events occurred, and the principal witnesses are located, in another district." Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Melvin Simon Productions, 774 F. Supp. 858, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). While courts generally defer to a plaintiff's choice of forum, plaintiff's selection is "given less weight where, as here, the plaintiff is not a resident of the forum and the cause of action is minimally connected with the forum."Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 677 F. Supp. 198, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citations omitted). See also Fontana v. E.A.R., a Division of Cabot Corp., 849 F. Supp. 212, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Cheong v. Okayama Enterprises, Inc., 2000 WL 1404379 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000).
Here, the events in question all occurred in Rhode Island. Young alleges that Rhode Island-based Starbucks employees negligently maintained a Starbucks shop in Rhode Island, where Young allegedly tripped and was injured. Most of the employees and former employees who could testify about the property live in Rhode Island, except one who now lives in Virginia. Moreover, the emergency medical services workers who arrived to transport Young to a local hospital and the doctors who treated her there all live and work in Rhode Island.
In contrast, neither the plaintiff nor her treating doctor nor any of the other witnesses she suggests might testify live in this District. They all live in Nassau County, in the Eastern District of New York. (Taylor Aff. ¶ 4.) Nor was this Court, in fact, the forum chosen by plaintiff, she brought suit in the state court in the Bronx, a forum not especially convenient for any party to the case, and which was likely chosen because of the plaintiff-friendly reputation of Bronx jurors. A plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to considerable deference, and if plaintiff had brought suit in her home district, that factor might well have been controlling. In reality, however, the plaintiff chose a relatively inconvenient forum for tactical reasons, then had the case removed from the chosen court against her will, into a federal court with no connection whatsoever to the dispute. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff's choice of forum is not entitled to controlling weight.
Other considerations, however, oppose transfer. The strongest argument against transfer is that, in view of the relative means of the parties, the Court should favor the convenience of the plaintiff over that of the defendant. Plaintiff, an individual with no apparent ties to Rhode Island, will be seriously burdened by having to retain counsel in Rhode Island and maintain a litigation there, at considerable distance from her home. Though, as noted, she is not a resident of this district, she is located within the New York metropolitan area, approximately as convenient to this Court as she is to either courthouse in the Eastern District of New York; to travel to Rhode Island she would have to pass through this district. Starbucks, in contrast, is a corporation with nationwide operations, which must expect to engage in litigation of this kind all over the country. Of the two most likely employee-witnesses, while one lives in Rhode Island, the other lives in Virginia, so that New York is most likely a more convenient trip for him than Rhode Island.
As far as non-party witnesses are concerned, there are medical witnesses who provided emergency treatment in Rhode Island and others who provided plaintiff with on-going medical care in New York. Hence, balancing the convenience of the non-party witnesses or their amenability to service in either jurisdiction appears to be a wash. (Of course, expert witnesses could be retained in either jurisdiction.) Moreover, given modern transportation and communication possibilities, the reality is that it makes little difference where this litigation is held. Cases of this kind are extremely likely to settle, and the discovery that will be necessary for the parties to evaluate the claim fairly will be conducted at the witnesses' convenience in any case. Until and unless the case goes to trial, the only consequence attached to where the case is officially maintained is where the lawyers will have to go for occasional conferences (and even those can be held by telephone). Both parties already have lawyers here in New York, and the burden of finding new lawyers or paying additional expenses for lawyers' travel time will fall more heavily on plaintiff if a transfer is ordered.
Finally, a change of venue can be ordered at any time. See Wright, Miller Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3844 at 334-35 (2d ed. 1986). If it turns out that the case does have to be tried, there will be plenty of time then — when the Court has a fuller record and the parties have a clearer idea of what witnesses will actually be important for trial — to decide whether the amenability to process or convenience of those witnesses will be furthered by transfering the case to Rhode Island.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that Starbucks has made the required "clearcut showing" not merely that Rhode Island might be a more logical place for trial, but that "a transfer is in the best interests of the litigation." Dwyer, 853 F. Supp. at 692.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to transfer this action to the District of Rhode Island is denied.
SO ORDERED.