Opinion
May 4, 1949.
Appeal from Supreme Court, Ulster County.
Present — Foster, P J., Heffernan, Brewster, Deyo and Santry, JJ.
On the day of the accident the plaintiff, a trained nurse, worked professionally in the home of one of the defendants from 8:00 A.M. until about 8:30 P.M. The premises which were owned by the defendants were used as combined residence and physician's office by Dr. Sonking, one of the defendants, and his family. At about 8:30 in the evening the plaintiff prepared to leave for home. Dr. Sonking escorted her to the front door of the residence, turned on an overhead porch light and as she passed on to the porch closed the door. The plaintiff walked across the porch which was about eight feet wide, slipped on the top step leading from the porch to the street, and was injured. It is conceded that there was ice on the steps and that they were slippery. It was claimed on behalf of the plaintiff that due to a recent storm, the walks and streets in the vicinity were in an icy condition; that when plaintiff came to work in the morning she entered the premises by the walk and steps leading to the office, which were some fifteen feet from the steps where she fell, and that she warned the doctor that the walks and steps were slippery and that he promised to take care of them, but that he did nothing about the steps; that when she was leaving the house at night she walked carefully across the porch; that she did not notice the icy condition of the steps; that when she was about a foot from the edge of the porch and about ready to step onto the first step the defendant turned off the porch light; that she tried in the darkness to reach the pillar holding up the porch, and that as she put her foot on the icy top step she slipped and fell. The defendants denied that the plaintiff warned the doctor about the steps where she fell or that he turned off the porch light. They also claim that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. The conflicting testimony presented questions of fact for the jury, and the verdict was not against the weight of evidence. On the trial the defendants swore an insurance adjuster with reference to a statement which he had taken from the plaintiff relative to the accident. On cross-examination the plaintiff, over objection, was permitted to develop from the witness that when he took the statement he was employed by an insurance company which had liability coverage on the premises of the defendants where the accident occurred. The trial court carefully instructed the jury that this testimony was to be considered by them only on the question of the interest of the witness and for no other purpose. The plaintiff was entitled to show the interest or bias of the witness by any competent testimony, even though the facts developed might incidentally be prejudicial to the defendants. There was no error in the admission of this evidence. ( Wood v. New York State Elec. Gas Corp., 257 App. Div. 172, affd. 281 N.Y. 797; Keet v. Murrin, 260 N.Y. 586.) Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs.