Opinion
Case No. CV00-343-E-LMB.
July 3, 2001
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
Currently pending before the Court are Defendant KIFI's Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively Motion for More Definite Statement (Docket No. 13), Defendants Steven Miller, Kurt Friedmann, and Oregon Trail Broadcasting Company's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 18), and Defendant Garry Pritchett's Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 26).
Having carefully reviewed the record, and otherwise being fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum Decision and Order.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Harold Atchison Young commenced the instant action pro se, asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights against various media organizations and a police officer with the Pocatello Police Department. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants defamed him by disclosing information to the public concerning the fact that he is a convicted sex offender, and that he was just released from Washington state prison after serving twenty years (20) and intends to move to Pocatello, Idaho. Plaintiff further alleges that he was wrongfully convicted and that the dissemination of information by Defendants concerning his alleged wrongful conviction has "caused [him] unnecessary stress in finding and gaining employment, and [he] has been in fact discriminated against by" certain Pocatello businesses because of Defendants' conduct. Plaintiff filed suit against Lt. Garry Pritchett with the Pocatello Police Department, who was the lieutenant responsible for leading a press conference on Plaintiff's presence in Pocatello, as well as against various television stations which aired the news story, including KPIV-TV Channel 6, KIDK-TV Channel 3, and KIFI-TV Channel 8, and against Steve Miller and Kurt Friedmann personally, a reporter and editor for the newspaper, the Idaho State Journal.
All of the Defendants, except for KIDK-TV Channel 3 which has never been sewed, have filed various motions ultimately seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs Complaint on both procedural and substantive wounds. Defendants' motions are the subject of this Memorandum Decision and Order.
II. ANALYSIS
All of the Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5) (insufficiency of service of process) based on Plaintiff's failure to effect service as required under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4. In addition, Defendants KIFI-TV and Pritchett seek dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) (lack of jurisdiction) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted). Defendant Pritchett's Motion to Dismiss is entitled "Motion to Dismiss, or, In the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment." Because the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court concludes that his Complaint should be dismissed on this basis and will not address the parties' insufficiency of service of process arguments.
A. Standard for Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summon' Judgment
When analyzing a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true the factual allegations contained in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff Mishler v. Clift, 191 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 1999). Dismissal is improper unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief. Id. Thus, "'[t]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether [he] is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.'" Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1274 (9th Cir. 1993) (emphasis in the original).
Generally, with respect to Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the Court may not consider matters contained outside the pleadings. "If matters external to the pleadings are presented to the Court and not excluded, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim should be treated as a motion for summary judgment" under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Rosales v. United States, 824 F.2d 799, 802 (9th Cir. 1987); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). With respect to allegations in a pro se complaint, said allegations are generally held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).
In the instant action, Plaintiff has submitted for the Court's consideration various documents not contained or referred to in his Complaint, including copies of the newspaper articles which appear to be at the heart of his Complaint (Docket No. 12), and an affidavit from Sheriff Lorin W. Nielsen (Docket No. 38). In light of these submissions by Plaintiff, the Court will treat the various Motions to Dismiss as a motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs motions for summary judgment, provides, in pertinent part, that judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that under Rule 56, summary judgment is required if the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element which is essential to his case and upon which he or she will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). If the nonmoving party fails to make such a showing on any essential element of his case, "there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 323.
See also Rule 56(e), which provides in part:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Under Rule 56 it is clear that an issue, in order to preclude entry of summary judgment, must be both "material" and "genuine." An issue is "material" if it affects the outcome of the litigation. An issue is "genuine" when there is "sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute . . . to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial," Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 463 (1st Cir. 1975) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., Inc., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)), or when the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 212 (1986). The Ninth Circuit cases are in accord. See British Motor Car Distrib., Ltd. v. San Francisco Automotive Indus. Welfare Fund, 882 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1989).
In ruling on summary judgment motions, the court does not resolve conflicting evidence with respect to disputed material facts, nor does it make credibility determinations. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1987). Moreover, all inferences must be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 631. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, "[p]ut another way, if a rational trier of fact might resolve the issue in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment must be denied." Id.
In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit has held that a nonmoving party:
(1) must make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact with respect to any element for which it bears the burden of proof; (2) must show that there is an issue that may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party; and (3) must come forward with more persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary when the factual context makes the nonmoving party's claim implausible.British Motor Car Distrib., 882 F.2d at 374 (citation omitted). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held that where the moving party meets its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must "produce "specific facts showing that there remains a genuine factual issue for trial' and evidence "significantly probative' as to any [material] fact claimed to be disputed." Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1979)).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has acknowledged that in recent years the Supreme Court, "by clarifying what the nonmoving party must do to withstand a motion for summary judgment, has increased the utility of summary judgment." California Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987). As the Ninth Circuit has expressly stated: "No longer can it be argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact precludes the use of summary judgment." Id.
In addressing the application of the "Summary Judgment Test," the Ninth Circuit has specifically explained that:
A "material" fact is one that is relevant to an element of a claim or defense and whose existence might affect the outcome of the suit. The materiality of a fact is thus determined by the substantive law governing the claim or defense. Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)) (emphasis added).
B. Plaintiff's § 1983 Claim
In his Complaint, with respect to the issue of jurisdiction, Plaintiff alleges the following:
This is a civil action seeking judgment, relief and/or damages to defend and protect the rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. This Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331, [ 28 U.S.C. §] 1343(a)(3) and (4) and [ 28 U.S.C. §] 2201. This action is allowed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(Docket No. 1). Thus, Plaintiff alleges federal question jurisdiction as a jurisdictional basis for his Complaint.
Initially, the Court notes that, although Plaintiff alleges that federal jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, the federal declaratory judgment statute, Plaintiff does not seek any declaratory relief in his Complaint. Because Plaintiff does not seek any declaratory relief in his Complaint, the Court concludes that 28 U.S.C. § 2201 is an improper basis to assert jurisdiction over this action. Instead, the only question before this Court is whether Plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence to establish the prima facie elements of a cognizable cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
"To make out a cause of action under section 1983, plaintiffs must plead that (1) the defendants acting under color of state law (2) deprived plaintiffs of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes." Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). The express language in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 makes it clear that its prohibitions apply only to state actors or those acting under color of law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Because Plaintiff has failed to allege in his Complaint, nor has he presented any evidence to suggest that any of the privately-owned television stations, or the individual employees of the Idaho State Journal ( i.e., Steve Miller and Kurt Friedman) are state actors, or that any of these individuals or entities were acting under color of law during the events in question, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Defendants KPIV-TV Channel 6, KIDK-TV Channel 3, KIFI-TV Channel 8, Steve Miller and Kurt Friedman should be dismissed.
Defendant Pritchett is the only defendant who can reasonably be perceived as a state actor, since it is his conduct as a lieutenant with the Pocatello Police Department which is at issue here. In this regard, it is undisputed that Defendant Pritchett was acting under the color of law at the time of the events in question. Consequently, the only question before this Court, concerning Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Defendant Pritchett, is whether Plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence to establish that he has been deprived of a constitutionally protected right.
Plaintiff argues that by disseminating to the public that he is a convicted sex offender and the circumstances leading up to his conviction, as well as the fact that he intended to reside in Pocatello following his release from a Washington state prison, Defendant Pritchett has defamed him, making it difficult for him to obtain employment in the Pocatello area. Plaintiff contends that he was wrongfully convicted and that, by disseminating to the public that he is a convicted sex offender, Defendant has committed perjury and is guilty of slander.
Defendant Pritchett argues that Plaintiffs § 1983 claim against him should be dismissed because the dissemination of the fact of Plaintiff's conviction and his presence in Pocatello does not violate any of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Because no constitutional violation occurred, Defendant Pritchett argues that Plaintiff's § 1983 claim should be dismissed and, consequently, this action should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to establish a constitutional violation necessary to support his § 1983 claim.
Plaintiffs Complaint appears to state a traditional claim for defamation under state law. Indeed, with respect to the private individual Defendants named in his Complaint, Plaintiff has pled nothing more than a claim for defamation under state law. With respect to Defendant Pritchett who was a state actor, however, Plaintiff's implicit argument is that his defamation claim is transmuted into one for deprivation by the State of his constitutional rights. The United States Supreme Court, however, specifically rejected such a claim in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976).
In Paul, the United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had no right to due process before local police officers posted his picture in various retail establishments, identifying him as an "Active Shoplifter." The plaintiff in Paul had filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging his procedural due process rights were violated and that he had been deprived of his constitutional right to privacy. The Supreme Court in Paul held that the mere defamation of an individual by a state actor was insufficient to invoke the guarantees of procedural due process absent an accompanying loss of a state guaranteed right, such as a guaranteed right to continued government employment in certain circumstances. Id. at 706-12, 96 S.Ct. at 1163-66. The Supreme Court in Paul also rejected the plaintiff's right to privacy claim, after noting that said claim was based on the mere publicizing of a record of an official act such as an arrest and that none of its prior decisions concerning substantive privacy had ever held that such conduct invaded any of the various "zones of privacy" recognized under the United States Constitution, such as marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships and child rearing and education. Id. at 713, 96 S.Ct. at 1166.
In addition, the Court in the instant action recognizes an important distinction between the plaintiff in Paul and Plaintiff Young here. Unlike Plaintiff Young, the plaintiff in Paul was never convicted of shoplifting; instead, charges of shoplifting had been pending at the time the posters were circulated, but were later dismissed after circulation of the posters. Thus, while the plaintiff in Paul may have had a sufficient basis to assert a defamation claim, the United States Supreme Court nonetheless held that defamation alone did not state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 712-13, 96 S.Ct. at 1166.
In comparison, this Court has concerns about the validity of Plaintiff Young's defamation claim. Although he claims that he was wrongfully convicted, there is no dispute that he was convicted following a prior adversarial proceeding. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that "[a]n inmate who has been convicted of a sex crime in a prior adversarial setting, whether as the result of a bench trial, jury trial, or plea agreement, has received the minimum protections required by due process." Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 831 (9th Cir. 1997).
The truth of the matter asserted is an affirmative defense to a claim of defamation. Plaintiff in the instant action fails to identify exactly what statements were made by Defendant Pritchett which he alleges to be false. Nevertheless, regardless of the validity of Plaintiff's defamation claim, it is clear under Paul that a defamation claim standing alone is insufficient to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See also Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a convicted sex offender's § 1983 claim against various state officials, after concluding that the collection and dissemination of information under the Washington state statute requiring registration and notification of convicted sex offenders did not violate any protected privacy interest, nor did it amount to a deprivation of liberty or property); In Re Meyer, 16 P.3d 563, 620 (Wash. 2001) (rejecting convicted sex offenders' right of privacy claims, after noting that registration and notification statute simply allowed disclosure of information "available from public sources like the court files . . . as well as [the individuals'] correctional release plans," and that the "public interest in information about potentially dangerous individuals in local neighborhoods [was] legitimate").
Based on the above analysis, this Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to establish a constitutional violation necessary to support his § 1983 claim; therefore, said claim is dismissed.
III. ORDER
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
(1) Defendant KIFI's Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively Motion for More Definite Statement (Docket No. 13) and Defendant Garry Pritchett's Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 26) are GRANTED, thereby dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint against them in its entirety.
(2) Defendants Steven Miller, Kurt Friedmann, and Oregon Trail Broadcasting Company's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 18), which is based on Plaintiff's alleged failure to effect proper service, is MOOT.
(3) Plaintiffs Complaint asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED this 3rd day of July, 2001.
LARRY M. BOYLE CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE