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finding structure to be a "platform rig" because it was "an offshore structure affixed to the subsoil and seabed on the outer-continental shelf"
Summary of this case from Derouen v. Entergy Corp.Opinion
Civ. No. 99-827, SECTION "C" (1).
January 31, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Defendant Pool Company ("Pool") moves this Court for summary judgment. This motion requires the Court to determine whether Plaintiff Andrew Young ("Young") qualifies as a "seaman" under the Jones Act, 46 App. U.S.C. § 688. After considering the parties' briefs, the record, and all other relevant material, the Court finds that Andrew Young is not a Jones Act seaman because he did not work aboard a vessel and his intermittent duties aboard seagoing vessels to load and unload cargo were insufficient to constitute a substantial connection to a vessel. Accordingly, the Court grants Pool Company's motion for summary judgment.
I. CASE HISTORY
On March 13, 1998, Young, a Pool employee, was working in connection with his permanent assignment to Pool's platform Rig No. 10. In the course of his duties unloading a supply vessel, the M/V MISS ALLISON, Young allegedly sustained a severe debilitating injury to the tip of the middle finger of his right hand when a load of drilling pipe unexpectedly shifted and slipped. As a result of the accidental injury, Pool provided compensation to Young under the Longshore and Harborworkers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 900, et seq. ("LHWCA"), at a rate of $346.98 per week based upon Young's preinjury average weekly wage of $520.46. Pool provided these payments from the date of the accident through July 6, 1998, the date on which Young was deemed capable of returning to work. From July 6, 1998 through October 8, 1998, Pool paid benefits for loss of the tip of a finger as scheduled under the LHWCA. Likewise, as mandated by the LHWCA, Pool fully paid Young's medical benefits.
On March 12, 1999, Young filed suit in this Court against Pool. Young seeks recovery against Pool as a Jones Act seaman in addition to the compensation he has already received under the LHWCA. Pool contests Young's right to recovery by arguing that Young is not a Jones Act seaman under the applicable standards.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard for Summary Judgment
This Court can grant a motion for summary judgment only when the "`pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). A factual dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Beck v. Somerset Technologies, Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
After the moving party asserts that there is no genuine dispute, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence of the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id. The mere argued existence of a factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative," summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (citations omitted).
B. Jones Act Seaman Analysis
Pool permanently assigned Young to Rig No. 10 from the date his employment began on June 17, 1996 to the date it ended on January 5, 1999. Rig No. 10 is an offshore structure affixed to the subsoil and seabed of the outer-continental shelf. A platform rig, such as Pool's Rig No. 10, is not a "vessel" under the Jones Act. See Johnson v. Odeco Oil and Gas Co., 864 F.2d 40, 43 (5th Cir. 1989) (fixed drilling platform not a vessel for Jones Act purposes). Offshore structures are governed by the provisions of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331, et seq. ("OCSLA"), which limits injured workers to the LHWCA as their exclusive remedy. See 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (b). Permanent assignment to a fixed platform rig without any further evidence of other duties precludes a maritime worker from claiming Jones Act seaman status. See, e.g., Garner v. Pool Co. of Texas, 595 So.2d 751, 752-53 (La.Ct.App. 1992).
The Jones Act and the LHWCA each provide a mutually exclusive remedy to injured maritime workers. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 355-56, 115 S.Ct. 2172, 2183-84, 132 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995). Each law provides different remedies to a different class of maritime workers. The Jones Act provides a cause of action in negligence to "any seaman," 46 App. U.S.C. § 688 (a), while the LHWCA provides scheduled compensation as the exclusive remedy for land-based maritime employees, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (a). Therefore, Young must establish some connection to a vessel in navigation to assert a Jones Act claim. Otherwise, Pool has already satisfied any compensation due Young by complying with the provisions of the LHWCA.
1. Test for Seaman Status
The issue of seaman status under the Jones Act is "a mixed question of law and fact." Harbor Tug Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 554, 117 S.Ct. 1535, 1540, 137 L.Ed.2d 800 (1997). "The inquiry . . . is of necessity fact specific; it will depend on the nature of the vessel and the employee's precise relation to it." McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 356, 111 S.Ct. 807, 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991) (citing Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187, 190, 72 S.Ct. 216, 218, 96 L.Ed. 205 (1952)). Summary Judgment is appropriate only if "the facts and the law will reasonably support only one conclusion." McDermott, 498 U.S. at 356, 111 S.Ct. at 818.
In Chandris, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for determining whether maritime workers qualify as seamen. See 515 U.S. at 368, 115 S.Ct. at 2190. First, an employee's duties must "contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission." Id. Second, the employee must have "a connection to a vessel in navigation . . . that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature." Id. Therefore, a court applying the two-prong test must examine the "total circumstances" of a maritime worker's employment "to determine whether he had a sufficient relation to the navigation of vessels and the perils attendant thereon." Id. at 370, 115 S.Ct. at 2190 (internal quotation omitted). The test ultimately serves to differentiate between "a member of the vessel's crew [and] . . . simply a land-based employee who happens to be working on the vessel at a given time." Id.
2. Application of the Chandris Test
Young's loading and unloading of the supply barge on which he was injured undoubtedly contributed to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its mission and thus satisfied the broad first prong of the Chandris test. The issue here is whether Young satisfied the second prong of the Chandris test; in other words, whether his connection to the vessel was substantial in terms of both duration and nature.
Pool readily admits that it assigned Young to a jackup rig, which does qualify as a vessel, for a period of one week, December 4-11, 1997, as an emergency substitute for another Pool employee. That short one week assignment compared to three years of permanent stationing aboard a fixed platform rig surely does not constitute a substantial connection to a vessel either in duration or in nature. Compare Harbor Tug (one day painting job aboard tug was insufficient to establish substantial connection necessary for Jones Act seaman status) and Wisner v. Professional Divers of New Orleans, 731 So.2d 200 (La. 1999) (diver who spent ninety percent of his work life aboard vessels was a Jones Act seaman).
Young's only other connection to seafaring vessels is the loading and unloading of supply vessels for Rig No. 10. Young brings forth no evidence to prove these duties resulted in a substantial connection in either duration or nature to vessels in navigation. His mere assertion that "he spent a substantial amount of [his employment with Pool Company] . . . in assisting the unloading or loading of boats, ships and other vessels" does not suffice to bear his burden to prove the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Pl.'s Mem. Opp. Summ. J., Aff. of Andrew Young.
In Chandris, the Supreme Court held that "where undisputed facts reveal that a maritime worker has a clearly inadequate temporal connection to vessels in navigation, the court may take the question from the jury by granting summary judgment or a directed verdict." 515 U.S. at 371, 115 S.Ct. at 2191. The general test in the Fifth Circuit is that a maritime worker must spend at least thirty percent of his time on a vessel in navigation to qualify as a Jones Act seaman. See Palmer v. Fayard Moving and Transportation Corp., 930 F.2d 437, 439 (5th Cir. 1991); Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1076 (5th Cir. 1986). Young's mere assertions of"substantial" periods in connection with vessels in navigation neither suffices the thirty percent test nor any other test that other courts might apply.
Young cites Gumpert v. Pittman Construction Co., 736 So.2d 1026 (La.Ct.App. 1999), to support his argument. The Louisiana Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, found that claimants in that case were working on a vessel when they were injured. Therefore, this Court finds Gumpert unpersuasive in the instant case.
Therefore, looking at the totality of Young's employment with Pool by examining both the duration and nature of his connections to vessels in navigation, this Court finds, as a matter of law, that Young cannot qualify as a Jones Act seaman under the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Chandris.
III. CONCLUSION
As explained above, Pool permanently assigned Young to a rig affixed to the outer-continental shelf. Thus, without any further connection to vessels in navigation, Young could not qualify as a Jones Act seaman. His one week assignment on a jackup rig is clearly insufficient to establish such a connection. He asserts that his loading and unloading duties to supply the fixed rig provided "substantial" connections to vessels in navigation but brings forth no further evidence of the duration and nature of his connection to vessels in navigation. That statement alone does not bring forth any genuine issue of material fact to be heard by a jury at trial and thus fails to meet Young's burden to bring forth a genuine issue of material fact to defeat Pool's motion for summary judgment. Therefore, Young, as a matter of law, cannot qualify as a Jones Act seaman. His only remedy is compensation under the LHWCA, which Pool has already provided.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Pool Company's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 31 day of January, 2000.