Young v. Nichols

Full title: Robert E. Young, Plaintiff, v. Sheriff Ron Nichols, et al., Defendants

Court: United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division

Date published: Sep 28, 2006

Civil Action 2:06-cv-00531 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 28, 2006)

Opinion

Civil Action 2:06-cv-00531.

September 28, 2006

ORDER

GEORGE SMITH, District Judge

Plaintiff Robert E. Young, an inmate at the Northside Correctional Institution, Una, South Carolina, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants illegally arrested him, denied him medical treatment, and caused him to be extradited to South Carolina. This matter is before the Court on plaintiff Young's September 25, 2006 motion under Rule 59(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. to alter or amend judgment. (Doc. 12.) This suit is barred by the statute of limitations. In support of his motion to alter or amend judgment, plaintiff argues that his suit is timely under the Ohio Savings Statute, Ohio Revised Code § 2305.19(A). The alleged actionable conduct occurred during the period November 2000 through December 2002. On November 30, 2003, Young filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina alleging that the defendant Ohio and South Carolina officers illegally extradited him from Ohio to South Carolina. Young v. Nickols, Case No. 6:03CV03640. On February 19, 2004, judgment was entered dismissing the Ohio defendants without prejudice because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. Id. doc. 20. It dismissed the South Carolina defendants without prejudice on the ground that the claims against them were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) because Young's criminal conviction had not been set aside. Young appealed that judgment as to the South Carolina defendants, but not as to the Ohio defendants. Young v. Nickols, 413 F.3d 416, 418 (4^th Cir. 2005).

There is a two year statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989) ( en banc). The actionable events occurred no later than December 2002. Thus, unless tolled, the statute of limitations bars this lawsuit.

Recognizing that the more than two years has passed since the actionable events alleged in the complaint, plaintiff argues that his suit is timely under the Ohio Savings Statute, Ohio Revised Code § 2305.19(A). That statute provides:

(A) In any action that is commenced or attempted to be commenced, if in due time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff or, if the plaintiff dies and the cause of action survives, the plaintiff's representative may commence a new action within one year after the date of the reversal of the judgment or the plaintiff's failure otherwise than upon the merits or within the period of the original applicable statute of limitations, whichever occurs later. This division applies to any claim asserted in any pleading by a defendant.

Here Young's South Carolina § 1983 suit against the Ohio defendants failed otherwise than on the merits on February 19, 2004, when the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina entered judgment dismissing them for failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over them. Young v. Nickols, Case No. 6:03CV03640 (doc. 20). Assuming Ohio's Savings Statute applies to this action under § 1983, see Harris v. Canton, 725 F.2d 371, 377 (6^th Cir. 1984), Young had one year from February 19, 2004 to file suit against the Ohio defendants. He failed to do so.

Accordingly, plaintiff Young's September 25, 2006 motion under Rule 59(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. to alter or amend judgment (doc. 12) is DENIED.