Opinion
CV 20-10718-ODW(E)
03-03-2021
ZURI S.K. YOUNG, Petitioner, v. GAVIN NEWSOM, GOV., ET AL., Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CHARLES F. EICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Otis D. Wright II, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
PROCEEDINGS
On November 12, 2020, Petitioner, a state prisoner, filed a “Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Following a transfer of the Petition to the Central District of California, Petitioner filed “Petitioner's Timely Traverse etc.” and “Petitioner's Good Cause Request etc.” on January 4, 2021. Respondent filed a “Motion to Dismiss etc.” on January 22, 2021. Petitioner filed a “Traverse and Return etc.” on January 25, 2021, and “Petitioner's Opposition etc.” on February 17, 2021.
SUMMARY OF PETITIONER'S CLAIMS
The Petition appear to allege two claims:
1. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and the state courts erred in failing to enforce Petitioner's asserted right to accelerated parole consideration under Proposition 57 (Cal. Const., Art. I, § 32(a)(1)) (“Claim 1”); and
2. Petitioner's 1998 Three Strikes sentence is constitutionally infirm and is in breach of the plea agreement underlying Petitioner's 1993 conviction (“Claim 2”).
DISCUSSION
I. Claim 1 fails to state a claim cognizable on federal habeas corpus.
Federal habeas corpus relief may be granted “only on the ground that [Petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). “There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Therefore, substantive errors in the application of state parole laws are not redressable through federal habeas corpus. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 222 (2011).
In Claim 1, Petitioner argues that the state authorities, i.e. the CDCR and the state courts, have misinterpreted Proposition 57 or otherwise have failed to recognize and enforce Petitioner's asserted rights thereunder. Such argument fails to state any claim cognizable on federal habeas corpus. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. at 222 (“a mere error of state law is not a denial of due process”) (citation and quotations omitted); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (per curiam) (“it is only noncompliance with federal law that renders a State's criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts”) (original emphasis); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“it is not the province of a federal habeas corpus court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions”); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Federal habeas will not lie for errors of state law”). In his arguments, Petitioner does invoke certain general principles of federal constitutional law. However, a habeas petitioner may not “transform a state law issue into a federal one” merely by invoking general principles of federal constitutional law. Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 881 (1997).
Indeed, the district courts in all of the federal districts in California agree that prisoners' claims of eligibility for accelerated parole consideration under Proposition 57 fail to raise a cognizable federal issue. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Jaime, 2021 WL 597874, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2021); Chubbuck v. Brown, 2021 WL 22433, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2021); Johnson v. Federal Court Judges, 2020 WL 758787, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2020); Rodriguez v. Neuschmid, 2019 WL 6251237, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2019); Inman v. Koenig, 2019 WL 7484747, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2019), adopted, 2020 WL 58273 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2020); Blanco v. Asuncion, 2019 WL 2144452, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 16, 2019), adopted, 2019 WL 3562215 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2019).
Petitioner also appears to criticize the summary nature of the state courts' habeas denials. Such criticism does not state a claim cognizable on federal habeas corpus. The summary nature of a state court's ruling on a habeas corpus petition does not offend the federal constitution. See, e.g., Owens v. Nool, 2010 WL 144364 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2010) (dismissing habeas petitioner's claim that the California Court of Appeal “erred in failing to state, in a written opinion, its reasons for denying petitioner's petition”); Stewart v. Sisto, 2008 WL 5178835, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2008) (“there is no federal constitutional prohibition preventing state courts from disposing of [the petitioner's] post-conviction claims in a summary fashion. Nor is there a federal requirement that state courts consider post-conviction claims with a full discussion of the merits”); see also Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1012 (1989) (allegations of procedural error in state's post-conviction review are not addressable through habeas corpus proceedings).
II. The Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Claim 2 at this time.
Claim 2 purports to challenge the legality of Petitioner's 1998 and/or 1993 state court criminal judgments. Petitioner previously challenged these same state court judgments in habeas corpus petitions filed in this Court. See Young v. Terhune, CV 98-6530-AHM(E) (challenging 1993 judgment); Young v. Terhune, ED CV 01-474-GLT(E) (challenging 1998 judgment). The Court denied and dismissed those previous habeas petitions on the merits and with prejudice.
This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Claim 2 because the claim is “second or successive” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. section 2244(b). See Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 157 (2007) (where petitioner did not receive authorization from Court of Appeal before filing second or successive petition, “the District Court was without jurisdiction to entertain [the petition]”); Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000) (“the prior-appellate-review mechanism set forth in § 2244(b) requires the permission of the court of appeals before ‘a second or successive habeas application under § 2254' may be commenced”); see also Rule 9 of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. A petition need not be repetitive to be “second or successive, ” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. section 2244(b). See, e.g., Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 920-21 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 965 (1998); Calbert v. Marshall, 2008 WL 649798, at *2-4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2008). This Court has rejected several previous attempts by Petitioner to bring “second or successive” habeas claims. See, e.g., Young v. People, CV 19-1336-AG (E); Young v. State of California, ED CV 11-566-AHM(E); Young v. Horel, ED CV 08-454-AHM(E); Young v. Harrison, CV 04-9884-AHM(E).
This conclusion also applies to any portion of Claim 1 challenging Petitioner's existing sentence, as distinguished from Petitioner's parole status.
According to the docket of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, available on the PACER database, no individual named Zuri Young has obtained an order from the Ninth Circuit permitting the filing of a successive habeas petition in this Court. See Mir v. Little Company of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988) (court may take judicial notice of court records). Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Claim 2 at this time.
The Court need not and does not reach any of the other issues raised in Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) accepting and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) denying and dismissing the Petition without prejudice.
For the reasons discussed herein, Petitioner's requests for an evidentiary hearing and sanctions are also denied.
NOTICE
Reports and Recommendations are not appealable to the Court of Appeals, but may be subject to the right of any party to file objections as provided in the Local Rules Governing the Duties of Magistrate Judges and review by the District Judge whose initials appear in the docket number. No. notice of appeal pursuant to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should be filed until entry of the judgment of the District Court.
If the District Judge enters judgment adverse to Petitioner, the District Judge will, at the same time, issue or deny a certificate of appealability. Within twenty (20) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation, the parties may file written arguments regarding whether a certificate of appealability should issue.