Opinion
Civil Action No. 95-2760 (NHP).
March 19, 1999
Mr. Norris Young, ADULT DIAGNOSTIC AND TREATMENT CENTER, Avenel, N.J., Plaintiff Pro Se.
Andrew R. Sapolnick, Deputy, Attorney General PETER VERNIERO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY, Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of Law, Hughes Justice Complex, CN ll2, Trenton, N.J., Attorneys for Defendants.
LETTER OPINION ORIGINAL ON FILE WITH CLERK OF THE COURT
Dear Litigants:
This matter comes before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). For the reasons explained below, defendants motion is GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Young is an inmate currently incarcerated at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center in Avenel, New Jersey. This civil rights action arises out of a February 23, 1995 altercation between Young and Corrections Lieutenant Charles Morris. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Young insulted defendant Morris' mother and that Morris responded with excessive force, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, when he grabbed Young by the neck and collar and then pushed him against a gate. Plaintiff also alleges that Senior Corrections Officers Guy Cirillo and Victor Scaturro violated his rights by failing to intervene and by submitting false reports regarding the incident.DISCUSSION
Motions to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(c) are governed by the same standards of legal sufficiency applicable to 12(b)(6) motions. In this case, however, both parties have relied on materials outside the pleadings. The Court will therefore treat defendants' motion as a motion for summary judgment. See Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 578-79 (3d Cir. 1996).
I. Summary Judgment
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may only be granted if, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 896 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987). Summary judgment may be granted against a party who fails to adduce facts sufficient to establish the existence of any element essential to that party's case, for which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying evidence which demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. Once that burden has been met, the nonmoving party must set forth "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," or the factual record will be taken as presented by the moving party and judgment will be entered as a matter of law. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
The nonmovant must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. at 586. Speculation, conclusory allegations, and mere denials are not enough to raise genuine issues of material fact. To defeat "a properly supported summary judgment motion, the party opposing it must present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in its favor." Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995).
A. Excessive Force
Turning first to plaintiff's claim of excessive force, plaintiff does not allege that he was physically injured as a result of the incident with defendant Morris. Although the absence of injury does not necessarily mean that the force was not excessive, it is certainly an important factor to be considered as part of the totality. See Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997). Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that "the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of `cruel and unusual' punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort `repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'" Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992).
In this case, plaintiff does not dispute the fact that he suffered no injury as a result of his altercation with defendant Morris. Rather, plaintiff merely argues that the use of force was not de minimis because he suffered pain and was prescribed Tylenol. At best, plaintiff has made a out a claim of assault and battery. See Collins v. Bopson, 816 F. Supp. 335, 340 (E.D.Pa. 1993). But he has adduced no facts that could, if proven, support a constitutional claim. Plaintiff was not injured; he claims only to have suffered minor pain, which was treated with Tylenol; and he has proffered no other allegations or evidence that suggest that defendant's conduct was constitutionally repugnant. Summary Judgment is therefore appropriate.
B. Filing False Reports
Plaintiff also claims that the defendants filed false reports in connection plaintiff's disciplinary proceeding and that this violated plaintiff's due process rights.
Courts have consistently held that "`the mere filing of [a false] charge itself' does not constitute a cognizable claim under § 1983 so long as the prisoner `was granted a hearing and had the opportunity to rebut the unfounded or false charges." See White v. Fauver, 19 F. Supp.2d 305, 319 (D.N.J. 1998). That is, "[s]o long as an inmate receives due process, the filing of false disciplinary charges against him raises no constitutional cause of action." Creter v. Arvonio, Civ. No. 92-4493, 1993 WL 306425, *7 (D.N.J. 1993).
Apart from the allegedly false reports, there is no allegation or evidence in this case that plaintiff's procedural rights were in any way abrogated. This claim must therefore be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, defendants' motion is GRANTED and plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Letter Opinion.