Opinion
CIVIL NO.: WDQ-14-1764
02-24-2015
NADINE YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF BALTIMORE CITY, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Nadine Young, pro se, sued the Housing Authority of Baltimore City ("HABC") for retaliation and hostile work environment based on sex discrimination. ECF No. 11. Pending are HABC's motions to dismiss Young's original and amended complaint. ECF Nos. 6, 12. No hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). For the following reasons, HABC's motion to dismiss Young's original complaint will be denied as moot, and its motion to dismiss the amended complaint will be granted. I. Background
The original complaint named "Baltimore Housing Authority" as the Defendant. ECF No. 1. HABC's motion to dismiss the original complaint and Young's amended complaint name "Housing Authority of Baltimore City" as the Defendant. The Clerk will correct the docket to reflect the revision.
Young's amended complaint does not specify the laws under which she is suing. See ECF No. 11 at 1-2. However, in an arguably unclear "Memorandum in Support of the Amended Complaint," Young appears to assert claims for retaliation and a hostile work environment. See ECF No. 11-1 at 3 ("A plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII . . . by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment"); see also ECF No. 15 (addressing sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims in Young's opposition to HABC's motion to dismiss). Young also states that she was discriminated against when she was denied a work-site transfer, but does not state the basis upon which she was discriminated. See id. at 3. Young states that "medical care due to work stress" led to her request; however, even liberally construed, that is insufficient to allege a disability discrimination claim. Accordingly, the Court will construe Young's amended complaint as alleging retaliation, and sex discrimination under the hostile work environment theory.
"It is well settled that an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading, and that motions directed at superseded pleadings are to be denied as moot." Blount v. Carlson Hotels, 3:11CV4 52-MOC-DSC, 2011 WL 6098697, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 6, 2011) (citing Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 573 (4th Cir. 2001) ("The general rule . . . is that an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading, rendering the original pleading of no effect.")). Because Young amended her complaint as of right, see supra note 10, HABC's motion to dismiss the original complaint will be denied as moot.
Because pro se pleadings are afforded liberal construction, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), the facts are from the amended complaint and Young's memorandum in support of her amended complaint. ECF Nos. 11, 11-1. For the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the well-pled allegations in the amended complaint (and Young's memorandum) are accepted as true. See Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503, 505 (4th Cir. 2011). However, the Court may "look beyond the pleadings" to decide whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. Khoury v. Meserve, 268 F. Supp. 2d 600, 606 (D. Md. 2003). Additional facts relevant to subject matter jurisdiction are from documents attached to the complaint and HABC's motion to dismiss the original complaint. ECF Nos. 1-2, 6-2.
On June 9, 2011, George Reeves, Young's co-worker, made an inappropriate sexual comment that offended, embarrassed, and humiliated Young. ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 1, 4. Young reported the comment to her supervisor, Tyrone Johnson, who "did nothing." Id. ¶ 2. Young then reported the comment to Johnson's superior, Rhonda Van Dyke, who reported it to Barbara Snow. Id. ¶ 3. Snow investigated the incident for the Baltimore Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, and, in November 2011, recommended that Young, Reeves, and Johnson receive disciplinary action. Id. ¶ 4; ECF No. 11-1 at 2. On November 15, 2011, Johnson received a letter of counseling "for inappropriate conversation." ECF No. 11-1 at 2.
On December 8, 2011, Young filed a charge of sex discrimination jointly with the Baltimore Community Relations Commission ("BCRC") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). ECF No. 6-2 at 1-2. Young checked the box marked "sex," and not "retaliation," when indicating the type of discrimination. Id. at 1. Young alleged, inter alia, that, on June 9, 2011, Reeves made an inappropriate sexual comment, over which they argued, and Johnson told Reeves and Young to be quiet. ECF No. 6-2 at 1. Young further alleged that, on July 29, 2011, she and Reeves argued about food during the "Work Appreciation Cookout," and Young told Reeves "that he needed to respect [her]." Id. at 2. Young met with Johnson, Van Dyke, Reeves, and her union representative; during the meeting, Reeves admitted the June 9, 2011 comment. Id. Young reported the incident to Snow, who told her "to come to the workplace, not to socialize[,] and not to show any pictures to co-workers." Id.
The EEOC charge number is 12B-2012-00005. ECF Nos. 6-2 at 1; 1-2 at 1.
On January 3, 2012, Young received five days suspension "for allegedly engaging in sexually inappropriate behavior." ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 6-7. Young "appealed the suspension," alleging that it was retaliation for filing the sex discrimination charge. Id. ¶ 8; ECF No. 11-1 at 2. In a January 17, 2012 letter to HABC, AFSCME Local 64 7 President Anthony Coates stated that Young's disciplinary action was "extremely discriminating." ECF No. 11-1 at 2.
"American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees."
Young's amended complaint repeats Coates's statement, but does not indicate its source. ECF No. 11-1 at 2. However, Young attached Coates's letter to her supplement to her opposition to HABC's motion to dismiss. See ECF No. 16-3.
On February 3, 2012, the EEOC sent HABC notice of Young's charge of discrimination. ECF No. 6-2 at 3. Under "circumstances of alleged discrimination," the box marked "sex" was checked; the box marked "retaliation" was not checked. Id.
"As a result of" Coates's letter, on July 25, 2012, "the suspension was reduced," Young received the five days' pay, and forfeited two days leave instead. ECF Nos. 11 ¶ 8; 11-1 at 2.
Young's memorandum in support of her amended complaint alleges that the suspension was reduced on July 25, 2013; however, that appears to be a typographical error in her timeline. See ECF No. 11-1 at 2.
After Young's suspension was reduced, the workplace became hostile, and she requested a transfer. Id. ¶ 9. Young began seeing a therapist, who recommended that she be transferred to another work site. Id ¶¶ 10-11. Young's request was denied because her employer said "employees were not transferred between work sites." Id. ¶ 12. However, "persons [were] transferred to other sites." Id.
Young also alleges that the work place became hostile after Johnson received his letter of counseling. Id. at 3.
On May 1, 2014, the EEOC sent Young a dismissal and notice of right to sue. ECF No. 1-2. On June 2, 2014, Young sued HABC for sex and disability discrimination, and retaliation. ECF No. 1 at 1-2. On July 14, 2014, HABC moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, or for a more definite statement. ECF No. 6. On July 29, 2014, Young opposed the motion. On August 7, 2014, Young filed an amended complaint, alleging retaliation and a hostile work environment. ECF No. 11. On August 25, 2014, HABC moved to dismiss the amended complaint. ECF No. 12. On September 11, 2014, Young opposed the motion. ECF No. 15. On September 12, 2014, Young supplemented her opposition. ECF No. 16. On September 29, 2014, HABC replied. ECF No. 17. II. Analysis
Young originally filed her amended complaint on July 30, 2014, within the 21 day period for amending as a matter of course under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). Young's pleading was returned because she had failed to include a red-line version showing changes from the original, hand-written complaint. ECF No. 9. Young complied, insofar as she submitted a red-line version that showed additions, but it did not show deletions. ECF No. 11-2. The Court recognizes the difficulty of showing red-line deletions to a handwritten complaint, and will accept the amended complaint as timely filed.
In the alternative, HABC moved for a more definite statement. ECF No. 12-1 at 3. Because the Court will grant HABC's motion to dismiss, it will not address HABC's alternative motion.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
1. Legal Standard
"[Q]uestions of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised . . . sua sponte by the court." Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. Datanet Eng'g, Inc., 369 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2004). "Regardless of the basis for [HABC's] motion, the [C]ourt has an independent duty to satisfy itself of its own subject matter jurisdiction." Snead v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George's Cnty., 815 F. Supp. 2d 889, 893 (D. Md. 2011). The plaintiff has the burden of proving the Court has jurisdiction, and the Court must make all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Khoury, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 606. Dismissal is appropriate when "the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the defendant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." Snead, 815 F. Supp. 2d at 894 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court may "look beyond the pleadings" to decide whether it has subject matter jurisdiction, Khoury, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 606, "without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment," Snead, 815 F. Supp. 2d at 894.
2. The Court's Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Title VII claims are subject to administrative exhaustion. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff-6(a)(1), 2000e-5(e)(1); Kobraei v. Alexander, 521 F. App'x 117, 118 (4th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (per curiam) (citing Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 513 (4th Cir. 2005)). A plaintiff exhausts her administrative remedies by filing an EEOC charge and obtaining a "right-to-sue" letter; failure to do so "deprives the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over the claim." Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009); Davis v. N. Carolina Dep't of Correction, 48 F.3d 134, 140 (4th Cir. 1995).
A complaint filed in court may raise "claims stated in the initial charge, those reasonably related to the original complaint, and those developed by reasonable investigation of the original complaint." Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 963 (4th Cir. 1996) (age discrimination claim barred when EEOC charge alleged sex discrimination).
See Chacko, 429 F.3d at 511 (failure to exhaust administrative remedies when EEOC charges alleged harassment by supervisors not based on national origin, and complaint alleged hostile work environment based on national origin epithets by coworkers).
Young's amended complaint asserts Title VII claims; thus, they are subject to administrative exhaustion. See ECF No. 11-at 3; Kobraei, 521 F. App'x at 118. Her amended complaint, however, lacks allegations about administrative exhaustion; the only grievance Young alleges she filed was with the Baltimore Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity. ECF No. 11-1 at 2.
Young's opposition confusingly asserts that her claim "is under the legal doctrine of 'Negligence,'" and Johnson's negligence "entitle[s her] to bring [an] action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for sexual harassment." ECF No 15 at 2. There are no allegations supporting common law negligence; Young's amended complaint alleges hostile work environment based on sex discrimination and retaliation. ECF Nos. 11, 11-1.
Looking "beyond the pleadings," Khoury, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 606, it is evident that, on May 1, 2014, the EEOC sent Young a dismissal and notice of right to sue in connection with her December 2011 charge. ECF Nos. 1-2, 6-2. That charge had alleged sex discrimination; however, the "retaliation" box was not checked. ECF No. 6-2 at 1, 3.
Mere failure to check the "retaliation" box on the charge form is not fatal to exhaustion of this claim. If the appropriate box is not checked, however, the narrative of the charge must either: (1) specifically allege or describe retaliation; or (2) show that retaliation was a "kind of discrimination like or related to allegations contained in the charge and growing out of such allegations during the pendency of the case before the Commission." See Johnson v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 682 F. Supp. 2d 560, 571, 573 (E.D. Va. 2009) (quoting Jones, 551 F.3d at 302). That the claim alleged in the charge and the retaliation claim arise from the same facts or from the same animus is not sufficient to exhaust the retaliation claim. If the plaintiff fails to provide sufficient notice of her claim to the employer and the EEOC in the charge form, the plaintiff's claim is subject to dismissal.
See Williams v. Mancom, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 693, 695 n.2 (E.D. Va. 2004) ("EEOC complaints filed by individuals acting without the assistance of an attorney are not so strictly construed that a failure to check the 'Retaliation' box on the EEOC charge form is necessarily fatal to the later assertion of a retaliation claim."); cf. Sydnor v. Fairfax Cnty., Va., 681 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he exhaustion requirement should not become a tripwire for hapless plaintiffs.").
See also Michaels v. Cont'l Realty Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109172, at *17-*18 (D. Md. Sept. 26, 2011) ("Without explicitly mentioning a retaliation claim in his EEOC Charge, merely describing the events that led to his termination is insufficient to have triggered a Commission investigation.").
See, e.g., Black v. Mission Hosp., Inc., 1:11CV146, 2012 WL 112234, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2012) (dismissing retaliation claim, because plaintiff only referred to discrimination in her charge form, even though the plaintiff alleged the same facts in support of both claims); see also Shepheard v. City of New York, 577 F. Supp. 2d 669, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) aff'd sub nom. Shepheard v. New York City Corr. Dep't, 360 F. App'x 24 9 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Where the EEOC charge alleges discrimination but not retaliation, the reasonable scope of the agency's investigation cannot be expected to encompass allegations of retaliatory motive.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
Steward v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 954 F. Supp. 1118, 1122-23 (E.D. Va. 1996) aff'd, 103 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1996) ("While [plaintiff]'s retaliation discrimination claim is similar to his race discrimination claim in their animus, the fact that [plaintiff] listed race discrimination on the EEOC charge would not lead the EEOC to investigate retaliation discrimination by [defendant].").
See, e.g., Sloop v. Mem'l Mission Hosp., Inc., 198 F.3d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1999) (dismissing plaintiff's retaliation claim when EEOC charge only alleged that she had been terminated on the basis of her age).
Here, Young's charge narrative alleges Reeves's inappropriate sexual comment, their argument at the Work Appreciation Cookout, and her attempts to seek redress for Reeves's conduct; it does not mention retaliation. ECF No. 6-2 at 1-3. Because Young's EEOC charge did not exhaust her retaliation claim, the Court will dismiss this claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, Young has exhausted her sex discrimination claim, and the Court will address HABC's motion to dismiss that claim.
B. Motion to Dismiss
1. Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), an action may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, but does not "resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).
The Court bears in mind that Rule 8(a)(2) requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325-26 (4th Cir. 2001). Although Rule 8's notice-pleading requirements are "not onerous," the plaintiff must allege facts that support each element of the claim advanced. Bass v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 764-65 (4th Cir. 2003). These facts must be sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
This requires that the plaintiff do more than "plead[] facts that are 'merely consistent with a defendant's liability;'" the facts pled must "allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twomly, 550 U.S. at 557). The complaint must not only allege but also "show" that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id. at 679 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Whe[n] the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged--but it has not shown--that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
2. HABC's Motion
Title VII provides that it "shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his . . . terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Sexual harassment gives rise to a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII. Young alleges that she was subjected to a hostile work environment. ECF Nos. 11 at 2; 11-1 at 3. Under the hostile work environment theory, the harasser's conduct "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
To state a hostile work environment claim, Young must show that: (1) she was harassed because of her sex; (2) the harassment was unwelcome; (3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive working environment; and (4) some basis exists for imputing liability to the employer. Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 386 (4th Cir. 2011) (dismissing hostile work environment claim when plaintiff's allegations, which included actions taken in response to concerns about her performance, failed to show that harassment was connected to her race or gender); Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc., 123 F, 3d 766, 772 (4th Cir. 1997).
HABC asserts that Young's claim fails on the third requirement because her allegation of a single comment by Reeves is insufficient "to rise to the level of a hostile work place." ECF No. 12-1 at 8. Young asserts that "gossip, jokes, hearsay, and innuendoes" created a hostile work environment. ECF No. 15 at 3-4.
"Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment--an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive--is beyond Title VII's purview." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993). "[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the 'terms and conditions of employment,'" such that they objectively create a hostile environment. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (single incident of sexual harassment not actionable) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, Young alleges that Reeves made an inappropriate sexual comment. ECF Nos. 11 ¶ 1; 11-1 at 1. Taken alone, that is insufficiently severe to establish an objectively hostile workplace. See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 532 U.S. at 271.
Young's opposition asserts that "gossip, jokes, hearsay, and innuendoes" created a hostile work environment. ECF No. 15 at 3. Generally, a motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. See, e.g., Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). However, even under the liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, Young's conclusionary assertion lacks sufficient facts for the Court to conclude that she is entitled to relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
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Young also alleges that the work place became hostile after Johnson received his letter of counseling, and she successfully appealed her five day suspension. ECF Nos. 11 ¶ 9; 11-1 at 3. However, neither incident gives rise to the reasonable inference that the hostile environment was "because of [Young's] sex." See Bonds, 629 F.3d at 385-86. Accordingly, Young's hostile work environment claim fails on the first and third requirements, and HABC is entitled to dismissal of that claim. III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, HABC's motion to dismiss Young's original complaint will be denied as moot, and its motion to dismiss the amended complaint will be granted. 2/24/15
Date
/s/_________
William D. Quarles, Jr.
United States District Judge