Because that finding is a threshold requirement of Rule 804, we will begin our review there. See Young v. HAC, LLC , 2001 WY 50, ¶ 9, 24 P.3d 1142, 1145 (Wyo. 2001) ("We will not determine if the substantive requirements of W.R.E. 804(b) were met, unless the threshold eligibility of the unavailability request is demonstrated."). We will then turn to the admissibility of the testimony under the rules on which the court based its determination, and Plaintiffs’ claim that the admission of Mr. Linklater's testimony violated their due process rights because they had no opportunity to cross-examine him.
We must ask ourselves whether the district court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.Young v. HAC, LLC, 2001 WY 50, ¶ 6, 24 P.3d 1142, 1144 (Wyo.2001) (quoting Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Wyo.2000)).Pauley, ¶ 7, 92 P.3d at 822.
We must ask ourselves whether the district court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious. Young v. HAC, LLC, 2001 WY 50, ¶ 6, 24 P.3d 1142, 1144 (Wyo.2001) (quoting Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Wyo.2000)).Pauley, ¶ 7, 92 P.3d at 822.
We must ask ourselves whether the district court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious."Young v. HAC, LLC, 2001 WY 50, ¶ 6, 24 P.3d 1142, 1144 (Wyo. 2001) ( quoting Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Wyo. 2000)). DISCUSSION
We must ask ourselves whether the district court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious."Young v. HAC, LLC, 2001 WY 50, ¶ 6, 24 P.3d 1142, 1144 (Wyo. 2001) ( quoting Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Wyo. 2000) and Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998)). [¶ 11] We note at the outset that the appellants have provided neither a transcript of the hearing on the referenced petition pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.02 nor a statement of the evidence pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03, and it does not appear that they requested special findings of fact and conclusions of law under W.R.C.P. 52(a).
It is agreed by both parties that the letter constitutes hearsay evidence and is in the nature of parol evidence. The admission of evidence, including the admission of hearsay, is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb evidentiary rulings unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Young v. HAC, LLC, 2001 WY 50, ¶ 6, 24 P.3d 1142, ¶ 6 (Wyo. 2001). [¶ 15] Husband contends that the letter was admissible because it met the requirements of W.R.E. 804(b)(6) (also see W.R.E 803(24)):
" Young v. HAC, LLC, 2001 WY 50, ¶ 6, 24 P.3d 1142, 1144 (Wyo. 2001) ( quoting Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Wyo. 2000)). In this respect, we give considerable deference to the trial court's rulings.
These general rules apply to rulings on the admissibility of hearsay evidence. Young v. HAC, LLC, 2001 WY 50, ¶ 6, 24 P.3d 1142, 1144 (Wyo. 2001); Robinson, 11 P.3d at 367. W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(b)
Error in Admission of Evidence of an Improper Collateral Source [¶ 13] The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb evidentiary rulings unless the appellant demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion. Young v. HAC, LLC, 2001 WY 50, ¶ 6, 24 P.3d 1142, ¶ 6 (Wyo. 2001). The core of our inquiry must reach the question of the reasonableness of the choice made by the trial court.
" W.R.E. 401. "Admission of evidence . . . is within the sound discretion of the trial court; we will not disturb evidentiary rulings unless the appellant demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion." Young v. HAC, LLC, 2001 WY 50, ¶ 6, 24 P.3d 1142, ¶ 6 (Wyo. 2001); see also Brown v. Michael Pryor, M.D., P.C., 954 P.2d 1349, 1350 (Wyo. 1998). Ms. Schlesinger's bald assertion does not establish abuse of discretion, and we will not disturb the trial court's determination on this basis.