Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-3384-KHV
January 17, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Sylvester Young, Jr. and Marvin Bonga, inmates at the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas, bring suit against Joseph Corriston, Industrial Shop Supervisor for the Federal Prison Industries, alleging a deprivation of their constitutional rights. This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Or, Alternatively, Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. #7) filed June 27, 2000. Defendant seeks either dismissal for a failure to state a claim or summary judgment based on qualified immunity. For reasons set forth below, the Court sustains the motion for summary judgment.
The Court also sustains the Motion To Strike Plaintiff's Surreply (Doc. #17) which defendant filed on September 28, 2000 because surreplies are not allowed by the Court (D.Kan. Rule 7.1).
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1538-39 (10th Cir. 1993). A factual dispute is "material" only if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A "genuine" factual dispute requires more than a mere scintilla of evidence. Id. at 252.The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Hicks v. City of Watonga, Okla., 942 F.2d 737, 743 (10th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that genuine issues remain for trial "as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof." Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Secs., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991). The nonmoving party may not rest on its pleadings but must set forth specific facts. See Applied Genetics, 912 F.2d at 1241.
The Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See Deepwater Invs., Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 938 F.2d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Summary judgment may be granted if the non-moving party's evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51. "In a response to a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rely on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on suspicion, and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that something will turn up at trial." Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 1988). Essentially, the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
Factual Background
The following facts are either undisputed or, where disputed, construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
Work in the prison industries is highly regimented and structured. Inmates are assigned a grade level from one to five, and this assignment determines what job an inmate will perform and the rate of pay he will receive. Grade One is the highest rate of pay and Grade Five the lowest. Plaintiffs bring suit to vindicate their purported rights to an additional $0.23 an hour for their work. Young and Bonga currently receive wages of $0.96 and $0.46 an hour, respectively.
The incidents leading to this case center on the furniture shop. On January 7, 1999, Corriston supervised the work of eight inmates in the furniture shop at the federal penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas. During the morning, he learned that a piece of metal from a chair arm was missing from the shop. Corriston reported the loss to the senior foreman and conducted an unsuccessful search of the work area for the missing piece. A lieutenant transferred the eight inmates who were working in the furniture shop at that time, including plaintiffs, to the Special Housing Unit (SHU) for detention and further investigation of the loss. Plaintiffs contend that while Corriston himself did not put them in segregation, he started the chain of events which resulted in their detention.
The authorities released Young from SHU on January 14, 1999, and he returned to work in the furniture shop. In his absence, however, his position had been filled by another inmate and Billy Stuby, Superintendent of Industries, demoted Young from Grade One to Grade Two. Similarly, when the authorities released Bonga from SHU on January 12, 1999, he returned to work in the furniture shop. Stuby demoted him, however, from Grade Three to Grade Four. Plaintiffs cite defendant's ill will towards them as the reason for their demotions. In addition, plaintiffs state that 28 C.F.R. § 345.67(2) guarantees that they will be reassigned to their previous pay scale after administrative segregation. Response To Defendant's Motion To Dismiss (Doc. #11) filed July 24, 2000 at 6.
Plaintiffs complain that defendant violated their rights in eight ways. Plaintiffs allege defendant acted beyond the scope of his official authority by taking disciplinary action contrary to 28 C.F.R. § 541.10(1) (Count 1), using group punishment (Count 7), and wrongfully using prison process (Count 8). Plaintiffs assert that defendant violated their equal protection and due process rights by subjecting them to administrative segregation (Counts 2 and 3), using group punishment (Count 4), and punishing some inmates who worked in the furniture shop and not others (Count 6). Finally, Count 5 argues that defendant subjected plaintiffs to cruel and unusual punishment. Defendant seeks either dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim or, alternatively, summary judgment because his actions regarding the missing piece of metal were reasonable and thus he is entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs respond that conditions in administrative segregation are indistinguishable from disciplinary detention and federal regulations barred their pay grade demotions.
Analysis
The gist of plaintiffs' complaint is an attack on their temporary placement in administrative detention and loss of a job grade level. Plaintiffs assert that they have a constitutional entitlement to certain prison grade classifications which may not be disturbed absent appropriate procedures and that they have a right to not be placed in administrative detention. Plaintiffs' contentions will fail, however, if defendant is not liable to suit. Qualified immunity spares defendant the burden of proceeding with the litigation unless plaintiffs can show that defendant violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable person would not have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The Court must first assess whether plaintiffs have "asserted a violation of a constitutional right." Dill v. City of Edmond, Okla., 155 F.3d 1193, 1204 (1998) (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)). If the complaint alleges a violation of a constitutional right, then the Court determines if the constitutional right is clearly established so that reasonable officials would have understood that their conduct violated that right. See Dill, 155 F.3d at 1204 (citing Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534-35 (10th Cir. 1995)).
1. Defendant's Lack of Authority
Plaintiffs first allege that defendant lacked the authority to either place them in administrative segregation (Count 1) or use group punishment by placing in segregation all workers who were present during the missing chair arm incident (Count 7). Plaintiffs also claim that their detention without subsequent disciplinary action constituted "wrongful use of prison process by a renegade guard" (Count 8). Complaint (Doc. #1) filed Dec. 9, 1999 at 5.
Plaintiff's first count is that defendant did not have the authority to put them in administrative segregation or take disciplinary action against them. Under 28 C.F.R. § 541.10(b)(1), "[o]nly institutional staff may take disciplinary action." Staff is defined in 28 C.F.R. § 500.1(b) as "any employee of the Bureau of Prisons or Federal Prison Industries, Inc." Defendant is employed by Federal Prison Industries, Inc. as a woodworking supervisor; he is therefore authorized to take disciplinary action against inmates. Defendant asserts that he did not place plaintiffs in administrative segregation but only reported the missing chair part to the proper authorities, and that a lieutenant placed the inmates in the special housing unit. See Declaration of Joseph C. Corriston, III in Defendant's Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss (Doc. #8) filed June 27, 2000. While plaintiffs are correct in noting that defendant's action of reporting the theft started the chain of events which caused their detention, they have not shown that defendant exceeded his authority in reporting the theft to a lieutenant. Since prison regulations allow defendant to discipline inmates, it is logical that he can also report thefts to his superiors.
Under 28 C.F.R. § 541.22(a)(2) and (a)(3), a lieutenant is authorized to place inmates in administrative segregation pending investigation of criminal acts and violations of regulations. Plaintiffs have not sued the lieutenant who placed them in administrative segregation, and they apparently do not contest his authority to do so. Count 1 is based sole on defendant's action in reporting the theft. Essentially, plaintiffs want to hold defendant liable for the actions of other prison officials. Plaintiffs bring suit against defendant, an employee of the federal government, pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Defendant is not, however, liable for the conduct of other officials under Bivens. See Whayne v. Kansas, 980 F. Supp. 387, 394 (D.Kan. 1997) (must allege actual and knowing participation for Bivens liability). Plaintiffs provide no evidence of a conspiracy between defendant and other prison officials other than to assert that it is a "good ole boy system." Response to Defendant's Motion To Dismiss at 7; see Lee v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2000 WL 1478539, at *5 (D.Kan. Sept. 22, 2000) (must allege specific facts to show defendants had an agreement and worked in concert to state conspiracy claim). In addition, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable because plaintiffs do not allege an "affirmative link" between the actions of the two parties. Kite v. Kelley, 546 F.2d 334, 337 (10th Cir. 1976) (Bivens action may be asserted against superior only if plaintiff shows "affirmative link" to subordinate's actions). Plaintiffs have not shown any reason why defendant should be held liable for the actions of other prison officials. Plaintiffs have not established a genuine issue of material fact whether defendant exceeded his authority by placing them in administrative segregation and defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Count 1.
Plaintiffs do not cite, and the Court does not find, any legal support for the proposition that multiple inmates may not be placed in administrative segregation at the same time. Prison authorities are given broad deference in managing penal institutions, and the Court will not question their decisions without evidence of abuse of discretion. See Sandin, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) ("[F]ederal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment."); Del Raine v. Bureau of Prisons, 989 F. Supp. 1373, 1375 (D.Kan. 1997). Plaintiffs do not provide any information which suggests that the placement of multiple inmates in administrative detention constituted an abuse of discretion in these circumstances. On this claim, plaintiffs have not established a genuine issue of material fact in regard to the issue whether plaintiffs and other furniture shop workers could be lawfully segregated from the general prison population pending an investigation of the missing chair arm piece. In addition, since plaintiffs have not shown that defendant wrongfully used his authority, Count 8 of their complaint (wrongful use of prison process) also fails. Thus, plaintiffs have not shown that defendant violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right in regard to the claim that defendant unlawfully placed them in administrative segregation, subjected them to "group punishment," or wrongfully used prison process.
2. Equal Protection and Due Process Violations
Plaintiffs next assert that defendant violated their rights to equal protection and due process by placing them in administrative segregation, subjecting them to group punishment, and punishing some but not all inmates. They first complain of their placement in administrative segregation. It is established in this Circuit that "the transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence." Penrod v. Zararas, 94 F.3d 1399, 1406 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983)); see also Everson v. Nelson, 941 F. Supp. 1048, 1050 (D.Kan. 1996) (placement of inmate in segregation for allegedly requesting sexual favors from other inmates not violation). Administrative detention implicates constitutional due process concerns only if the confinement is "the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest." McDiffett v. Stotts, 902 F. Supp. 1419, 1426 (D.Kan. 1995) (quoting Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. at 485). While plaintiffs cite a laundry list of reasons that administrative detention is not as agreeable as regular prison quarters, they have cited no evidence which demonstrates a significant hardship. Thus, the decision to place plaintiffs in administrative detention following a possible theft does not state a constitutional due process violation.
Plaintiffs' complaint only raises the issue of their pay grade demotion in conjunction with their cruel and unusual punishment claim.
Plaintiffs allege that prisoners in administrative segregation are denied religious services, educational programs, access to the inmate canteen, the ability to work, and open visits with visitors. See Response To Defendant's Motion To Dismiss (Doc. #11) filed July 24, 2000 at 1-2. Defendant provides an affidavit and attachments from a lieutenant assigned to SHU, however, stating that inmates do have access to religious and educational materials and the possibility of open visits with visitors. Affidavit of Shawn Grant in Reply Of Defendant To Plaintiff's Response To Defendant's Motion To Dismiss (Doc. #14) filed August 28, 2000.
Similarly, placement of plaintiffs in administrative segregation does not constitute an equal protection violation. In order to receive heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause, plaintiffs must allege that they are members of a constitutionally protected class or that they have been denied a fundamental right. Plaintiffs do not argue that they are part of a protected class, but they do assert that placement in SHU violated their rights. As the Court discussed above, inmates do not have a right, much less a fundamental right as it is defined in this context, to be free from administrative segregation. Because plaintiffs are not in a protected class and a fundamental right has not been violated, their placement in SHU "must only bear a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose." Penrod, 94 F.3d at 1406-07 (neither equal protection nor due process denied when prison placed unassigned inmates in administrative segregation). The Court finds that placing inmates in administrative segregation while investigating a prison theft bears a rational relationship to the legitimate purpose of maintaining order and safety in a penitentiary.
Plaintiffs also complain that defendant's use of group punishment violated their rights to equal protection and procedural due process. As an initial matter, administrative segregation is not ordinarily punishment because transferring an inmate to less pleasant quarters for administrative reasons is constitutionally unobjectionable and, if possible, inmates in segregation are to be given the same privileges as those who are not. See Penrod, 94 F.3d at 1406; see also 28 C.F.R. § 541.22(d) (2000) ("If consistent with available resources and the security needs of the unit, the Warden shall give an inmate housed in administrative detention the same general privileges given to inmates in the general population."). Nevertheless the Court will evaluate whether prison officials are allowed to punish or detain groups of prisoners. Plaintiffs state:
Group punishment is a danger to prison staff and therefore against BOP policy. Regulations do not authorize Group Punishment. Defendant used group punishment against a group of eight prisoners, including plaintiffs, thus violating their Constitutional right to be free of Group Punishment, damaging plaintiffs and depriving them of their civil rights. Complaint (Doc. #1) at 5.
Plaintiffs do not cite and the Court is unable to find any law or prison regulation which specifically bars group punishment or segregation. Support for plaintiffs' position may stem from Blake v. Hall, 668 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1981), where the court stated, "We see no reason why well-behaved inmates should have to suffer cruel and unusual punishment because of the actions of some disruptive ones." Id. at 57. Blake is easily distinguishable since, as discussed below, administrative segregation as plaintiffs describe it is not cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiffs apparently assert that group punishment is not acceptable under any circumstances and that they are constitutionally entitled to be free of it. This proposition, however, is simply not well-founded. Prison officials may use group punishment when it is warranted and prisoners do not have a right to be free from it. See Smith v. Scroggy, 803 F.2d 721, 1986 WL 17801, at *1 (6th Cir. Sep. 22, 1986) (group punishment appropriately used on group of prisoners who disobeyed direct order). Plaintiffs do not cite any authority for the proposition that the federal government has created a liberty interest in being free from group punishment or that its use is a significant or atypical hardship which may constitute a due process violation. Furthermore, the punishment or detention of groups of prisoners who may be involved in a prison violation is clearly rationally related to the legitimate purpose of maintaining order and safety in a prison and is not an equal protection violation. See Hall v. Furlong, 77 F.3d 361, 364 (10th Cir. 1996) (equal protection violation when indigent inmates were penalized for inability to make bail); LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d 1117, 1120 (10th Cir. 1991) (claim stated when authorities refused to comply with inmate's religious dietary restrictions); Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972) (violation when gender determined whether defendants between the ages of 16 and 18 would be tried as juvenile or adult).
Plaintiffs' final equal protection claim is that defendant punished some inmates but not all. As discussed above, plaintiffs are not part of a protected class and they have not asserted a fundamental right. This allegation therefore receives only rational basis review. Plaintiffs are correct in asserting that defendant did not punish or segregate all inmates who might have possibly committed the theft at issue, i.e. all shifts of inmates who worked in the furniture shop. Defendant asserts, and plaintiffs do not controvert, that the authorities segregated only those inmates who were working in the furniture shop when the theft was discovered. Reply Of Defendant To Plaintiffs' Response To Defendant's Motion To Dismiss (Doc. #14) at 3. Segregating all inmates in the location of a theft is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of avoiding security concerns in the prison. The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs have not stated an equal protection or due process violation.
3. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Plaintiffs next claim that defendant's actions constitute cruel and unusual punishment. They state that their punishment "was intended to cover up defendant's failure to meet his responsibilities, and intended to cover up his illegal behavior relative to his employer." Complaint (Doc. #1) at 5. Plaintiffs, however, do not state what failure or illegal behavior defendant tried to cover up. The Court is left to analyze whether it is possible that being placed in administrative segregation or losing a pay grade can amount to cruel and unusual punishment. In this Circuit, the Eighth Amendment is violated "only when the alleged deprivation is objectively, sufficiently serious, and the prison official acts with deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety." Penrod, 94 F.3d at 1405-06 (possible Eighth Amendment violation when denial of dental supplies might have led to inmate's dental problems). The record contains no suggestion that the deprivations of which plaintiffs complain implicate harm to their health or safety. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim of cruel and unusual punishment because none of their alleged deprivations suggested that defendant acted with deliberate indifference to their health or safety.
The Court notes that there is a possible conflict between 28 C.F.R. § 345.67(a)(2) ("for up to the first 30 days when an inmate is in Administrative Detention, that inmate may retain Federal Prison Industries pay grade status") (emphasis added) and 28 C.F.R. § 345.67(c)(1) ("[a]n inmate retains pay grade status . . . for up to 30 days in Administrative Detention"). As will be discussed, plaintiffs do not state a claim of cruel and unusual punishment even if the mandatory regulation controls and prison officials erred in demoting plaintiffs.
As noted in footnote 1, the parties disagree about over the level of deprivation which inmates in SHU experience. Even taking all of plaintiffs' claims as true, the Court finds that conditions in administrative segregation do not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment. See Easter v. Hill, 95-3047, 1997 WL 30553, at *4 (D.Kan. Jan. 8, 1997) (limitation on commissary purchases, phone calls, visits and exercise time in administrative segregation did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
The Court finds that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact with regard to their claims that defendant violated their statutory or constitutional rights. Therefore he is entitled to qualified immunity.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant's Motion To Dismiss, Or Alternatively, Motion For Summary Judgement (Doc. #7) filed on June 27, 2000 and Motion To Strike Plaintiff's Surreply (Doc. #17) filed on September 28, 2000 be and hereby are SUSTAINED.