Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. CV010060
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.
Plaintiffs are owners of lots in a subdivision called Wetherbee Lake located in San Joaquin County and grantees of easements to specified 16-foot frontages of the shoreline of the lake, part of Walthall Slough. Plaintiffs’ lots are not located directly across from the lake, but are on streets a block or two away from the lake. Defendants are other lot owners in the subdivision who own lots that are directly across from the lake. Defendants’ lots abut an area of land between Ash Lane and Willow Avenue designated on the subdivision map as Lake Avenue. Plaintiffs use such portion of Lake Avenue to access their granted easements to the shoreline of the lake. When defendants Kenneth and Stacey Cody (appellants) built structures on the part of Lake Avenue abutting their lot, plaintiffs could no longer access their shoreline docks by vehicle.
Alleging defendants are wrongfully interfering with and depriving plaintiffs of their rights to access, use and enjoy their easements, plaintiffs sued defendants for declaratory relief, for injunctive relief, for a judgment granting them an easement by necessity, and to quiet title to their deeded easements.
After a court trial, the trial court determined plaintiffs are owners of deeded dock easements giving them the exclusive right to the use and enjoyment of specific 16-foot frontages on the southerly shoreline of Wetherbee Lake with a right to the unimpeded use of the entirety of Lake Avenue between Ash Lane and Willow Avenue for access. The trial court concluded defendants did not have any right, title or interest in Lake Avenue superior to or superseding plaintiffs’ right of access along the entirety of Lake Avenue between Ash Lane and Willow Avenue. The trial court ordered appellants to remove all structures that encroach into Lake Avenue.
On appeal, appellants contend the trial court improperly determined plaintiffs have easement rights or alternatively, if plaintiffs have easement rights, the trial court erred in concluding they extend to the entirety of Lake Avenue between Ash Lane and Willow Lane. We disagree and shall affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Wetherbee Lake subdivision was created by the recordation of a subdivision map in July 1933. The owners/developers of the property were William Hanna, Joe Donato and Stella Donato (the developers). The subdivision map was originally made up of 63 lots, 5 designated roads and a narrow strip of land directly adjacent to Walthall Slough, also known as Wetherbee Lake. One of the roads designated on the original map is Lake Avenue. As shown on the original map, Lake Avenue is 40 feet wide. The north edge of Lake Avenue abuts the narrow strip of land adjacent to the lake while the south edge of such road abuts 17 lots in blocks 1 and 4 of the subdivision. All other lots in the subdivision front on the remaining roads.
A certified copy of the original recorded subdivision map was introduced into evidence as defendant’s exhibit 101. We have attached a reduced copy of such map as Appendix A to this opinion.
At the time the subdivision map was recorded, the developers offered “to dedicate, and do hereby dedicate all roads, streets, avenues, and lanes to the public use forever.” San Joaquin County elected to hold the offer of dedication open, noting that “‘[t]he offer to dedicate streets, highways and ways to public use will be acceptable in whole or any part thereof if, as and when, public necessity is determined by the Board of Supervisors shall render acceptance thereof advisable.”
When the developers sold any of the 63 lots shown on the subdivision map, the grant deed description of the individual lot referenced the lot and block number as shown on the subdivision map filed with the county.
A few years after the subdivision was established, a dispute arose between the developers and owners of a lot in block 4 (the La Joies), whose lot abutted the eastern portion of Lake Avenue, regarding the right of the lot owners to access the shoreline of Wetherbee Lake across the narrow strip of land still owned by the developers and to moor a boat to that part of the shore. The judgment entered in the ensuing litigation determined the lot owners did not have an easement for use of the strip of land by executed oral agreement with the developers, but they did have such an easement by prescription. The judgment did not consider or determine the owners’ right to use Lake Avenue to reach the strip of land owned by the developers.
The title of this case is Geo. A. La Joie et al. v. William Hanna et al., San Joaquin Superior Court No. 29923. The judgment was entered on September 25, 1941.
Subsequent to this judgment, the developers began selling dock easements to the shoreline of Wetherbee Lake to other lot owners in the subdivision. Plaintiffs or their predecessors purchased dock easements from the developers between 1947 and 1965. The parties here agreed at trial the developers adopted a general form of grant of easement which reads: “in and to sixteen (16) foot frontage of the southerly shore line of Wetherbee Lake, as per plat thereof on file and of record in the office of the County Recorder of San Joaquin County, California, the Easterly and Westerly boundaries of which 16 foot frontage are marked by stakes placed in the ground by grantors, and being easement number __ as such easements are numbered Easterly commencing with number 1 at the East line of Oak Street; together with a right of access to such shore line at said place from Lake Avenue, that is shown on said plat.”
However, several of the deeds granting the dock easements to plaintiffs or their predecessors introduced into evidence at trial used the following language: “in and to sixteen (16) feet frontage of the southerly shore line of Wetherbee Lake, approximately opposite the Northerly end of Lot _, in Block 4, of Wetherbee Lake Subdivision, Tract No. 2, as per plat thereof on file and of record in the office of the County Recorder of San Joaquin County, California, the Easterly and Westerly boundaries of which 16 foot frontage are marked by stakes placed in the ground by grantors, and being easement numbered [__] as such easements are numbered Easterly commencing with number 1 at the East line of Oak Street; together with a right of access to such shore line at said place from Lake Avenue, as shown on said plat.” (Italics added.)
All of the dock easements granted the grantees the right to construct and maintain a dock or float at the water frontage with a landing stage or gangplank, as well as the right to moor two boats up to 25 feet in length to the dock or float. The developers granted each easement in perpetuity and made the easement appurtenant to the lot owned by the purchaser subject to defeasance at the option of the developers for violation of the conditions of the easement prohibiting operation of a commercial business from the easement or the clearing of timber or excavation in excess of what was reasonably necessary for access. Plaintiffs and/or their predecessors built docks and moored boats at the shore line of the lake pursuant to their easements soon after their purchase. Joe Donato helped at least one of plaintiffs’ predecessors physically locate their easement for the construction of a dock. The easements were used in the following decades for fishing, boating, waterskiing, and swimming.
In 1978, 1985, and 1987, San Joaquin County accepted for dedication certain portions of the roads located in the Wetherbee Lake subdivision. Eventually, all of the roads in the subdivision became public roads by accepted dedication except that portion of Lake Avenue east of Ash Lane and west of Willow Avenue, the portion at issue in this case. That portion of Lake Avenue remained unimproved covered with dirt and natural vegetation; grasses, some bushes, and a few trees.
There was conflicting testimony regarding whether there was vehicle traffic on the eastern portion of Lake Avenue over the years and the frequency of any such traffic. According to plaintiff Eileen Young, there were ruts on the property, which she believed indicated where the road was. Defendant Raymond Montosa thought the ruts were from the rain rather than cars. A number of witnesses stated easement owners drove vehicles on the easterly portion of Lake Avenue to get to their easements when they had a lot of recreational equipment to be taken to the lake or as necessary for dock construction and maintenance. Appellants testified there was only foot traffic to the easements.
In 1995, at the request of defendant Kenneth Hagerty, the San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors passed Resolution No. R-95-78 vacating and abandoning the portion of Lake Avenue between Ash Lane and Willow Avenue. The resolution stated, “the title to the lands previously subject to the roadway or portion thereof . . . shall hereby revert to the respective owners thereof free from such roadway . . . . After the date this Resolution is recorded, the roadway will no longer constitute a public roadway.”
As it is undisputed San Joaquin County never accepted the developers’ offer of dedication of this portion of Lake Avenue, such portion of Lake Avenue actually never was a public roadway. (10 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2001) Dedication, § 26:19, p. 44 [there is no completed dedication if offer of owner to dedicate not accepted by the public either expressly or impliedly].)
In the winter of 1997, the subdivision was inundated by a flood causing substantial damage to many of the homes. Appellants demolished their home located on lot 1 of block 4 of the subdivision at the northeast corner of Lake Avenue and Ash Lane because of the flood damage. They decided to rebuild and obtained a building permit for the new structure in April 1998. The northernmost edge of the new house appellants constructed is just six inches from the original southern border of Lake Avenue adjacent to their lot. The covered porch, deck, and exterior staircase on the north of their house extend into the area north of the original south line of Lake Avenue. Their concrete pad for parking is almost entirely north of the original south line of Lake Avenue. However, all of the structures and concrete are south of the original centerline of Lake Avenue. That is, appellants’ construction occupied much of the south half (20 feet) of Lake Avenue, but did not encroach on the north half of Lake Avenue as it was originally set forth on the subdivision map. Plaintiffs complained to appellants and to the county about appellants’ new construction obstructing their access to their easements. Appellants obtained a county variance for their setbacks. Plaintiffs’ appeal of the grant of the variance was denied by the San Joaquin Board of Supervisors.
In connection with obtaining a preliminary title report and the variance, the Codys recorded a deed from themselves granting to themselves title to the southern 20 feet of the original Lake Avenue.
In light of the dispute over their construction, appellants obtained an official survey of block 4 of the subdivision, focusing particularly on the location of Lake Avenue and the shoreline of Wetherbee Lake. Such survey revealed there had been substantial erosion of the shoreline of the lake. The original strip of land north of Lake Avenue retained by the developers when the subdivision was originally created did not exist at the time of the survey in 1999. In 1999, the high water line of the lake was located well within the north half of Lake Avenue, as originally designated, for virtually the entire length of the road between Ash Lane and Willow Avenue. The existing bank of the lake was located even further south towards the centerline of Lake Avenue. At one point on Lake Avenue there remained only four feet of usable travel width between the bank and the original centerline of the road, too little to permit an easement owner vehicle access to their dock.
Plaintiffs filed this litigation seeking to quiet title to their easements and to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief.
The trial court determined the developers had the ability to and did grant to plaintiffs or their predecessors a right to use a portion of the shoreline of Wetherbee Lake and the right to use the entirety, not just the north half, of Lake Avenue for access to their shoreline easements. The trial court determined plaintiffs’ shoreline easement and access rights have not been lost or abandoned and are in full force and effect. The court concluded appellants’ construction into Lake Avenue impedes and interferes with the plaintiffs’ right of access and deprives plaintiffs of vehicular access to their easements. Finding the equities weighed in favor of plaintiffs, the trial court issued a mandatory injunction requiring appellants to remove the encroachments and a prohibitory injunction requiring all defendants to refrain from any encroachments into Lake Avenue.
DISCUSSION
Contentions
Reminding us that “a grantor of an easement can only grant an easement over his or her own land” (Civ. Code, § 804), appellants claim the developers only owned the strip of land north of Lake Avenue according to the judgment from the 1941 litigation and so the developers could not have granted any easement to plaintiffs and their predecessors between 1947 and 1965 to any part of Lake Avenue. As further developed in their reply brief, it is appellants’ position that the dock easements only granted a right to access the shoreline of the lake across the developers’ strip of land north of Lake Avenue, which strip of land did not exist when the easements were purportedly granted, nor at the time of trial. Plaintiffs’ dock easements were, thus, either void at the inception or have been extinguished by the erosion of the shoreline.
Appellants also claim that “[e]ven if there were some evidence to support the conclusion that the southern boundary of [the developers’] strip of land went to the center line of Lake Avenue, that is, at a maximum, as far as [the developers’] rights could have extended.” Therefore, not only did the easement deeds not grant any easement in Lake Avenue, the deeds could not have granted any easement rights over the entirety of Lake Avenue.
Appellants contend plaintiffs’ claim to easement rights to the entirety of Lake Avenue cannot be supported by the fact Lake Avenue appears on the subdivision map and was once offered for dedication to the county. Appellants argue the county’s abandonment of the easterly portion of Lake Avenue extinguished all private easements except for the private easements owned by abutting owners, which plaintiffs are not. (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 8353 & former Civ. Code, § 812.)
Appellants argue “historical use” cannot expand plaintiffs’ easement rights, noting plaintiffs did not allege or claim any prescriptive rights. Appellants contend plaintiffs did not obtain easement rights over the entirety of Lake Avenue as a secondary easement right or based on their status as “so-called abutters.”
To evaluate appellants’ claims, we must determine the developers’ retained ownership interest in the land as subdivided by the original subdivision map and as held at the time of the grant of the easements to plaintiffs or their predecessors. We must interpret the language of the easement deeds. Finally, we must consider the effect, if any, of the county’s vacation and abandonment of the eastern portion of Lake Avenue through its Resolution No. R-95-78.
I.
The Developers’ Retained Ownership Interest In The Wetherbee Lake Subdivision
In 1933, the subdivision map for Wetherbee Lake Subdivision showed a strip of land directly adjacent to Wetherbee Lake. It is undisputed that at the time the subdivision map was recorded, the developers retained fee title ownership to this strip of land. The southern border of such strip of land abutted the north border of Lake Avenue, a designated roadway on the subdivision map. The developers subsequently sold the numbered lots in the subdivision by reference to lot and block number as shown on the subdivision map filed with the county.
It is also certain from the superior court’s findings and judgment in the 1941 litigation over access to the shoreline of the lake that this strip of land was still in existence at that time and was then owned by the developers.
Since 1872, Civil Code section 831 has provided that “[a]n owner of land bounded by a road or street is presumed to own to the center of the way, but the contrary may be shown.” Since 1874, Civil Code section 1112 has provided “[a] transfer of land, bounded by a highway, passes the title of the person whose estate is transferred to the soil of the highway in front to the center thereof, unless a different intent appears from the grant.” (See also, Safwenberg v. Marquez (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 301, 305-308; Main v. Legnitto (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 667, 674, and cases cited therein.) These statutory presumptions were not rebutted in this case.
Specifically, there is nothing in the record suggesting any intent by the developers in 1933, when the Wetherbee Lake subdivision was established, that their reserved ownership of the strip of land adjacent to the lake extend only to the north edge of Lake Avenue when numbered lots were subsequently sold. There is certainly no evidence the developers intended to favor the purchasers of lots on the southern side of Lake Avenue with a transfer of title to the entire road while the purchasers of lots fronting on other roads in the subdivision would share title only to the centerline.
Nor do we find the later legal description of the developers’ strip of land in the La Joies 1941 judgment, which describes the developers’ strip of land as “[t]hat certain strip of land . . . lying North of the North line of Lake Avenue and South of the South line of Wetherbee Lake, also known as Walthal Slough . . .,” as being evidence of an intention in 1933 contrary to the statutory presumptions. At issue in the La Joies litigation was the right of the La Joies to access the lake shoreline across the developers’ strip of land, for which the above legal description was given. The question of ownership or use of Lake Avenue was not raised or considered.
It was undisputed that when the developers sold any of the 63 lots shown on the subdivision map, the grant deed description of the individual lot referenced the lot and block number as shown on the subdivision map filed with the county. There is no indication there was additional language in the grants indicating the lot owners did not take title to the centerline of any adjacent street.
As a matter of law, there being no evidence of contrary intent, both the developers and the owners of the 17 lots fronting on Lake Avenue, as owners of land abutting Lake Avenue as described in the subdivision map, held fee title to the centerline of Lake Avenue. (Civ. Code, §§ 831, 1112; Safwenberg v. Marquez, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at p. 308; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 2077, subd. (4).) Of course, such fee title was subject to both a potential public easement for a public right of way, based on the developers’ offer of dedication (which became irrevocable upon the sale of lots referring to the subdivision map (Richards v. County of Colusa (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 803, 806)), and any implied private easements of access. We turn to the latter.
The application of the presumption of title in Civil Code section 1112 does not depend on the actual existence or use of the designated road as a street at the time of the conveyance. (Main v. Legnitto, supra, 230 Cal.App.2d at p. 674.)
“‘When a lot conveyed by a deed is described by reference to a map, such map becomes a part of the deed. If the map exhibits streets and alleys it necessarily implies or expresses a design that such passageway shall be used in connection with the lots and for the convenience of the owners in going from each lot to any and all the other lots in the tract so laid off. The making and filing of such a plat duly signed and acknowledged by the owner, . . . is equivalent to a declaration that such right is attached to each lot as an appurtenance. A subsequent deed for one of the lots, referring to the map for the description, carries such appurtenance as incident to the lot.’ ([Danielson v. Sykes (1910) 157 Cal. 686,] 690; see also Hocking v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1951) 37 Cal.2d 644, 650 [234 P.2d 625, 40 A.L.R.2d 1238] (‘It is established law in this state that the title to such a lot embraces an easement to use all of the streets disclosed on the subdivision map. . . .’) and Petitpierre v. Maguire (1909) 155 Cal. 242, 246-247 [100 P. 690].) This rule applies regardless of whether the city or county has ever accepted the right-of-ways laid out in the map, and whether or not the right-of-ways have ever been opened or used as streets or highways. [Citation.]” (Tract Development Services, Inc. v. Kepler (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1374, 1382; 6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2006) Easements, § 15:26, pp. 15-97 to 15-98.) These private easement rights in the streets shown on the map “exist entirely independent of the fact [the streets] have been dedicated to public use.” (6 Miller & Starr, supra, Easements, § 15:26, p. 15-100.)
Thus, when the developers sold the numbered lots in Wetherbee Lake subdivision by reference to the subdivision map, private appurtenant easement rights were created in the described roads on such map for the owners to go “from each lot to any and all the other lots[.]” (Danielson v. Sykes, supra, 157 Cal. at p. 690; Tract Development Services, Inc. v. Kepler, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at p. 1382.) The developers were also owners of property in the subdivision. They remained owners of the strip of land in the subdivision adjacent to the lake. As such they also had an implied private appurtenant easement in the roads described on the subdivision map, including Lake Avenue. (Tract Development Services, Inc. v. Kepler, supra, at p. 1384 [“each owner in the subdivision has the right to use every other owner’s property to travel both within and through the subdivision”].) We have been cited to no authority, and have found none, which limits such private access easements in the roads to any particular portion of the described roads and we reject such notion as contrary to the reason for implying such easements.
We conclude the developers owned, after the establishment of the subdivision and the initial sale of the lots fronting on Lake Avenue, (1) fee title to the strip of land shown on the original subdivision map as immediately adjacent to the lake, (2) fee title from that strip of land to the centerline of Lake Avenue (the north half of Lake Avenue) subject to both a potential public easement in the road and the implied private access easements in the road held by all the other lot owners, and (3) an implied private easement for access in the entirety of Lake Avenue and the other streets designated on the subdivision map.
We are cognizant of, and have reviewed carefully, appellants’ objections to the trial court’s statement of decision. Our legal conclusions in this opinion do not rely on inferences that the trial court decided in favor of plaintiffs on unresolved controverted issues or ambiguities brought to the attention of the trial court by appellants’ objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 634.)
By the time of appellant’s survey of the area in 1999, the original strip of land owned by the developers shown on the subdivision map had eroded away. Although the timing of such erosion was the subject of conflicting evidence, the trial court found “[f]rom the late 1950s to the present, there has been little or no erosion of the shoreline along Wetherbee Lake.” Substantial evidence supports such finding and based on such finding, it follows that the original strip of land was already gone at the time of the grants of virtually all of the dock easements to plaintiffs or their predecessors. At that point, the shoreline had moved by erosion into the north half of Lake Avenue. Nevertheless, the developers still owned the shoreline at the time of the dock easement grants. It is well settled “‘a boundary marked by a water line is a shifting boundary, going landward with erosion and waterward with accretion.’” (Lechuza Villas W. v. Cal. Coastal Com. (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 218, 239, quoting City of Oakland v. Buteau (1919) 180 Cal. 83, 87.) The northern boundary of the developers’ strip of land was marked by the shoreline of Wetherbee Lake. Such boundary moved with erosion into the north half of Lake Avenue, an area to which the developers still held fee title.
Only dock easement No. 49 was granted prior to the late 1950s.
Therefore, at the time of the grants of the dock easements to plaintiffs the developers still owned (1) fee title to what remained of the north half of Lake Avenue, including the shoreline of Wetherbee Lake, and (2) an implied private easement for access to the shoreline in the entirety of Lake Avenue. Contrary to the arguments of appellants, the developers had interests in the land sufficient to grant plaintiffs or their predecessors easement rights to use and access the shoreline of Wetherbee Lake. The next question is whether the developers did so.
II.
Interpretation Of The Dock Easement Deeds
A deed creating an easement is to be construed in the same manner as other grant deeds, which in turn are interpreted in the same way as contracts. (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 521-522.) “With deeds as any other contracts, ‘[t]he primary object of all interpretation is to ascertain and carry out the intention of the parties. [Citations.] All the rules of interpretation must be considered and each given its proper weight, where necessary, in order to arrive at the true effect of the instrument. [Citation.]’ (Burnett v. Piercy (1906) 149 Cal. 178, 189 [86 P. 603]; Civ. Code, § 1066; see Civ. Code, § 1635 et seq.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1856 et seq.) ‘Extrinsic evidence is “admissible to interpret the instrument, but not to give it a meaning to which it is not susceptible” [citations], and it is the instrument itself that must be given effect. [Citations.] It is therefore solely a judicial function to interpret a written instrument unless the interpretation turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence.’” (City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 232, 238.) “The task of the reviewing court has been described as placing itself in the position of the contracting parties in order to ascertain their intent at the time of the grant. [Citation.] If the intent of the parties can be derived from the plain meaning of the words used in the deed, the court need not, and should not, resort to technical rules of construction.” (Machado v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 347, 352-353.)
Here the parties agreed at trial that the developers adopted a general form of grant deed for the dock easements which reads: “in and to sixteen (16) foot frontage of the southerly shore line of Wetherbee Lake, as per plat thereof on file and of record in the office of the County Recorder of San Joaquin County, California, the Easterly and Westerly boundaries of which 16 foot frontage are marked by stakes placed in the ground by grantors, and being easement number __ as such easements are numbered Easterly commencing with number 1 at the East line of Oak Street; together with a right of access to such shore line [] at said place from Lake Avenue, that is shown on said plat.”
However, several of the deeds granting the dock easements to plaintiffs or their predecessors introduced into evidence at trial used the following language: “in and to sixteen (16) feet frontage of the southerly shore line of Wetherbee Lake, approximately opposite the Northerly end of Lot [__], in Block 4, of Wetherbee Lake Subdivision, Tract No. 2,as per plat thereof on file and of record in the office of the County Recorder of San Joaquin County, California, the Easterly and Westerly boundaries of which 16 foot frontage are marked by stakes placed in the ground by grantors, and being easement numbered [__] as such easements are numbered Easterly commencing with number 1 at the East line of Oak Street; together with a right of access to such shore line at said place from Lake Avenue, as shown on said plat.”
Appellants direct our attention to the language in the general form of deed that the easement granted was “in and to sixteen (16) foot frontage of the southerly shore line of Wetherbee Lake, as per plat thereof on file . . . together with a right of access to such shore line [] at said place from Lake Avenue, that is shown on said plat.” Appellants argue this plain language clearly shows the easement granted was located on the strip of land owned by the developers when the subdivision map was filed in 1933, i.e., that the easement was in the shoreline “as per plat thereof on file” and that access was to be from Lake Avenue as shown on the map. Thus, according to appellants, the deeds were either defective at the inception or the easements were extinguished when that strip of land eroded away.
To begin with, we note the specific deeds in the record include additional language preceding the phrase “as per plat thereof on file” on which appellants rely. The specific deeds state the easement granted is “in and to sixteen (16) feet frontage of the southerly shore line of Wetherbee Lake, approximately opposite the Northerly end of Lot [__], in Block 4, of Wetherbee Lake Subdivision, Tract No. 2, as per plat thereof on file.” (Italics added.) In these deeds, it appears the phrase “as per plat thereof on file” refers to the description of the lot across from which the specific easement is located, not the shoreline. It is such lot that is shown on the map.
However, even if we restrict our consideration to the standard form language of the easements, we do not agree with appellants that the plain language establishes the location of the easement was to be in the strip of land owned by the developers at the time of the filing of the subdivision map in 1933. The form language grants an easement in a sixteen foot “frontage” of the “shore line” of the lake, the eastern and western “boundaries of which . . . are marked by stakes placed in the ground by grantors[.]” The deed then states the number of the easement being granted “as such easements are numbered Easterly commencing with number 1 at the East line of Oak Street.” There can be no other conclusion from the combination of these words and phrases but that the developers intended to grant an easement in the shoreline as physically in existence and marked at the time of the grants.
Indeed, uncontradicted extrinsic evidence supports such conclusion. The shoreline was, in fact, marked with stakes with metal tabs on top indicating the number of the easement. Some of these stakes were still present before the 1997 flood and a few remained after the flood. Plaintiff Lawrence Piepmeier testified one of the original developers accompanied his parents and assisted them in the location of the easement they had purchased. Purchasers of the easements constructed and maintained docks from the existing shoreline of the lake. There was no evidence the developers objected to such construction. All of the conduct of the developers and the easement purchasers evidenced a practical understanding that the easements were in the existing shoreline. It is ludicrous to suggest they intended otherwise, that they only intended an easement if the shoreline still lay and remained within the developers’ original strip of land.
The easements also granted the purchasers a right of access to their easement from Lake Avenue, as such road was shown on the subdivision map. The language includes no restrictions on such access and there is nothing in the deed to limit such right of access to any particular portion of Lake Avenue. The road as a whole is referenced. The simple language suggests the developers intended to grant the purchasers the developers’ private easement of access to use the entirety of Lake Avenue to reach their numbered easements on the shoreline. Such access was still “from” Lake Avenue when the shoreline was located in the north half of Lake Avenue. If anything, the erosion of the shoreline into Lake Avenue reinforces our construction of the grant of access to the shoreline to be a grant of the developers’ private easement rights to access from the entire area of Lake Avenue as originally mapped.
Like the trial court, we conclude the developers “had the ability to and did grant to Plaintiffs or their predecessors a right to use a portion of the shoreline of Wetherbee Lake and the right to use the entirety of Lake Avenue for access to their dock easements[.]”
III.
Effect Of San Joaquin County Resolution No. R-95-78
In 1995, the San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors passed Resolution No. R-95-78 vacating and abandoning the portion of Lake Avenue between Ash Lane and Willow Avenue.
Appellants claim any private access easements held by plaintiffs or their predecessors in the eastern portion of Lake Avenue were extinguished when the county passed Resolution No. R-95-78 because an abandonment extinguishes all private easements created by virtue of ownership of a lot in a subdivision with a designated roadway except a private easement owned by an abutter. (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 8353, subd. (a).) Appellants argue plaintiffs and their predecessors are not “abutters.”
Plaintiffs claim their private access easement, implied from their general lot ownership, is not extinguished by the county’s abandonment of the public’s interest in the eastern portion of Lake Avenue. Plaintiffs argue they are “abutters” based on their dock easements to the shoreline of the lake. Plaintiffs contend Streets and Highways Code section 8353 (section 8353) cannot be constitutionally applied to them because their easements vested prior to its enactment. They claim the precursor statute to section 8353, Civil Code section 812 included a provision of necessity, which applies in this case.
We conclude section 8353 by its terms does not apply to plaintiffs’ dock easements and, therefore, we need not otherwise address the parties’ arguments.
The relevant portion of section 8353 provides as follows:
“(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b) [not applicable here], the vacation of a street or highway extinguishes all private easements therein claimed by reason of the purchase of a lot by reference to a map or plat upon which the street or highway is shown, other than a private easement of ingress and egress to the lot from or to the street or highway.”
Assuming without deciding that the county’s action in passing Resolution No. R-95-78 was a vacation of a street within the meaning of section 8353, plaintiffs’ private easements were not extinguished by section 8353 because plaintiffs claim their private dock easements by reason of their purchase of them from the developers separate from their purchase of their home lots. They do not claim their dock easements “by reason of the purchase of a lot by reference to a map or plat upon which the street or highway is shown[.]” They claim their easement rights by reason of the easement deeds. The county’s abandonment of its interest in the eastern portion of Lake Avenue had no effect on plaintiffs’ deeded dock easements. (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 8352, subd. (a); 6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate, supra, Easements, § 15:81, p. 15-271 [private rights of use that may have been acquired in the public right of way by express grant survive the abandonment of the public easement].)
As we have noted before, San Joaquin County never accepted the developers’ offer of dedication of the eastern portion of Lake Avenue. The eastern part of Lake Avenue never became a public road. It is unclear, therefore, whether San Joaquin County could “vacate” the road. Since we conclude section 8353 does not apply in any event, we need not consider this possible issue further.
In summary, the developers had fee title in the shoreline of Lake Wetherbee at the time they granted plaintiffs or their predecessors dock easements to such shoreline. The developers owned a private access easement to the shoreline from the entirety of Lake Avenue that they could and did transfer to plaintiffs or their predecessors by the deeds of dock easement. The county’s later abandonment of the eastern portion of Lake Avenue did not effect such easements. Given these conclusions, we need not reach appellants’ arguments regarding “historical use[,]” “secondary easement rights[,]” and plaintiffs’ “special rights as so-called abutters[.]”
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs/respondents are awarded costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P.J., MORRISON, J.