Opinion
No. 1:20-cv-30-JAJ
2021-10-27
Charles YOUNG, Jr., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF COUNCIL BLUFFS, IOWA; Colton Thompson; Michael Brown ; Corey Sherven, William Perry; Ryan Engle, and United States of America, Defendants.
Jack Bjornstad, Jack Bjornstad Law Office, Spirit Lake, IA, for Plaintiff. Sara E. Bauer, Council Bluffs City Attorneys Office, Council Bluffs, IA, for Defendants City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, Colton Thompson, Michael Brown. David L.D. Faith, William C. Purdy, United States Attorney's Office, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants Corey Sherven, William Pettery, Ryan Engle.
Jack Bjornstad, Jack Bjornstad Law Office, Spirit Lake, IA, for Plaintiff.
Sara E. Bauer, Council Bluffs City Attorneys Office, Council Bluffs, IA, for Defendants City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, Colton Thompson, Michael Brown.
David L.D. Faith, William C. Purdy, United States Attorney's Office, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants Corey Sherven, William Pettery, Ryan Engle.
ORDER
JOHN A. JARVEY, Chief Judge
This action arises out of a tragic error in arresting the plaintiff based on an arrest warrant that sought a different suspect. This matter is before the Court pursuant to two separate motions for summary judgment. Defendants Corey Sherven, William Perry, and Ryan Engle ("the Deputy Defendants") moved for summary judgment on August 19, 2021 [ECF No. 39], and Young resisted the Motion for Summary Judgment on September 9, 2021 [ECF No. 45]. The Deputy Defendants replied on September 16, 2021 [ECF No. 46]. Defendants City of Council Bluffs, Colton Thompson, and Michael Brown ("the City Defendants") filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on August 30, 2021 [ECF No. 44], and Young resisted the Motion on September 20, 2021 [ECF No. 47]. The City Defendants filed their reply on September 27, 2021 [ECF No. 50]. For the reasons that follow, the Deputy Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted , and the City Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted .
I. Background
This factual background is drawn from the parties’ statements of undisputed facts and responses thereto. In particular, the Court focuses on the admitted portions of each party's response to the statements of undisputed facts. Unless otherwise indicated, the facts here are undisputed as to all defendants.
In May 2018, the Superior Court of Washington in Spokane County, Washington issued an arrest warrant for Charles Young, with a date of birth of XX/XX/XXXX, for rape of a child in the first degree. The exact name that appeared on the warrant is unclear, and the parties did not submit a copy of the original warrant. At the very least, the warrant listed the name "Charles Young" accompanied by the middle initial "L" or middle name "Lee." Plaintiff's name is Charles Lee Young, Jr., his date of birth is July 31, 1984, and he formerly resided in Washington.
Deputy U.S. Marshal William Perry became involved with the criminal case in May 2018 to assist with the arrest warrant and tracking of the suspect. Deputy Perry requested a photograph of the suspect from the Spokane Police Department but was informed that they did not have one but that there was a Washington driver's license. He searched the Washington driver's license database and obtained the Plaintiff's driver's license record. Deputy Perry inputted Plaintiff's information into a national law enforcement database and discovered driver's licenses in Missouri and Iowa, and he also obtained Plaintiff's photograph.
On May 22, 2018, several law enforcement officials participated in the arrest of Young, who was believed to be the suspect, in Council Bluffs, Iowa. U.S. Deputy Marshals Sherven and Engle were present for the arrest along with two Council Bluffs police officers, Colton Thompson and Michael Brown. At some point during the arrest, one of the marshals pointed a rifle at Young. Young was compliant and did not resist the arrest. On May 24, 2018, a Spokane police detective determined Young was not the suspect in the Washington case and requested his release. A Spokane County Superior Court judge signed an order quashing the arrest warrant, and Young was released on May 26, 2018. The charges were dismissed.
Young filed this action based on his allegedly wrongful arrest. The defendants seek summary judgment on all counts.
II. Legal Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). It provides, further, that a "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explained:
"The movant ‘bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,’ and must identify ‘those portions of [the record] ... which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’ " Torgerson v. City of Rochester , 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (alterations in original) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). "If the movant does so, the nonmovant must respond by submitting evidentiary materials that set out ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). "The nonmovant ‘must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’ " Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ).
Mensie v. City of Little Rock , 917 F.3d 685, 688 (8th Cir. 2019).
More specifically, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Villanueva v. City of Scottsbluff , 779 F.3d 507, 510 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). Once the parties have met their burdens, the court may grant summary judgment only "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Torgerson , 643 F.3d at 1042–43 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Also, "[w]here ... the unresolved issues are primarily legal rather than factual, summary judgment is particularly appropriate." Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner , 779 F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Cochrane , 124 F.3d 978, 981–82 (8th Cir. 1997) ).
III. Analysis: Deputy Defendants
The Court first considers the Deputy Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts VII and VIII.
In a previous order, the Court dismissed Counts I, II, and IX as to the substituted party the United States of America.
A. Whether Counts VII and VIII May Proceed as Bivens Actions
Count VII alleges the Deputy Defendants violated Young's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure and excessive force, and Count VIII alleges the Deputy Defendants violated Young's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. Young brings these Counts pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). In Bivens , the U.S. Supreme Court authorized a direct cause of action against federal officials for damages based on a deprivation of constitutional rights. Id. at 397, 91 S.Ct. 1999. The U.S. Supreme Court has only recognized a cause of action under Bivens on three occasions. Farah v. Weyker , 926 F.3d 492, 497 (8th Cir. 2019) ; see Carlson v. Green , 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) ; Davis v. Passman , 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979) ; Bivens , 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619. In 2017, the Supreme Court stated expanding Bivens is "now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity." Ziglar v. Abbasi , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857, 198 L.Ed.2d 290 (2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). There is a presumption against expanding Bivens . Neb. Beef, Ltd. v. Greening , 398 F.3d 1080, 1084 (8th Cir. 2005).
Courts employ a two-step inquiry when determining whether to recognize a Bivens action. Ahmed v. Weyker , 984 F.3d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 2020). First, courts consider whether the case falls within one of the three Bivens claims recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court. Farah v. Weyker , 926 F.3d at 498. If the Supreme Court has recognized the context previously, the case may proceed. Id. If the case does not fall within one of the recognized actions, courts assess whether "any special factors counsel hesitation before implying a new cause of action." Ahmed , 984 F.3d at 567 (quoting Farah , 926 F.3d at 498 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Courts must reject the new cause of action if there is reason to hesitate before applying Bivens to a new context. Id. at 567–68.
The U.S. Supreme Court has set forth the following criteria for determining whether a case presents a new Bivens context:
If the case is different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by this Court, then the context is new. Without endeavoring to create an exhaustive list of differences that are meaningful enough to make a given context a new one, some examples might prove instructive. A case might differ in a meaningful way because of the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate under which the officer was operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or the presence of potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.
Ziglar , 137 S. Ct. at 1859–60. A modest extension of Bivens is still an extension. Id. at 1864.
As to the second consideration, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated:
This Court has not defined the phrase "special factors counselling hesitation." The necessary inference, though, is that the inquiry must concentrate on whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed. Thus, to be a "special factor counselling hesitation," a factor must cause a court to hesitate before answering that question in the affirmative.
Id. at 1857–58.
The Deputy Defendants contend Counts VII and VIII present a new Bivens context that has not been recognized by the Supreme Court. They further argue that special factors counsel hesitation before implying a damages remedy here. Young argues his claims are similar to Bivens and do not require an extension of Bivens .
Bivens arose out of a search and arrest of the plaintiff's apartment. Bivens , 403 U.S. at 389, 91 S.Ct. 1999. The plaintiff alleged federal officers entered his apartment and arrested him. Id. "The agents manacled petitioner in front of his wife and children, and threatened to arrest the entire family. They searched the apartment from stem to stern." Id. The U.S. Supreme Court held the plaintiff could sustain a cause of action for damages against the officers based on their unconstitutional conduct. Id.
1. Count VII
Here, the Court considers whether Count VII presents a new Bivens context and begins by analyzing whether Young's claim falls within one of the three recognized Bivens cases. Because Young proceeds on the theory that Count VII falls under Bivens , the Court does not consider whether his claims fall under Carlson v. Green or Davis v. Passman , although the Court does not believe they would.
Here, Young alleges that he was wrongfully arrested by federal officers and that the officers used excessive force in arresting him. "No Supreme Court case exactly mirrors the facts and legal issues presented here." Farah , 926 F.3d at 498 (citing Ziglar , 137 S. Ct. at 1859–60 ). The case before the Court meaningfully differs from Bivens in that the alleged wrongful conduct is different. The Supreme Court described Bivens as "a claim against FBI agents for handcuffing a man in his own home without a warrant...." Ziglar , 137 S. Ct. at 1860. In Bivens , the federal agents entered the plaintiff's apartment without a warrant, strip-searched the plaintiff, and threatened to arrest his entire family. 403 U.S. at 389, 91 S.Ct. 1999. There was no allegation that federal agents arrested the wrong person pursuant to an arrest warrant. Here, by contrast, Young was arrested outside of his home based on an arrest warrant that, at the very least, was for a suspect who had the same first name, last name, middle initial, and date of birth. There is no allegation that the officers threatened to arrest any of Young's family members. Additionally, Young contends one of the marshals pointed an automatic weapon at him and threatened to shoot him, no such threat occurred in Bivens . Based on the meaningful factual distinctions between Bivens and the case before the Court, the Court concludes that the Count VII claims present a new Bivens context.
Young and the Deputy Defendants are inconsistent as to exactly what name was listed on the warrant. In the Deputy Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, they assert the warrant listed "the Plaintiff's exact name." Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 2, ECF No. 39-1. In their Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, the Deputy Defendants state that the arrest warrant was issued for "Charles Lee Young, Jr." Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 1, ECF No. 39-2. Young does not dispute this in his Corrected Statement of Disputed Facts, where he lists the first paragraph as "undisputed." Pl.’s Corrected Statement of Disputed Facts ¶ 1, ECF No. 52. However, in response to other statements Young suggests the warrant listed "Charles L. Young." Id. ¶¶ 5–7. In their Reply Brief, the Deputy Defendants suggest the warrant listed either "Charles L. Young" or "Charles Lee Young." Reply Br. 1–2, ECF No. 46. Seeing as the parties did not submit a copy of the original warrant, the Court cannot be certain as to what was listed on the warrant. Because the Court must take all facts in the light most favorable to Young at this stage, the Court will proceed as if the warrant listed either "Charles L. Young" or "Charles Lee Young."
Granted, some similarities exist between Young's case and Bivens . Both cases involve allegations that the defendants violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable seizures and excessive force. See Bivens , 403 U.S. at 389, 91 S.Ct. 1999. However, a context can be new even if it implicates the same constitutional right as a previous case. Farah , 926 F.3d at 499 (citing Ziglar , 137 S. Ct. at 1859 ). Further, "it is not enough to identify a few similarities." Ahmed , 984 F.3d at 570. " ‘[A] modest extension is still an extension," ... even if it involves ‘the same constitutional provision ....’ " Id. (quoting Ziglar , 137 S. Ct. at 1864 ; Hernandez v. Mesa , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743, 206 L.Ed.2d 29 (2020) ). It is also evident that not every excessive force case falls within Bivens ’s purview. See Mesa , 140 S. Ct. at 743 (concluding an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment was a new Bivens context based on factual distinctions between the case and Bivens ).
Having concluded Young's case presents a new Bivens context, the Court next considers whether any special factors exist causing the Court to hesitate before finding a new implied cause of action. The Deputy Defendants argue that special factors bar extending Bivens to encompass Young's claim. Specifically, they contend that the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") is an alternative process. They also argue that Congress's silence is telling and that permitting Young's claim could have a chilling effect on law enforcement. Young contends his claim does not intrude on the Executive Branch because the Executive Branch should be aware that drawing a weapon is not an issue unless the weapon remains drawn after officers determine the suspect is not a threat. He also notes that Bivens itself did not identify any special factors counseling hesitation for the excessive force claim.
Courts are unlikely to entertain a damages action where Congress has not authorized a damages remedy even though it has taken other action in the area and when an alternative remedial structure exists. Farah , 926 F.3d at 500 (citing Ziglar , 137 S. Ct. at 1858, 1862–63 ). The Court first considers whether an alternative remedial structure exists. The alternative remedial structure must offer "deterrence and compensation" that is "roughly similar" to that available under Bivens . Minneci v. Pollard , 565 U.S. 118, 120, 130, 132 S.Ct. 617, 181 L.Ed.2d 606 (2012). Even assuming Young could bring a viable claim under the FTCA, The Supreme Court has recognized the FTCA does not provide an adequate alternative remedy. See Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko , 534 U.S. 61, 68, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001). FTCA claims are brought against the United States, and "the threat of suit against the United States [is] insufficient to deter the unconstitutional acts of individuals." Id. Bivens actions, however, are against individuals, making them a more effective deterrent. Id. The Court therefore concludes the FTCA does not provide an adequate alternative remedy to Young's Bivens claim. See id. However, the lack of an alternative remedy alone does not compel the Court to imply a cause of action for damages. See Quintero Perez v. United States , 8 F.4th 1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Schweiker v. Chilicky , 487 U.S. 412, 421–22, 108 S.Ct. 2460, 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988) ).
The Court next considers whether Congress has taken action in this area without authorizing a damages remedy. The Deputy Defendants contend Congress regularly acts within the realm of criminal justice yet has not authorized a damages remedy for Young's proposed cause of action. Even if Congress does regularly enact laws pertaining to criminal justice, the Deputy Defendants do not cite any specific actions by Congress. Accordingly, the Court does not find this factor to counsel hesitation.
Next, the Court considers whether the Deputy Defendants’ asserted chilling effect on law enforcement activity is a special factor counseling hesitation. The Deputy Defendants’ cite to Vennes v. An Unknown Number of Unidentified Agents of the United States of America to support their contention that the potential chilling effect on legitimate law enforcement activity counsels hesitation here. In Vennes , the plaintiff brought a Bivens action against federal officers for violating his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights by entrapping him and causing an improper indictment to be filed against him. 26 F.3d 1448, 1449 (8th Cir. 1994). In declining to imply a Bivens cause of action as to the defendant's substantive due process claim, the Eighth Circuit concluded special factors counseled hesitation. Id. at 1452. Notably, the Eighth Circuit believed expanding Bivens "would have a chilling effect on law enforcement officers and would flood the federal courts with constitutional damage claims by the many criminal defendants who leave the criminal process convinced that they have been prosecuted and convicted unfairly." Id.
Although Vennes presented a different claim than the one before the Court, the Court finds the Eighth Circuit's recognition of a chilling effect on law enforcement activity as a factor counseling hesitation to be instructive. Here, the Deputy Defendants arrested Young pursuant to a valid arrest warrant for a suspect who shared his first name, middle initial, last name, date of birth, and had previously resided in Washington. Implying a new cause of action in this context would undoubtedly cause a chilling effect in law enforcement's execution of validly issued warrants. The judiciary is not well suited to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of permitting Young's cause of action to proceed, absent congressional instruction. See Ziglar , 137 S. Ct. at 1857–58. Congress is better suited to "consider if the public interest would be served by imposing a new substantive legal liability." Id. at 1857 (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he concept of ‘special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress’ has proved to include an appropriate judicial deference to indications that congressional inaction has not been inadvertent." Schweiker , 487 U.S. at 423, 108 S.Ct. 2460. This factor counsels hesitation.
Finally, the Court considers an additional factor that it believes to be implicated here—the risk of interference with other branches of government. Adopting Young's claims would involve probing into the evidence available to federal investigators and other officers involved in executing warrants. It would also involve delving into and judging the investigatory decisions made by federal officers. This kind of intrusion was not present in Bivens . Accordingly, this factor also counsels hesitation.
In sum, Count VII presents a new Bivens context, and the Court declines to extend Bivens because special factors counsel hesitation. The Deputy Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment as to Count VII.
2. Count VIII
The Court next considers Count VIII which alleges the Deputy Defendants violated Young's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. Specifically, Young alleges the Deputy Defendants violated his due process right by arresting him without taking steps to verify he was the person listed in the warrant. He also alleges the Deputy Defendants violated his due process rights by threatening him with an automatic rifle. In their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Deputy Defendants note Young's Fourteenth Amendment claim is only applicable to the states. Even if Young intended to allege a Fifth Amendment substantive due process claim, the Deputy Defendants contend that Young's claim presents a new Bivens context. Young states he brought both a Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claim out of an abundance of caution, recognizing courts typically prefer the Fourth Amendment when analyzing the arrest of the wrong person pursuant to an arrest warrant.
Young's claim, regardless of whether it is a Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment claim, undoubtedly presents a new Bivens claim. His claim does not mirror any recognized Bivens cause of action. See Carlson , 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468 (implying a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment for a claim against prison officials who failed to treat the plaintiff's asthma ); Davis , 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264 (recognizing a cause of action for gender discrimination based on the Fifth Amendment); Bivens , 403 U.S. at 389, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (recognizing a cause of against FBI agents who handcuffed the plaintiff and searched his home without a warrant). The same factors counseling hesitation that the Court recognized with Count VII also apply here. The Deputy Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment as to Count VIII.
B. Qualified Immunity as to the Deputy Defendants
Even if Young had set forth a valid Bivens action, the Deputy Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity as to Counts VII and VIII. "Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ). Courts have the discretion to consider either of these factors first. Ivey v. Audrain County , 968 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir. 2020).
As to the first prong, courts "consider whether a constitutional violation ... in fact occurred." Jackson v. Stair , 944 F.3d 704, 710–11 (8th Cir. 2019). "[T]he right allegedly violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity...." Craighead v. Lee , 399 F.3d 954, 962 (8th Cir. 2005). As to the second prong, "A clearly established right is one that is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’ " Morgan v. Robinson , 920 F.3d 521, 523 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Reichle v. Howards , 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) ). "The Supreme Court has cautioned courts not to define clearly established law at too high a level of generality." Ivey , 968 F.3d at 849 (citing Kisela v. Hughes , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152, 200 L.Ed.2d 449 (2018) (per curiam)). Young bears the burden of proving the law is clearly established. Wagner v. Jones , 664 F.3d 259, 273 (8th Cir. 2011).
1. Count VII
Count VII alleges the Deputy Defendants violated two separate rights protected by the Fourth Amendment, the right to be free from unreasonable seizure and the right to be free from excessive force. The Deputy Defendants characterize the first right as the right to have the identity of a person named in an arrest warrant re-investigated before an arrest. They characterize the second right as the right not to be yelled at or have a gun pointed at you during an arrest for a serious felony. By contrast, Young defines the right as the right to be free from excessive force.
a. Whether a Constitutional Violation Occurred
First, the Court considers whether the Deputy Defendants violated Young's constitutional rights. The Court begins with the unreasonable seizure claim. Assuming the right exists, a constitutional violation did not occur as to the unreasonable seizure claim. When "a government official's act causing injury to life, liberty, or property is merely negligent, ‘no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required.’ " Wells v. Walker , 852 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting Daniels v. Williams , 474 U.S. 327, 333, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) ). Although Wells v. Walker and Daniels v. Williams involved § 1983 claims, the Court concludes the same logic applies here because Bivens claims are the "more limited" "federal analog" to § 1983 claims. See Mesa , 140 S. Ct. at 747. Meaning, negligent conduct is insufficient to state a constitutional claim. See id. ; Daniels , 474 U.S. at 333, 106 S.Ct. 662 ; Wells , 852 F.2d at 372. Essentially, Young contends that with further investigation, the Deputy Defendants would have known they were arresting the wrong man. These allegations, accepted as true, at most, constitute negligence.
The Court next considers whether a constitutional violation occurred as to the excessive force claim. "An officer's use of excessive force violates the Fourth Amendment if ‘objectively unreasonable.’ " Wilson v. Lamp , 901 F.3d 981, 989 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Graham , 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ). "Objective unreasonableness is ‘judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,’ in light of ‘the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’ " Id. (quoting Graham , 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ).
Here, there are several noteworthy facts that Young disputes in his Corrected Statement of Disputed Facts and his brief in resistance for which he has provided no evidence in the record to support his position. Young disputes ¶ 11 of the Deputy Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, which states that Young alleges an officer threatened to shoot him if he did not get on the ground and that the same officer kept a rifle pointed at him while he was on the ground. Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 11, ECF No. 39-2 at 4; Pl.’s Corrected Statement of Disputed Facts ¶ 11, ECF No. 52 at 5. In response, Young contends a marshal kept an assault rifle pointed at him even after he was handcuffed and brought to his feet, he cites his deposition testimony to support this contention. Pl.’s Corrected Statement of Disputed Facts ¶ 11, ECF No. 52 at 5. Young also disputes ¶ 12 which states that the officers arrested him quickly and that he was probably only on the ground for one or two minutes. Id. ¶ 12, ECF No. 52 at 5; App. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B, 14, 15, ECF No. 39-3 at 15, 16.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that a party who argues a fact is genuinely disputed must support that contention by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record ...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (emphasis added). Local Rule 56(b) requires a party responding to a statement of material fact that is not admitted to support their response with a citation to the appendix where records supporting the position can be found. LR 56(b). The failure to respond to an individual fact with an appendix citation and supporting documents may result in the admission of that fact. Id. Young cites pages 76 and 82 of his deposition to support his position that an assault rifle was pointed at him even after he was handcuffed; however, these pages are not in the record. As to whether the officers arrested Young quickly, in the deposition testimony that is in the record, Young states the officers arrested him quickly and that he was only on the ground for one or two minutes. The Court is not bound to accept Young's unsupported facts and will not do so. Based on the undisputed facts that are supported by the record, the Court concludes the Deputy Defendants did not act unreasonably. The Deputy Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Count VII.
b. Whether the Rights Are Clearly Established
Although the Court has concluded no constitutional violations occurred and the Deputy Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity on that basis alone, the Court still considers whether the disputed rights were clearly established. "For officials to lose the benefit of qualified immunity, the law must be clearly established at the time of the incident because ‘reasonably competent public official[s] should know the law governing [their] conduct.’ " Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Harlow , 457 U.S. at 818–19, 102 S.Ct. 2727 ). Young defines the right at stake at "too high a level of generality" for his unreasonable seizure claim. Ivey , 968 F.3d at 849. The Court frames the right as the right to have law enforcement conduct further investigation to confirm a suspect's identity after a warrant has been issued for the suspect's arrest. Young has not cited, and the Court has not found, any decision showing that the violative nature of the conduct at issue here is clearly established. A reasonable officer would not have known his conduct violated Young's rights. Further, a constitutional violation is not obvious from the alleged conduct. Accordingly, the Court concludes the Deputy Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to the unreasonable seizure claim.
As to the excessive force claim, Young again defines the right at stake at "too high a level of generality." Id. The Court frames the right as the right not to have a gun pointed at you for a brief amount of time after being handcuffed during an arrest for a serious felony. The Court concludes this right was not clearly established at the time of Young's arrest. Young cites Wilson v. Lamp as recognizing that the right to be free from excessive force during an arrest is clearly established. In Wilson , officers pulled over the plaintiff after receiving information that a suspect was driving the vehicle. 901 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 2018). Before the stop, officers believed the vehicle was driven by the plaintiff's brother, who had outstanding arrest warrants and who officers believed to be a convicted child molester. Id. The officers approached the vehicle with their guns drawn, and the plaintiff put his hands up after being ordered to do so. Id. At this point, one of the officers recognized the plaintiff and knew he was not the suspect. Id. Nevertheless, the officers ordered the plaintiff out of the vehicle, threw him against the truck, and patted him down. Id. Officers pointed a gun at the plaintiff for the entirety of the stop. Id. The Eighth Circuit concluded it was not excessive force for the officers to approach the vehicle with their weapons drawn. Id. at 990. However, based on the facts set forth, including the fact that the officers recognized the plaintiff and knew he was not the suspect, the Eighth Circuit concluded "the continuous drawing and pointing of weapons constitutes excessive-force." Id.
Although Wilson v. Lamp was decided several months after Young's arrest, the Eighth Circuit concluded the right to be free from excessive force was clearly established as of 2014. 901 F.3d 981, 985, 990–91 (8th Cir. 2018).
However, not every instance where an officer points a gun at a non-resisting suspect gives rise to a constitutional violation. Following Wilson , the Eighth Circuit considered its application in Pollreis v. Marzolf . In Pollreis , a police officer kept his gun pointed at several boys, who he believed were the armed suspects police were searching for, even after they complied with his commands. 9 F.4th 737, 741, 747 (8th Cir. 2021). After considering Wilson , the Eighth Circuit found Pollreis to be factually distinguishable. Id. at 748. Noteworthy to the court was the fact that the officer lacked personal knowledge that the boys were not in fact the suspects sought. Id.
Pollreis v. Marzolf was decided in 2021; however, the conduct at issue occurred in January 2018, several months before Young's arrest. 9 F.4th 737, 741 (8th Cir. 2021).
The case before the Court is factually distinguishable from Wilson . Here, there is no allegation that the Deputy Defendants knew that Young was not the suspect named in the arrest warrant. Young was suspected of committing a very serious crime, rape of a child in the first degree. This case is also distinguishable from Rochell v. City of Springdale Police Department . In Rochell , the plaintiff alleged the officer held a gun to his ear and said, "I'll blow your f*****g brains out if you ever approach me like that again." 768 F. App'x 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2019) (Colloton, J., concurring). This occurred after the plaintiff was on the ground, with his hands behind his back, and his weapon laying several feet away from him. Rochell v. City of Springdale Police Dep't , 5:16-CV-5093, 2017 WL 4817883, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 25, 2017). Here, the parties do not suggest, nor is there any evidence indicating, that the marshal threatened to shoot Young after he was on the ground and handcuffed. Finally, as the Court noted above, it is not obligated to accept as true Young's unsupported statements that a marshal pointed an assault rifle at him even after he was handcuffed and brought to his feet. On the undisputed facts that are supported by the record, this matter is distinguishable from Wilson and Rochell , and Young cannot demonstrate that the alleged right was clearly established on these facts. The Deputy Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to the excessive force claim.
2. Count VIII
The Court next considers whether the Deputy Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Count VIII. Even assuming the rights set forth in Count VIII exist, a constitutional violation cannot be shown. First, Young brings Count VIII against federal officials pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment applies to states, not federal employees. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1 ; San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm. , 483 U.S. 522, 543 n.21, 107 S.Ct. 2971, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987). Accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment cannot provide the basis for Young's due process claim. Young's claim would also fail if brought under the Fifth Amendment. Supreme Court precedent clearly indicates the Fourth Amendment—not the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment due process clause—is the appropriate mechanism for violations arising from unreasonable seizures and excessive force. Graham , 490 U.S. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ("[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness standard, rather than under a ‘substantive due process’ approach."); see United States v. Lanier , 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). A constitutional violation cannot be shown, and Young has not demonstrated that the disputed right is clearly established. The Deputy Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity as to Count VIII.
IV. Analysis: City Defendants
The Court next considers the City Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. The City Defendants moved for summary judgment as to Counts I–VI and Count IX.
A. Immunity
The City Defendants contend they are entitled to immunity as to all federal and state constitutional claims. The Court addresses each of these claims for immunity below.
1. All Due Care Immunity for All City Defendants: Counts I–IV
The Court begins by examining whether the City Defendants are entitled to all due care immunity for the state constitutional claims. A government official is entitled to immunity for constitutional torts if they exercise "all due care" in the execution of their duties. Baldwin v. City of Estherville (Baldwin II) , 915 N.W.2d 259, 281 (Iowa 2018). The all due care immunity defense also applies to municipalities. Baldwin v. City of Estherville (Baldwin III) , 333 F. Supp. 3d 817, 832 (N.D. Iowa 2018). Although Iowa appellate courts have not yet defined the exact contours of all due care immunity, this Court recently considered the issue in Saunders v. Thies . In Saunders , the Court concurred with former-District Judge Mark Bennett's analysis of the relevant factors to the analysis. Saunders v. Thies , 4:19-cv-191-JAJ-HCA, 2020 WL 10731253, at *10–11 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 8, 2020). Accordingly, the Court believes the all due care standard is likely breached when a government official acts with "negligence," "bad faith," "malice and lack of probable cause," or a "lack of ‘reasonable ground’ for the conduct in question." Baldwin III , 333 F. Supp. 3d at 842–45.
As it did in Saunders , the Court asks two questions to determine whether all due care immunity applies. First, whether the defendants violated an Iowa constitutional right. 2020 WL 10731253, at *11 (citing Ivey , 968 F.3d at 849 ). Second, if a violation has been proved—or, at summary judgment, if the plaintiff has generated a genuine issue of material fact that there was a violation—the court considers whether the officer "exercised all due care to conform to the requirements of the law." Baldwin II , 915 N.W.2d at 281 ; cf. Ivey , 968 F.3d at 849 (explaining that, for purposes of federal qualified immunity, if there was a violation of a federal constitutional right, the second question is "whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's conduct"). If the answer to both questions is yes , then the individual defendants are not entitled to "Baldwin immunity" to an Iowa constitutional claim. Nevertheless, as with federal qualified immunity, this court concludes that courts "have the discretion to decide either question first." Cf. id. " ‘[E]xercising all due care to conform with the requirements of the law’ imposes a greater burden on defendants than not violating ‘clearly established ... constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ " Baldwin III , 333 F. Supp. 3d at 843 (quoting Harlow , 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 ).
a. Counts I and III
Count I alleges a violation of Young's right to be free from unreasonable seizure and excessive force under article I, § 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Count III alleges the same violation but is brought pursuant to the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act ("IMTCA"). The parties do not set forth a specific standard for the unreasonable seizure and excessive force claims under Iowa law. Rather, the parties adopt the federal standard. Defs. City of Council Bluffs, Colton Thompson, & Michael Brown Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 7, 9, ECF No. 44-2; Br. Supp. Pl.’s Resis. Defs. City of Council Bluffs, Colton Thompson, & Michael Brown's Mot. Summ. J. 9, 11, ECF No. 47-1. The Court does the same. See State v. Tyler , 830 N.W.2d 288, 291–92 (Iowa 2013) (noting the Iowa Supreme Court generally applies the substantive federal standards when a party alleges both federal and state constitutional claims but does not articulate a standard other than the federal approach, although it reserves the right to apply a more stringent standard). Accordingly, a warrantless arrest that lacks probable cause is a constitutional violation. Robbins v. City of Des Moines , 984 F.3d 673, 679 (8th Cir. 2021). As to the excessive force claim, force is excessive when it is objectively unreasonable. See Wilson , 901 F.3d at 989.
Based on the undisputed facts that are supported by the record, the Court concludes no Iowa constitutional violation occurred as to Counts I and III and the City Defendants exercised all due care to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law. It was not negligent for the City Defendants to assist in the execution of the arrest warrant at the request of the U.S. Marshal Service. Further, it was not negligent for the City Defendants not to second guess the deputy marshals, who have immunity, that Young was the subject of the arrest warrant. The nature of the suspected offense was such that prompt action was required. Additionally, the nature of the arrest does not give rise to negligence for the City Defendants’ mere assistance in effectuating the arrest warrant. Finally, the Court is unpersuaded by Young's contention that the warrant was invalid and did not provide probable cause to arrest him. Young was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant for a suspect who had the same first name, middle initial, last name, and birthdate as him. The City Defendants had reasonable grounds to assist in Young's arrest and acted with all due care to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law in assisting with the arrest. Additionally, there is no evidence of bad faith, malice and lack of probable cause, or a lack of a reasonable ground for the City Defendants’ conduct. The City Defendants are entitled to all due care immunity as to Counts I and III.
For the same reasons articulated in section III.B.1.a, the Court does not consider Young's allegations that are unsupported by the record.
b. Counts II and IV
Count II alleges a violation of Young's right to due process under article I, § 9 of the Iowa Constitution, and Count IV alleges the same violation but pursuant to the IMTCA. The Court concludes the City Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim because Young's excessive force and unreasonable seizure claims are more properly brought under article I, § 8 of the Iowa Constitution. The Iowa Supreme Court has not yet considered whether an unreasonable seizure claim can be properly brought under article I, § 9 of the Iowa Constitution. See Williams v. City of Burlington , 516 F. Supp. 3d 851, 870 (S.D. Iowa 2021). However, the Iowa Supreme Court generally " ‘interpret[s] the scope and purpose of the Iowa Constitution's search and seizure provisions to track with federal interpretations of the Fourth Amendment’ because of their nearly identical language." State v. Brown , 930 N.W.2d 840, 847 (Iowa 2019) (quoting State v. Christopher , 757 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Iowa 2008) ). "[T]he Court sees no reason why Iowa courts would depart from federal interpretation to allow an unreasonable seizure to be pursued under article I, section 9, particularly when article I, section 8 is available." Williams , 516 F. Supp. 3d at 870. Even if Young could properly bring this claim, the City Defendants would be entitled to all due care immunity for the same reasons outlined above in section IV.A.1.a.
2. Discretionary Function Immunity for the City: Counts III and IV
Counts III and IV alleges constitutional violations and are brought pursuant to the IMCTA. Both Counts are brought pursuant to the IMTCA. The City Defendants contend they are immune from liability based on the discretionary function exception. Iowa Code § 670.2(1) states: "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, every municipality is subject to liability for its torts and those of its officers and employees, acting within the scope of their employment or duties, whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function." Iowa Code § 670.2(1). The Iowa Code further states:
1. The liability imposed by section 670.2 shall have no application to any claim enumerated in this section. As to any of the following claims, a municipality shall be liable only to the extent liability may be imposed by the express statute dealing with such claims and, in the absence of such express statute, the municipality shall be immune from liability:
...
c. Any claim based upon an act or omission of an officer or employee of the municipality, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute, ordinance, or regulation whether the statute, ordinance or regulation is valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of the municipality or an officer or employee of the municipality, whether or not the discretion is abused.
First, the Court notes that Iowa Code § 670.4(1)(c) only provides for municipal immunity, not of individual government officials. Saunders , 2020 WL 10731253, *9–10. Under the IMTCA, "a municipality can be ‘vicariously immune’ from liability for its employees’ constitutional torts when the employees would be immune from personal liability." Baldwin v. City of Estherville (Baldwin V) , 929 N.W.2d 691, 696 (Iowa 2019). "If the officers exercised due care in executing an ordinance, the City would be immune pursuant to section 670.4(1)(c)." Id. at 698. Iowa courts apply a two-prong test when analyzing a claim for discretionary function immunity. Goodman v. City of Le Claire , 587 N.W.2d 232, 237 (Iowa 1998). First, courts consider the nature of the disputed conduct, analyzing whether the conduct involved "a matter of choice for the acting employee." Id. (quoting Berkovitz v. United States , 486 U.S. 531, 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988) ). Second, "court[s] must determine whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield." Id. (quoting Berkovitz , 486 U.S. at 536–37, 108 S.Ct. 1954 ). Iowa courts consider federal decisions interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act to be persuasive authority in interpreting the IMTCA. Id. at 236.
Because the Court concluded that Defendants Thompson and Brown acted with all due care and are immune from liability for the Iowa constitutional torts, the City of Council Bluffs is vicariously immune from liability for the same claims. See Baldwin V , 929 N.W.2d at 696, 698. Nevertheless, the Court briefly analyzes whether the City can otherwise satisfy the two-prong discretionary function immunity test. The decision to effectuate an arrest generally involves the exercise of judgment or choice. Deuser v. Vecera , 139 F.3d 1190, 1195 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Law enforcement decisions of the kind involved in making or terminating an arrest must be within the discretion and judgment of enforcing officers.") (citation omitted); Redmond v. United States , 518 F.2d 811, 816–17 (7th Cir. 1975) ("It cannot be denied that the Government has a duty to maintain law and order, but how best to fulfill this duty is wholly within the discretion of its officers ...."). Decisions regarding the proper way to effectuate an arrest warrant are undoubtedly the kind of judgment calls the discretionary exception is designed to shield. See generally Hart v. United States , 630 F.3d 1085, 1090 (8th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, the City is also entitled to discretionary function immunity as to Counts III and IV.
3. Qualified Immunity: Counts V and VI
The Court next considers whether Defendants Brown and Thompson are entitled to qualified immunity as to Counts V and VI. Count V alleges a violation of Young's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure and excessive force under the U.S. Constitution, and Count VI alleges a violation of Young's right to due process of law pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Both Counts are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The qualified immunity analysis is identical for § 1983 claims and Bivens actions. Wilson v. Layne , 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999). Section 1983 claims must be based on intentional conduct, negligent conduct is insufficient to state a § 1983 claim. Davis v. Hall , 992 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Daniels , 474 U.S. at 334, 106 S.Ct. 662 ).
Defendants Brown and Thompson are entitled to qualified immunity as to Counts V and VII for the same reasons the Deputy Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to Counts VII and VIII as articulated in section III.B. Additionally, the Defendants Brown and Thompson are entitled to qualified immunity as to the excessive force claim because neither of them pointed the rifle at Young. Despite Young's arguments to the contrary, Brown and Thompson's mere assistance in effectuating the arrest warrant does not make them liable for the deputy marshal's conduct. Defendants Brown and Thompson had no obligation to intervene and their failure to do so does not rise to a constitutional violation. Brown and Thompson are entitled to qualified immunity as to Counts V and VI.
B. Count IX: All City Defendants
Finally, the Court considers Count IX, which is a false arrest claim. Under Iowa law, a false arrest claim has two elements "(1) detention or restraint against one's will, and (2) unlawfulness of the detention or restraint." Thomas v. Marion Cty. , 652 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Iowa 2002) (citations omitted). The City Defendants contend that an arrest made pursuant to an arrest warrant cannot serve as the basis for a false arrest claim. Young argues the arrest was unlawful because there was a lack of probable cause for his arrest. Young contends a reasonably competent officer should have recognized the arrest warrant did not authorize his arrest because the warrant included a different name.
Here, for the purpose of this motion, the Court assumes that the first element is met and proceeds to the second element. Generally, an arresting officer is protected from liability for false arrest when an arrest is made on a facially valid warrant. Id. ; Baldwin v. Estherville, Iowa , 218 F. Supp. 3d 987, 1003 (N.D. Iowa 2016) ; Wilson v. Lapham , 196 Iowa 745, 195 N.W. 235, 238 (1923) ("The rule is universal that, where an arrest is made by an officer in possession of a warrant regular and valid upon its face, and issued by a magistrate having jurisdiction of the subject–matter, it affords complete protection to the officer and informant."). The Superior Court of Washington in Spokane County, Washington issued a valid arrest warrant for the arrest of a suspect with the same first name, middle initial, last name, and date of birth as Young. Despite Young's arguments to the contrary, the Deputy Defendants are protected from liability for assisting in Young's arrest based on the facially valid warrant.
The Court concludes Young has failed to generate a genuine issue of material fact as to the unlawfulness of his detention or restraint. The City Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment as to Count IX.
V. Conclusion
Upon the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED that the United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 39] is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the City Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 44] is granted.
The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of the Defendants.