Opinion
NO. 2015-CA-000669-MR
03-11-2016
GEOFFREY YOUNG APPELLANT v. STEVEN L. BESHEAR, JACK CONWAY, ALISON LUNDERGAN GRIMES, DAN LOGSDON, AND PATRICK HUGHES APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Geoffrey Young, Pro Se Lexington, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Mark D. Guilfoyle Crestview Hills, Kentucky Jon Salomon Louisville, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 15-CI-00214 OPINION
AFFIRMING BEFORE: CLAYTON, JONES AND TAYLOR, JUDGES. CLAYTON, JUDGE: Geoffrey M. Young, pro se, appeals from the Opinion and Order of the Franklin Circuit Court entered on May 1, 2015. After a review of the record and in consideration of the arguments presented, we affirm the decision of the Franklin Circuit Court.
Background
Young filed a complaint against Governor Steven L. Beshear, Secretary of State Alison Lundergan Grimes, Attorney General Jack Conway, State Democratic Central Committee Chair Dan Logsdon, and State Democratic Central Committee (Successor) Chair, Patrick Hughes. The governor, the secretary of state, and the attorney general were not sued in their elected capacities. The Kentucky Democratic Party (KDP) and the Executive Committee of the KDP were also not sued. However, all five appellees were sued for conspiracy to defraud the Kentucky democratic voters, corruption, cronyism, and intentional violation of the KDP bylaws.
Young stated that on February 9, 2015, Governor Beshear, Secretary of State Grimes, and Attorney General Conway held a "Unity Press Conference" at the KDP Headquarters. During this conference, "Beshear, Conway, and Grimes expressed their unity with and support for each other and the other Democrats attending the event." Young who is a member of the KDP as well as a Democratic candidate for Governor, states that he was denied an opportunity to speak at the event. He alleges that he repeatedly tried to contact Gov. Beshear and Hughes to demand a hearing with the KDP's Executive Committee as allowed by KDP's bylaws. Young accused both Gov. Beshear and Hughes of intentionally violating the KDP bylaws that prohibited a Democratic Party Officer, acting in his or her official capacity, to endorse or support one Democratic candidate over another candidate in the primary election. Young argued that both Logsdon and Hughes were complicit in holding this conference; that Young was never invited to attend the press conference; and that Logsdon was aware that Young was the opponent of Conway, and therefore Logsdon acted in bad faith as well as in blatant violation of the bylaws.
Young had also expressed interest in getting Logsdon removed as KDP chair and either being named himself as chair or to serve on the Search Committee to find a replacement for Logsdon. The complaint alleged that Logsdon was improperly replaced by Hughes through the efforts of Beshear and Conway. According to Young, their actions amount to a conspiracy to intentionally violate the KDP bylaws which require that notice is to be given concerning the procedures for the selection of Democratic Party officers and representatives. The bylaws also require the publication of qualifications to hold a party office. The complaint alleged cronyism in the installation of Hughes. It further alleged corruption in their effort to minimize any primary opponent which would allow Conway and Grimes to save their money fighting a primary opponent in order to have more money available in the general election.
Young argued that the intentional violation of KDP bylaws constituted fraud because it resulted in convincing Kentucky democrats that the leaders conducted party affairs in an ethical way. Young sought various claims of relief including but not limited to monetary damages, dismissal from any offices or positions that the appellees held in the Democratic Party, and a public apology. The appellees filed a "Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint" for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.02(f). The court granted the motion on May 1, 2015, determining that a political question is not appropriate to be determined by the court. The court held that intraparty political disputes are not justiciable.
Standard of Review
Carruthers v. Edwards, 395 S.W.3d 488, 491(Ky. App. 2012) states:
CR 12.02(f) sets forth the standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim.
The court should not grant the motion unless it appears the pleading party would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved in support of his claim. In making this decision, the circuit court is not required to make any factual determination; rather, the question is purely a matter of law. Stated another way, the court must ask if the facts alleged in the complaint can be proved, would the plaintiff be entitled to relief?
We begin our analysis pursuant to the aforementioned standards.
James v . Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 883-84 (Ky. App. 2002) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). We review dismissals under CR 12.02(f) de novo, accepting as true the plaintiff's factual allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 868-69 (Ky. App. 1987); Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Ky. 1968) ("For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the complaint the pleading must not be construed against the pleader and the allegations must be accepted as true.").
Analysis
The trial court relied upon Davis v. Hambrick, 51 L.R.A. 671, 22 Ky.L.Rptr. 815, 109 Ky. 276, 58 S.W. 779 (Ky. 1900), and found that Young only identified alleged violations of the KDP bylaws, therefore there was no statutory prohibition or authority which would allow the court to intervene. The Davis case held that political parties were voluntary associations for political purposes with their own rules, and concluded that any disagreements were essentially political and not judicial. Young argues to this Court that the trial court's reliance on this case is "fatally flawed" and cites Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S. Ct. 757 (1944), in support of his position that political parties' intraparty disputes are justiciable.
We agree with the trial court that Young does not have any claim upon which relief can be granted. The Davis case clearly disallows courts from interfering with intraparty disputes in political parties. The case of Rosenberg v. Republican Party of Jefferson County, 270 S.W.2d 171 (Ky. 1954), also follows this line of reasoning and expands it to discuss Section 6 of the Kentucky Constitution. In the Rosenberg case, the Republican candidate Rosenberg brought suit to restrain the local Republican Party from endorsing and actively supporting another candidate in the primary election. Rosenberg alleged that the appellees were engaged in a conspiracy to use the local party's money and influence to effectuate the nomination of someone else. The Court held that:
Section 6 of our Constitution provides that, 'All elections shall be free and equal.' That section has been construed by this Court as applying only to general elections. Davis v . Stahl, 287 Ky. 629, 154 S.W.2d 736; Montgomery v. Chelf, 118 Ky. 766, 82 S.W. 388. Clearly it has no application to this case.
....
Whether the Constitution and By-Laws of the Jefferson County Republican Executive Committee prohibit such action does not concern us. Courts do not interfere with internal party matters. Smith v. Howard, 275 Ky. 165, 120 S.W.2d 1040; Davis v. Hambrick, 109 Ky. 276, 58 S.W. 779, 51 L.R.A. 671.Rosenberg, 270 S.W.2d at 172.
Neither Kentucky Revised Statutes 118.105(1) nor Section 151 of the Kentucky Constitution provides any remedy for Young. The statute merely directs that political parties nominate all of their candidates. Section 151 of the Kentucky Constitution allows the General Assembly to provide a means of depriving a person of holding office if that person is found guilty of fraud, intimidation, bribery or corrupt practices. Creech v. Fields, 276 Ky. 359, 124 S.W.2d 503 (Ky. 1939), interpreted Section 151of the Constitution as applying to the general election not the primary election.
Young also argues that Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct 757, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944), allows the court to intervene in the affairs of a political party. However in Smith, the Democratic party of Texas allowed only white democrats to participate in primary elections, thereby denying the right to vote to citizens of color. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the Democratic Party was a private and voluntary organization, but the Court determined that a private organization cannot deny a constitutional right to individuals to vote in an election. The Court held:
The privilege of membership in a party may be, as this Court said in Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 55, 55
S.Ct. 622, 626, 79 L.Ed. 1292, 97 A.L.R. 680, no concern of a state. But when, as here, that privilege is also the essential qualification for voting in a primary to select nominees for a general election, the state makes the action of the party the action of the state.Smith, 321 U.S. at 664-65, 64 S.Ct. at 765. The case at bar does not involve any such constitutional privilege or state action.
Therefore, we agree that the court's dismissal of Young's complaint was proper. Thus, we affirm the decision of the Franklin Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Geoffrey Young, Pro Se
Lexington, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Mark D. Guilfoyle
Crestview Hills, Kentucky Jon Salomon
Louisville, Kentucky