These inspections were carried out as part of the city's general duty to the public to ascertain that buildings are safe (see Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, supra) not as part of a duty to firemen. Unless a building is in imminent danger of collapse or someone specifically relies on a positive inspection report, no special relationship and thus no special duty is created by a city's inspection (see Young v. Abdella, 84 A.D.2d 890; Runkel v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 173, supra). Further, the city's recognition of code violations and its partial efforts to enforce the building codes do not create a special relationship since those efforts, unlike the situation in Florence v. Goldberg ( 44 N.Y.2d 189, supra), do not establish a commitment to act to protect a particular limited class of persons which includes plaintiff.

The city apparently took no further action to ensure elimination of these dangers. Municipalities are not answerable for failing to enforce fire safety statutes and regulations unless a special duty can be found to exist between the plaintiff and the municipality ( Sanchez v. Village of Liberty, 42 N.Y.2d 876; Young v. Abdella, 84 A.D.2d 890). Here, however, there was nothing special about the relationship between plaintiff and the city, and hence no particular duty was owed to plaintiff ( Timmons v. Harvey, 85 A.D.2d 840). The mere fact that the premises were inspected and violations cited does not breed a special duty. Smullen v. City of New York ( 28 N.Y.2d 66) is distinguishable for there the city building inspector had made affirmations of safety directly to the plaintiff's decedent even though a highly unsafe condition actually existed.

The statutes in question were enacted, and repairs to fire hydrants are made, for the public good and not especially for plaintiff's decedent or any particular class of persons. Such being the case, the city cannot be held liable here based upon its failure to enforce the subject laws or repair the hydrant (cf. Sanchez v Village of Liberty, 42 N.Y.2d 876; Young v Abdella, 84 A.D.2d 890). With regard to plaintiff's additional allegations that the city was negligent in the manner in which it fought the fire, these are likewise insufficient to state a cause of action against the city. Plaintiff's assertions that the fire department of the city negligently connected hoses to a nonfunctioning hydrant and negligently moved a vehicle which was impeding its efforts with the result that time was needlessly lost in the department's battle with the blaze, even if proven, would be inadequate to support a verdict against the city, and it should be noted that plaintiff makes no charge that the city did not make its best effort, in a difficult emergency situation, to save his decedent and extinguish the fire.