Opinion
No. 5794
July 30, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The issue in this matter is whether the defendant's motion to strike should be granted on the basis that the plaintiff has failed to join or give reasonable notice of this action to all interested parties as required by Practice Book § 17-56(b). The Court concludes that the defendant's motion should be denied because the defendant has not established that the parties it claims should be joined or given notice are interested parties, and because the defendant has failed to provide their names and addresses as required by Practice Book § 10-39(b).
On February 4, 2003, the plaintiff, the Young Men's Christian Association of Stamford, Inc. (Stamford YMCA) filed a revised complaint against the defendant, Priscilla Bentley (Bentley), seeking a declaratory judgment that pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-2 (a) (3) the defendant's residency at the Stamford YMCA is not governed by Chapter 830 of the General Statutes and sections 47a-21, 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive, sections 47a-26 to 47a-26g, inclusive, sections 47a-35 to 47a-35b, inclusive, sections 47a-41a, 47a-43 and 47a-46 of the General Statutes, and therefore, that the plaintiff may proceed to lock the defendant out from her unit because she has failed to pay her rent.
General Statues § 47a-2 (a) (3) provides in pertinent part: "Arrangements exempted from application of title [47a Landlord and Tenant law]. . . . (a) Unless created to avoid the application of this chapter and sections 47a-21, 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive, 47a-26 to 47a-26g, inclusive, 47a-35 to 47a-35b, inclusive, 47a-41a, 47a-43 and 47a-46, the following arrangements are not governed by this chapter and sections 47a-21, 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive, 47a-26 to 47a-26g, inclusive, 47a-35 to 47a-35b, inclusive, 47a-41a, 47a-43 and 47a-46 . . . (3) occupancy by a member of a fraternal or social organization in the portion of a structure operated for the benefit of such organizations. . . ."
On March 6, 2003, the defendant filed the present motion to strike the revised complaint on the ground that, as required by Practice Book § 17-56(b), the plaintiff failed to join or give reasonable notice to the other tenants of the Stamford YMCA, and to the tenants and operators of all other YMCA's and similar types of residential facilities in the State of Connecticut. The defendant argues that if the plaintiff is successful in the declaratory action, the tenants of such residential facilities would lose the protections from eviction that are afforded them under the landlord-tenant and summary process laws. Therefore, the defendant argues, the tenants and operators of these other facilities in this state have an interest in the subject matter of this action that is direct, CT Page 8472-b immediate and adverse to the interests of the plaintiff or defendant.
The plaintiff opposes the motion on the grounds that the defendant has not established that the tenants and operators of all other YMCA's and similar type residential facilities in the State of Connecticut are interested parties of the instant action, and notwithstanding that the only necessary parties to this action are the plaintiff and the defendant, it gave notice to the residents of the Stamford YMCA by way of letter on April 17, 2003, making the defendant's motion moot. The plaintiff argues that it is seeking a declaratory judgment as to its relationship with this specific defendant and therefore, the tenants of every other YMCA and similar type residential facility in Connecticut are not interested parties to whom notice must be given.
On April 23, 2003, the plaintiff filed a supplemental certification stating that all residents of the Stamford YMCA were provided with reasonable notice of the pending action. In support thereof, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit from Ronald B. Kazi, the associate executive director of the Stamford YMCA, stating that a copy of the April 17, 2003, letter was placed in the mailbox of the current residents. No objections were filed by the defendant.
"The purpose of a declaratory action . . . is to secure an adjudication of rights where there is a substantial question in dispute or a substantial uncertainty of legal relations between the parties . . . and to make certain that the declaration will conclusively settle the whole controversy." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Mannweiler v. LaFlamme, 232 Conn. 27, 33, 653 A.2d 168 (1995). Practice Book § 17-56(b) provides the procedures for a declaratory judgment and states in pertinent part: "All persons who have an interest in the subject matter of the requested declaratory judgment that is direct, immediate and adverse to the interests of one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants in the action shall be made parties to the action or shall be given reasonable notice thereof. . . . The party seeking the declaratory judgment shall append to its complaint . . . a certificate stating that all such interested persons have been joined as parties to the action or have been given reasonable notice thereof. If notice was given, the certificate shall list the names, if known, of all such persons, the nature of their interest, and the manner of notice."
Practice Book § 17-56(c) further provides: "Except as provided in Sections 10-39 and 10-44, no declaratory judgment action shall be defeated by nonjoinder of parties or the failure to give notice to interested persons. The exclusive remedy for nonjoinder or failure to give notice to interested persons is by motion to strike as provided in Sections 10-39 and 10-44." Additionally, "no declaration shall be binding against any persons not joined as parties." Practice Book § 17-56(d). "Noncompliance with the notice requirement can . . . be cured . . . by providing the necessary notice before a . . . judgment is rendered." 37 Huntington Street, H, LLC v. Hartford, 62 Conn. App. 586, 592, 772 A.2d 633 (2001). "[O]ur Supreme Court's jurisprudence has construed the rules of practice to permit the mandatory certificate of notice to be filed at any time before a judgment is rendered at trial." CT Page 8472-c Id., 593.
"Effective January 1, 2000, our rules of practice were amended to provide that challenges to the failure to provide notice in a declaratory judgment action must be made by way of a motion to strike as provided by Practice Book § 10-39(a). . . ." Berlin Batting Cages, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 76 Conn. App. 199, 214 n. 10, 821 A.2d 269 (2003). Practice Book § 10-39(a) states in pertinent part that: "Whenever any party wishes to contest . . . (3) the legal sufficiency of any . . . complaint . . . because of . . . pursuant to Section 17-56 (b), the failure to join or give notice to any interested person . . . that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof." Additionally, § 10-39 (b) states in pertinent part that: "A motion to strike on the ground of . . . noncompliance with Section 17-56 (b) must give the name and residence of the missing party or interested person and must state the missing party's or interested person's interest in the cause of action."
The plaintiff's complaint specifically alleges that: The Stamford YMCA is a fraternal or social organization as that term is used in General Statutes § 47a-2 (a) (3); it operates a residential facility for its benefit; and, residence at the facility is limited to its members. In addition, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant, as a member of the Stamford YMCA, resided in the facility and agreed to pay a resident's and a membership fee to the Stamford YMCA on a biweekly basis, of which the defendant has failed to do. The defendant, argues that the plaintiff should join or give notice to the tenants of the Stamford YMCA, and to the tenants and operators of all other YMCA's and similar residential facilities throughout the entire State of Connecticut because they have an interest in the subject matter of this action that is direct, immediate and adverse to the interests of the plaintiff or defendant.
This court agrees that the defendant has not demonstrated that the tenants and operators of all YMCA's and similar residential facilities in this state are interested parties that require they be joined or receive reasonable notice of this action. The plaintiff's allegations do not seek to have all YMCA's or residential facilities effected by the declaratory judgment sought. The allegations further do not establish that the Stamford YMCA has any connection with any other YMCA or similar type residential facility. Additionally, the plaintiff has demonstrated that notice was given to the residents of the Stamford YMCA. Further, the defendant has failed to supply this court with the identity of the tenants and operators of the other YMCA's and similar type residential facilities that it believes have an interest in this action. "This procedural defect alone is sufficient to defeat the motion to strike." CT Page 8472-dSilver v. Birmingham, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford Docket No. CV 00 0801333 (June 25, 2001, Peck, J.) Therefore, because the defendant has not established that the parties it claims should be joined or given notice are interested parties, and because the defendant has failed to provide their names and addresses as required by Practice Book § 10-39(b), the Court hereby denies the defendant's motion to strike.
COCCO, J.