Opinion
Case No.: SACV 23-00972-CJC (JDEx)
2023-10-04
Seyit YILMAZ, Plaintiff, v. Ur Mendoza JADDOU, Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary of U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Defendants.
Joshua L. Goldstein, Goldstein Immigration Lawyers, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff. Richard C. Burson, SAUSA - Office of U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.
Joshua L. Goldstein, Goldstein Immigration Lawyers, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff. Richard C. Burson, SAUSA - Office of U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [Dkt. 8] AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
CORMAC J. CARNEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the over three-and-a-half-year delay in adjudicating Plaintiff Seyit Yilmaz's asylum petition. (Dkt. 1 [Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Complaint for Injunctive Relief, hereafter "Compl."].) Plaintiff and his family fled Turkey in 2016 after a faction of the Turkish Armed Forces attempted a coup against the government. (Compl. ¶ 2.) That same year, Plaintiff applied for and was granted an E-2 visa. (Id.) In 2019, he "was falsely named as a faction supporter and the Turkish Consulate confiscated [his] passport and refused to renew his daughter's passport. Plaintiff now fears for his family's safety." (Id.) In March 2020, Plaintiff timely filed an I-589 Application for Asylum/Withholding of Removal, which includes his wife and daughter as derivative applicants. (Id. ¶ 3.) Although the application has been pending for over three and a half years, Plaintiff has received no decision, or even been scheduled for an interview. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 14.) Plaintiff alleges that the delay in adjudicating his asylum application is unreasonable and therefore asserts three claims against Defendants Ur Mendoza Jaddou, Director of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), and Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security: (1) violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), (2) a request that the Court compel agency action under the Mandamus Act, and (3) violation of Plaintiff's constitutional right to procedural and substantive due process. (Id. ¶¶ 18-36.) He seeks an order from the Court demanding that USCIS process his asylum application and grant him an asylum interview date. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 32, Prayer for Relief.)
"The E-2 nonimmigrant classification allows a national of a treaty country (a country with which the United States maintains a treaty of commerce and navigation, or with which the United States maintains a qualifying international agreement, or which has been deemed a qualifying country by legislation) to be admitted to the United States when investing a substantial amount of capital in a U.S. business." USCIS, E-2 Treaty Investors, available at https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/e-2-treaty-investors.
Now before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 8 [hereafter "Mot."].) For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.
Having read and considered the papers presented by the parties, the Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; Local Rule 7-15. Accordingly, the hearing set for October 30, 2023, at 1:30 p.m. is hereby vacated and off calendar.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) can be either a facial or factual attack on jurisdiction. Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). A facial attack, such as the attack made in the present motion, asserts that the allegations in the complaint are "insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction." Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). With a facial attack, a court accepts the complaint's allegations as true and construes them in favor of the non-moving party. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 609 F. Supp. 2d 925, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Fed'n of African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1996)).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's claims. The issue on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims asserted. Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997). Rule 12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 985 F.3d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 2021). When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the district court must accept all material allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Skilstaf, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 669 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual material to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A complaint must contain well-pleaded factual allegations, not legal conclusions, that "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court addresses (1) its jurisdiction over Plaintiff's APA claim, (2) whether Plaintiff has stated a claim, and (3) whether to grant Plaintiff leave to amend.
A. Jurisdiction Over APA Claim
Defendants first argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's APA claim. (Mot. at 10-12.) The Court disagrees. The APA provides that a "reviewing court shall compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). "[A] claim under § 706(1) can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take." Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 159 L.Ed.2d 137 (2004) (emphases in original).
Once an asylum application is filed, USCIS is required to hold an interview within 45 days and adjudicate the application within 180 days unless there are "exceptional circumstances." See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii) & (iii). However, "[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to create any substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable by any party against the United States or its agencies or officers or any other person." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(7) (titled "[n]o private right of action"). Courts in this district have persuasively held that sections 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii) and (iii) fail to meet the Norton standard because the provisions contain discretion-enhancing carve outs for exceptional circumstances rather than mandating an action USCIS is "required to take." Norton, 542 U.S. at 64, 124 S.Ct. 2373 (emphasis in original). See Alaei v. Holder, 2016 WL 3024103, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2016); Liuqing Zhu v. Cissna, 2019 WL 3064458, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2019).
Viewing Plaintiff's Complaint in the light most favorable to him, he asserts not that USCIS violated the deadlines in the code, but more broadly that USCIS has failed to adjudicate his asylum application within a reasonable time. (See Dkt. 12 [Opposition, hereinafter "Opp."] at 13 ["Plaintiff does not seek to enforce the 45-day or 180-day limits. Instead, Plaintiff uses these time frames to establish that Defendants have unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed the processing of his immigration-related application."].) The "exceptional circumstances" exception to the deadlines does not mean Defendants can leave applications languishing in perpetuity. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(a) ("The Service shall adjudicate the claim of each asylum applicant whose application is complete[.]"). Indeed, the APA requires that, "[w]ith due regard for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives and within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it." 5 U.S.C. § 555 (emphasis added). Under Norton, the adjudication of asylum claims within a reasonable amount of time qualifies as a discrete action that USCIS is required to take.
The Court finds the reasoning in Xu v. Cissna, 434 F.Supp.3d 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) compelling on this point. There, the court explained:
Significantly, however, Plaintiff's APA claim does not concern Defendants' obligation to abide by § 1158(d). Instead, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have failed to comply with the much more general requirements set forth in the APA itself: that agency actions must be completed within a reasonable time and not be unreasonably delayed. 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706(1). Plaintiff's right to adjudication within a reasonable time exists independently of § 1158(d), and the Court concludes that § 1158(d)(7) is not so broad as to strip Plaintiff of her right to challenge all delays in the adjudication of her asylum application, no matter how egregious.Id. at 52. As explained in the below Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, the Court recognizes that its role in chaperoning delays in the asylum application process is quite limited, so long as USCIS employs a reasonable scheduling system for adjudicating asylum applications. But the Court cannot agree with Defendants that it has no role in supervising failures to adjudicate asylum applications "no matter how egregious." Id.; see also Fang Yan v. Dir. of Los Angeles Asylum Off. for the United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 2023 WL 4053410, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 2023) (denying motion to dismiss unreasonable delay claim for lack of APA subject matter jurisdiction).
B. Failure to State a Claim
1. Mandamus Claim
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the Mandamus Act. (Mot. at 17-18.) The Court agrees. Writs of mandamus are only available if: (1) the claim is clear and certain; (2) the official's or agency's duty is "nondiscretionary, ministerial, and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt;" and (3) no other adequate remedy is available. Lowry v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To the extent Plaintiff asks the Court to order USCIS to comply with the section 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii) and (iii) timeframes, this claim is barred by section 1158(d)(7)'s preclusion of a private right of action to enforce those sections. See Hui Dong v. Cuccinelli, 2021 WL 1214512, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2021); Chen v. Radel, 2016 WL 11002594, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2016) (collecting cases). Section 1158(d)(7)'s bar on a private right of action defeats Plaintiff's Mandamus Act claim on the first Lowry factor: there is no claim under sections 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii) and (iii), let alone a clear and certain claim.
To the extent Plaintiff's Mandamus Act claim seeks to enforce USCIS' more general obligation to adjudicate asylum applications within a reasonable time under 5 U.S.C. section 555, such a claim runs afoul of the third Lowry requirement: that no other remedy is available. That is because such a claim completely overlaps with Plaintiff's APA claim. See Sharkey v. Quarantillo, 541 F.3d 75, 93 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that a mandamus claim should be dismissed when it duplicated claims brought under the APA). And far from showing a clear and certain claim as required under the first Lowry factor, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the APA, as discussed next.
2. APA Claim
Defendants next argue Plaintiff fails to state an APA claim. (Mot. at 12-17.) The Court agrees, joining the chorus of Ninth Circuit courts that have dismissed APA claims similar to Plaintiff's at the pleadings stage. Courts analyze claims that an agency has failed to take required action within a reasonable amount of time under the factors laid out in Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. F.C.C., 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (the "TRAC factors"). See In re Pesticide Action Network N. Am., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 798 F.3d 809, 813 (9th Cir. 2015). The TRAC factors instruct that: (1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason; (2) where Congress has provided, in the enabling statute, a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court should take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 79-80.
The first factor weighs in Defendants' favor because courts have consistently found that USCIS' last in, first out ("LIFO") system for adjudicating asylum applications constitutes a rule of reason satisfying the first TRAC factor. Teymouri v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 2022 WL 18717560, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2022) ("[C]ourts consistently find that the last-in-first-out scheduling system ('LIFO') is a rule of reason."); Chen v. Wolf, 2020 WL 6825681, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2020); Liu v. Wolf, 2020 WL 2836426, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2020); Varol v. Radel, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1089, 1097 (S.D. Cal. 2019). Under LIFO, asylum interviews are granted first to applicants who had an interview scheduled but which was rescheduled, next to applicants whose applications have been pending 21 days or less, and third to all other applicants, with newer filings scheduled first. USCIS adopted the LIFO approach to "deter individuals from using asylum backlogs solely to obtain employment authorization by filing frivolous, fraudulent, or otherwise non-meritorious asylum applications." Bulletin.
The Court takes judicial notice of facts that can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned in USCIS' Affirmative Asylum Interview Scheduling bulletin (the "Bulletin"). See Fed. R. Evid. 201; (Dkt. 8-1 [Declaration of Ashley B. Caudill-Mirillo, USCIS' Deputy Chief of the Asylum Division] ¶ 26 [citing Affirmative Asylum Interview Scheduling, USCIS, available at https://www.uscis.gov/affirmative-asylum-scheduling (last updated May 31, 2022)].)
A first in, first out ("FIFO") method would work to a fraudulent or bad faith applicant's advantage because under 8 C.F.R. section 208.7(a)(1)(ii), an applicant whose asylum application is still pending after 365 days can apply for employment authorization and, if such authorization is granted, work in the U.S. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(1)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(8). Under a FIFO method, a bad faith asylum applicant could file an asylum application with little or no merit knowing that—because USCIS cannot adjudicate asylum applications within 365 days when moving linearly through those applications—he will become eligible to work in the U.S. by default. Put simply, he would hop in line knowing that the line moves slow enough to ensure him employment authorization. Under the LIFO method, the bad faith applicant's calculus must change because there is a threat that his asylum application is adjudicated earlier than 365 days after its filing. Such a system makes the bad faith applicant think twice before getting in line because he knows he can be thrown out of line quickly. As USCIS explains in the Bulletin, the LIFO system "reduces the incentive to file for asylum solely to obtain employment authorization."
The Bulletin describes a sensible prioritization system in response to a serious issue that USCIS understands better than this Court. Xu, 434 F. Supp. 3d at 53 (calling the LIFO method "a reasoned response to a systemic crisis"). The Court, like several federal courts in this state and throughout the country, finds that USCIS' LIFO method is a "rule of reason" sufficient to satisfy the first TRAC factor. See Varol, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1097; Xu, 434 F.Supp.3d at 53; Yueliang Zhang v. Wolf, 2020 WL 5878255, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2020); Lajin v. Radel, 2019 WL 3388363, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2019); Liuqing Zhu, 2019 WL 3064458, at *4.
As for the second TRAC factor, several courts have found that the timetables laid out in sections 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii) and (iii) are discretionary, both because of the "exceptional circumstances" carveout and also because of section 1158(d)(7)'s bar on a private right of action to enforce the timetables, such that those timetables should not weigh in a plaintiff's favor in a TRAC analysis on a motion to dismiss. See Xu, 434 F.Supp.3d at 53; Varol, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1097. The Court agrees that the importance of those timetables is low because they are discretionary. The Court further notes that USCIS' LIFO method is not inconsistent with the section 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii) and (iii) timetables. As the Bulletin explains, LIFO disincentives fraudulent and frivolous asylum applicants whose only goal is to obtain employment authorization by way of default. The logical conclusion is that the LIFO system—by reducing fraudulent applications—is meant to reduce the number of asylum applications, thereby reducing USCIS' caseload, which would obviously lead to quicker adjudication for good faith applicants. Even if under USCIS' "rule of reason," the LIFO method, USCIS is wholly failing to adjudicate claims within the discretionary timeframes set by Congress, it is clear that LIFO is not the cause of the delay, and Plaintiff makes no claim in his complaint that it is. In other words, there is no indication that USCIS did not permit the discretionary timetables in sections 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii) and (iii) to "supply content"—that "content" being a goal of quick adjudication—when deciding to adopt its LIFO method.
The third and fifth TRAC factors—concerning whether human health and welfare are at stake and the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay—also favor Defendants. Fang Yan, 2023 WL 4053410, at *5 (considering these factors together); Chen, 2016 WL 11002594, at *4 ("The third and fifth factors involve substantially the same analysis."); Varol, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1097 (similar); Xu, 434 F. Supp. 3d at 53-54 (similar). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' failure to resolve his application has caused him and his family "significant personal, financial, and emotional hardship" by putting a "hold on their ability to resettle and build their lives in the United States," including being unable to "plan for their 12-year-old daughter Berra's future." (Compl. ¶¶ 5-6.) He also alleges that his health "and his wife's health has been declining as a result of this delay," stating that Plaintiff had "a cancerous neuroendocrine tumor which had to be removed" and "now suffers from chronic pelvic pain," and that his "wife also had to undergo the removal of a breast fibroadenoma." (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff believes these illnesses or issues were "caused or exacerbated by stress and anxiety" resulting from the delay. (Opp. at 9.) Taken together, while the Court sympathizes with Plaintiff's concerns, they demonstrate minimal risk to human health or welfare, and courts have consistently found similar prejudice does not outweigh the competing TRAC factors. Varol, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1097 ("Although the Court recognizes the difficulty in waiting for the asylum interview and the processing of Plaintiff's application, the risk to human health and welfare, the potential prejudice of the delay, and the lack of any impropriety behind the delay all favor denial of relief."); Lajin, 2019 WL 3388363, at *4; Chen, 2016 WL 11002594, at *4 ("Neither the Complaint nor the materials attached to the Complaint demonstrate that delayed adjudication have placed Plaintiff's health or welfare at stake above and beyond the stresses inherent in the asylum application process."); Fang Yan, 2023 WL 4053410, at *5 ("Taken together, Yan's allegations demonstrate minimal risk to human health or welfare, and any prejudice Yan faces from delay is likewise faced by all asylum applications in similar positions. Thus, the Court finds that the risk to human health and welfare and potential prejudice from delay in the processing of the Application favor denying relief."). As the government notes, Plaintiff is allowed to live and work in the United States without fear of removal while he waits for the decision. (Reply at 5 [citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)]); Singh v. Bardini, 2023 WL 4669864, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 20, 2023) ("Plaintiff remains and works in the United States without fear of removal while his I-589 is being adjudicated."); Varol, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1097 ("However, the Court notes Plaintiff continues to reside in the United States pending the processing of her application and is authorized to work pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2)."). In short, "there are no implications of harm or prejudice to Plaintiff other than the passage of additional time, an aspect all asylum applicants in similar situation face." Teymouri, 2022 WL 18717560, at *4.
The fourth TRAC factor favors Defendants. As several courts have held, granting Plaintiff the relief he seeks would allow him to jump the line past other applicants simply because he has the resources to hire an attorney and file a case in federal court. Varol, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1098 ("Here, granting relief to the Plaintiff simply moves her to the front of the line at the expense of all other applicants who may not have filed an application for mandamus relief."); Xu, 434 F. Supp. 3d at 54; Lajin, 2019 WL 3388363, at *4; Chen, 2016 WL 11002594, at *4. Indeed, courts have held that an agency's competing priorities can defeat a plaintiff's claim even if other TRAC factors weigh in his favor. See In re Barr Lab'ys, Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("In short, we have no basis for reordering agency priorities. The agency is in a unique—and authoritative—position to view its projects as a whole, estimate the prospects for each, and allocate its resources in the optimal way. Such budget flexibility as Congress has allowed the agency is not for us to hijack."); Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 280 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining that USCIS "operates in an environment of limited resources, and how it allocates those resources to address the burden of increasing claims is a calculation that courts should be loathe to second guess").
Finally, the sixth TRAC factor states that "the court need not find any impropriety . . . in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed." TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. There is no indication that there is any impropriety behind the delay in adjudicating Plaintiff's application, and indeed "there is a substantial backlog of affirmative asylum applications that is stretching the agency's resources." Lajin, 2019 WL 3388363, at *4. Since the Court need not find any impropriety to find agency action unreasonably delayed, however, this factor is neutral. See Fang Yan, 2023 WL 4053410, at *5 ("Thus, the Court need not consider whether any impropriety contributed to the delay here, and this factor is neutral."); Singh, 2023 WL 4669864, at *3 ("The Court, as a result, need not consider whether impropriety contributed to the delay Plaintiff alleges, making this factor neutral."); see also Varol, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1097 (finding that the "lack of any impropriety behind the delay . . . favor[ed] denial of relief").
3. Due Process Claim
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V. "[T]he Due Process Clause was intended to prevent government officials from abusing their power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression." Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (citations and quotations omitted). The "touchstone" of due process is protecting people against arbitrary government action, whether from "denial of fundamental procedural fairness, or in the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective." Id. at 845-46, 118 S.Ct. 1708. "A threshold requirement to a substantive or procedural due process claim is the plaintiff's showing of a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution." Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff's due process claim fails. "[T]he government's delay in scheduling or conducting immigration proceedings does not violate due process." Vang, 237 F. App'x at 31; see Mudric v. AG of the United States, 469 F.3d 94, 99 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[F]ederal immigration laws do not vest in aliens a constitutional right to have their immigration matters adjudicated in the most expeditious manner possible."). A plaintiff whose asylum application is not promptly adjudicated "has not suffered a cognizable deprivation of rights because the plain language of § 1158(d)(7) expressly disclaims any substantive or procedural rights under the statute." Varol, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1099 (citing Vang v. Gonzales, 237 F. App'x 24, 31 (6th Cir. 2007)). Accordingly, courts routinely reject due process challenge to delays in adjudicating asylum applications. Varol, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1099 (collecting cases).
The Court sincerely empathizes with Plaintiff. There is no doubt he and his family are being held in limbo, waiting for a decision with extremely high stakes. The Court believes Plaintiff when he asserts that he fears for his family's safety if he is "forced to return to an authoritarian country where they have been accused of supporting a failed coup attempt." (Opp. at 9.) But Plaintiff must understand that his present request simply asks the Court to value his stress over that of thousands of other asylum applicants who are currently experiencing the same stress.
The Court is also concerned about cases like the one Plaintiff brings. Delays like the one Plaintiff is experiencing do not appear to be unprecedented. See, e.g., Teymouri, 2022 WL 18717560, at *4 (five-year delay reasonable); Fang Yan, 2023 WL 4053410, at *4 (four-year delay reasonable); Varol, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1097 (three-year delay reasonable). With people like Plaintiff bringing cases like this, one group of applicants would be sufficiently resourced or legally savvy to petition the Court to demand USCIS to adjudicate their application outside of the LIFO system. As USCIS works through its "regular" applications, these well-resourced or legally savvy plaintiffs would be continuously interrupting USCIS' work with court orders to put them at the front of the line. The other group of applicants lacking the resources or know-how to file a case in federal court would then be regularly pushed back to make way for a stream of court-ordered asylum interviews. But there would be no gain in average speed. The number of applicants would stay the same. The number of USCIS workers and resources would stay the same. All that would be achieved is a shuffling of the order. Put simply, cases like this ask courts to replace a sluggish system with one that is just as sluggish and also unjust.
Here, Plaintiff essentially complains that he is subject to a flawed asylum application process. But that flaw does not arise from anything that the Court is equipped to fix through Plaintiff's case. USCIS has picked a reasonable system for prioritizing thousands of applications: the LIFO method. USCIS put that method in place to achieve the sensible goal of disincentivizing fraudulent or frivolous applications that would otherwise languish and, by virtue of the delay, reward unworthy, bad faith applicants with employment authorization. Implicit in that goal is cutting down on the total number of asylum applications, which, if achieved, would allow USCIS to adjudicate good faith applications more efficiently. The Court believes USCIS is behaving reasonably and that is all the law asks it to do.
C. Leave to Amend
Generally, the Ninth Circuit has a liberal policy favoring amendments and leave to amend should be freely granted. See, e.g., DeSoto v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). "Although leave to amend 'shall be freely given when justice so requires,' it may be denied" where it "would not serve any purpose because to grant it would be futile in saving the plaintiff's suit." Chinatown Neighborhood Ass'n v. Harris, 794 F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). Given the Court's conclusion that awarding Plaintiff the relief he seeks in his Complaint would merely allow him, and future plaintiffs, to cut in line ahead of other good faith—and equally stressed—asylum applicants, the Court finds that leave to amend would be futile here. Plaintiff cannot allege any additional facts to show that Defendants' delay in adjudicating his asylum application is unlawful. Plaintiff's case will therefore be dismissed without leave to amend. See, e.g., Teymouri, 2022 WL 18717560, at *5 (granting motion to dismiss APA and Mandamus Act claims based on delay in asylum application adjudication without leave to amend); Varol, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1097 (granting motion to dismiss APA, Mandamus Act, and due process claims without leave to amend).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.