In the light of the statement in her opening brief that she "feels that . . . regardless of any issues of fault, mistake or inadvertence [she] should be entitled to have this default judgment set aside on the basis that [respondent] has accepted the benefits of the judgment and has relieved himself of its burdens," we are inclined to agree with respondent. Appellant really argues that since "divorce actions and judgments differ from ordinary judgments" because the defendant usually obtains relief coextensive with that obtained by plaintiff, and this is a "mutual judgment" which must be treated as a contract ( Yarus v. Yarus, 178 Cal.App.2d 190 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 50]; In re Ferrigno, 22 Cal.App.2d 472 [ 71 P.2d 329]), thus if one fails to perform his part of the agreement the other is entitled to have the judgment vacated ( Harth v. Ten Eyck, 16 Cal.2d 829 [ 108 P.2d 675]; Hecq v. Conner, 203 Cal. 504 [ 265 P. 180] [holding that where a condition of agreement for dismissal of an action is breached it was proper to vacate the judgment]), even though she has failed to make a proper showing for relief under section 473, Code of Civil Procedure, the interlocutory judgment of divorce must be set aside because of respondent's asserted breach of the property settlement agreement which was approved and incorporated therein. We are not prepared to say that respondent's voluntary petition in bankruptcy filed on his own behalf under the circumstances of this case constitutes a breach of his agreement "to use his best efforts to avoid bankruptcy for the parties."

[Citation.]" ( 48 Cal.2d 820 at p. 825; see also DiMarco v. DiMarco (1963) 60 Cal.2d 387, 391-393 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 610, 385 P.2d 2]; Flynn v. Flynn (1954) 42 Cal.2d 55, 60-61 [ 265 P.2d 865]; Fox v. Fox (1954) 42 Cal.2d 49, 52-53 [ 265 P.2d 881]; Dexter v. Dexter (1954) 42 Cal.2d 36, 41-44 [ 265 P.2d 873]; Roberts v. Roberts (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 93, 99-100 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 408]; Biagi v. Biagi (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 624, 628-633 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 707]; Roberts v. Roberts (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 507, 511-518 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 176]; Clark v. Clark (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 521, 526-534 [ 17 Cal.Rptr. 652]; Baker v. Baker (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 730, 733-739 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 772]; Yarus v. Yarus (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 190, 200-203 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 50]; Newhall v. Newhall (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 786, 791-793 [ 321 P.2d 818].) [9b] Defendant seeks to avoid the effect of the foregoing precedents by reference to several aspects of the agreement.

When a party claims that obligations expressed in a separation agreement have been discharged in bankruptcy, the agreement must be analyzed to ascertain whether it provides merely for a property settlement or embodies as well a legal obligation to support the other spouse and is, therefore, a provision for maintenance and support. In Re Alcorn, 162 F. Supp. 206, 209 (N.D. Cal. 1958). Yarus v. Yarus, 178 Cal.App.2d 190, 195-196 (1960). Although each agreement must be construed to ascertain the parties' intentions, the cases tend to find that maintenance and support was intended where the form of the payments more closely approximates a normal support arrangement, rather than a lump sum settlement payment.

[1] First, are agreements which contain "pure" or severable provisions which provide for periodic payments in the nature of alimony. Payments agreed to in such provisions may be modified by subsequent court order (see former Civ. Code, § 139 as it stood in 1956, when the agreement was signed and approved; Plumer v. Plumer, 48 Cal.2d 820, 823-824 [ 313 P.2d 549]; Roberts v. Roberts, 226 Cal.App.2d 507 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 176]) and may not be discharged in bankruptcy, because they are payments "for alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or support of wife or child. . . ." (11 U.S.C.A. § 35(a)(2); Yarus v. Yarus, 178 Cal.App.2d 190, 195-196 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 50]; Smalley v. Smalley, 176 Cal.App.2d 374, 375-376 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 440, 74 A.L.R.2d 756].) [2] Second, are agreements which contain provisions ordering periodic payments which are purely in the nature of a division of property.

[1] A discharge in bankruptcy does not release the bankrupt from an obligation for support of his wife or child; on the other hand, a liability for monthly payments to the wife entirely by way of a property settlement is discharged in bankruptcy. ( Yarus v. Yarus, 178 Cal.App.2d 190, 195-196 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 50], and authorities cited.) [2] If the divorce decree clearly fixes the nature of the obligation, the courts will not receive parole evidence to vary it; but if the parties' agreement embodied in a consent decree is ambiguous, then extrinsic evidence of intent is admissible to determine whether the decree orders (nondischargeable) support payments or (dischargeable) payments on account of a property settlement.

[Citation.]" ( Yarus v. Yarus (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 190, 200-201 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 50] .) [11b] It is only where the agreement is ambiguous on its face that parol evidence is admissible to determine the intent of the parties. [16] "As clearly stated in Estate of Gaines, 15 Cal.2d 255, at page 264 [ 100 P.2d 1055]: `The parol evidence rule, as is now universally recognized, is not a rule of evidence but is one of substantive law.

On the other hand, our correlative concern is to what extent this court may go, by consideration of evidence extrinsic to the document itself, in arguably deviating from the express terms of a "lump sum" settlement for federal income tax purposes and hold that the payments were for "alimony maintenance and support" for bankruptcy purposes, particularly when several courts have been reluctant to allow such payments to shed their formal tax disguise. See Yarus v. Yarus, 178 Cal.App.2d 190, 3 Cal.Rptr. 50 (1960); Abrams v. Burg, 327 N.E.2d 745 (Mass.Sup.Jud.Ct. 1975). See also, Adler v. Nicholas, supra.

Further, the cases cited by Debtor in support of his argument do not require such result. Debtor cites three California cases: Yarus v. Yarus, 178 Cal.App.2d 190, 3 Cal.Rptr. 50 (1960); Smalley v. Smalley, 176 Cal.App.2d 374, 1 Cal.Rptr. 440 (1959); Tropp v. Tropp, 129 Cal.App. 62, 18 P.2d 385 (1933).

As noted previously, the judgment must be read as a whole. ( Lazar v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.2d at p. 622; Yarus v. Yarus (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 190, 201 [3 Cal.Rptr. 50].) With respect, we reject the mother's contention that the agreement was intended to have the requisite finality in terms of custody and visitation issues.

" ( Id., at p. 375.) (See also Yarus v. Yarus (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 190 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 50]; Myhers v. Myhers (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 855 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 356]; Cal. Marital Termination Settlements (Cont.Ed.Bar 1971) Division of Assets and Obligations, § 4.22b, p. 70; 2 Markey, Cal. Family Law, Practice and Procedure (1978-1979) §§ 26.54[1], p. 26-89, 26.150[2], p. 26-163, and 4 Markey, Cal. Family Law, Practice and Procedure (1978-1979) § 50.05[2], pp. 50-19 — 50-20.) California's position in this area is consistent with federal law.