Opinion
No. CV-13-306
04-30-2014
LEWIS M. YANCY, JR. APPELLANT v. MONEATHA YANCY APPELLEE
Robinson & Zakrzewski, P.A., by: Luke Zakrzewski, for appellant. J. Slocum Pickell, for appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. DR-2010-1044-3]
HONORABLE WILLIAM BENTON,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED ON APPEAL AND
CROSS-APPEAL
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge
The parties were divorced by a decree entered November 20, 2012. The decree provided, inter alia, for an unequal division of the parties' property and debt, awarded appellee Ms. Yancy $500 per month in alimony, and awarded her $6,250 in attorney's fees. On direct appeal, appellant Mr. Yancy argues that the trial court erred in awarding alimony. On cross-appeal, appellee argues that the trial court erred in failing to award her attorney's fees in the requested amount of $21,602.95. We affirm both on appeal and on cross-appeal.
Division of marital property and the award of alimony are complementary devices that the trial court may employ to make the dissolution of a marriage financially equitable. Russell v. Russell, 2013 Ark. 372, ___ S.W.3d ___. Generally, the primary consideration in a decision to award alimony is the relationship between the needs of the payee spouse and the payor spouse's ability to pay. Id. An award of alimony lies within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id.
Here, the trial court found that appellant is an owner of a building housing an established, family-owned furniture store and the co-payee of three certificates of deposit belonging to his mother, totaling $300,000. He is employed in the family furniture business by his mother, is in good health, has good job security, and has the potential for increased income in the future. The trial court further found that appellee was unable to work because of a disability incurred as the result of an automobile accident in 2004.
Appellant argues that the trial court's finding that appellee was disabled was clearly erroneous. This argument is without merit. Appellee's disability was supported by medical evidence that appellee was injured in a 2004 auto accident and, as a result, is mobility-impaired and suffers pain that renders her unable to work even a sedentary clerical job. There was also evidence that appellee qualified for and received Social Security Disability benefits because of her condition. Appellant asks us to discount the evidence of appellee's disability, but we think that this was a matter of credibility best decided by the trial court and one in which we should not intrude. See Matthews v. Matthews, 2009 Ark. App. 400, 322 S.W.3d 15.
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in determining the extent and nature of his assets and his ability to pay alimony. His chief point is that the trial court failed to take into account that appellant had a surplus of expenses over income of approximately $423 per month and that he would be required to incur expenses to obtain new lodgings because of the award of the family home to appellee. However, as appellee points out, appellant indicated that maintenance of the marital home, for which he had been responsible, required expenditures of $2,500 per month, and that appellant was thus, prior to the decree, able to pay expenses in excess of $4,000 per month on a claimed income of only $2,483.61. We think that, under these circumstances, the fact-finder reasonably could infer that appellant had additional sources of income sufficient to maintain those expenses. Furthermore, the award of the marital home to appellee has the effect of relieving appellant of the $2,500 upkeep expense he had been previously paying—a sum that should be adequate to allow him to obtain other lodgings. On this record, we hold that the trial court did not clearly err in awarding appellee monthly alimony in the amount of $500.
On cross-appeal, appellee argues that the trial court erred in granting her only $6,250 in attorney's fees rather than the requested amount of $21,602.95. We find no error. The award of attorney's fees in a domestic-relations case is a matter within the trial court's discretion, and there is no fixed formula for determining what constitutes a reasonable amount. Tiner v. Tiner, 2012 Ark. App. 483. Because the trial court has presided over the case and gained familiarity with the case and the extent and quality of the services rendered by the attorney, the trial court has a superior opportunity to assess the critical factors, and an award of attorney's fees will therefore not be set aside absent an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Chrisco v. Sun Industries, Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990)). In Tiner, supra, we found no demonstrated abuse of discretion in an award of $5,000 in attorney's fees to the wife where the amount requested was $20,000. Giving due deference to the trial court's superior position to evaluate the quality of service rendered, we cannot say that the court erred in granting approximately thirty percent of the requested amount.
Affirmed.
WALMSLEY and HIXSON, JJ., agree.
Robinson & Zakrzewski, P.A., by: Luke Zakrzewski, for appellant.
J. Slocum Pickell, for appellee.