Opinion
No. 2 CA-CV 2018-0055-FC
09-12-2018
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF NJAHGEMEYA KU XI-RA, Petitioner/Appellant, and KIMBER A. KENNEDY, Respondent/Appellee.
Njahgemeya Ku Xi-Ra, Tucson In Propria Persona
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. D20152886
The Honorable Renee T. Bennett, Judge
AFFIRMED
Njahgemeya Ku Xi-Ra, Tucson
In Propria Persona
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Espinosa authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez and Judge Eppich concurred. ESPINOSA, Judge:
¶1 Njahgemeya Ku Xi-Ra appeals the trial court's January 2018 child support order, raising a variety of complaints referring, inter alia, to the jurisdiction of the court and violations of his due process rights. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 Because Xi-Ra has provided no statement of facts with citations to the record as required by Rule 13(a)(5), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., we glean the pertinent facts from our review of the record and the trial court's findings. We accept those findings unless clearly erroneous, Sherman v. Sherman, 241 Ariz. 110, ¶ 9 (App. 2016), and consider the evidence in a light that supports the court's rulings, Johnson v. Johnson, 131 Ariz. 38, 44 (1981). Xi-Ra and appellee Kimber Kennedy were married in October 2014, with two minor children born before the marriage. In September 2015, Xi-Ra filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage and served Kennedy via publication, as provided in Rule 4.1(l), Ariz. R. Civ. P. Kennedy did not become aware of the petition for dissolution until December 2016.
Xi-Ra was known as Kevin L. Short until December 2017, at which point the trial court noted his legal name change. Kimber Kennedy had adopted her then-husband's last name, but her maiden name was restored in the trial court's decree of dissolution of the marriage.
¶3 After learning of Xi-Ra's petition, Kennedy immediately filed an ex-parte motion for post-decree temporary orders pursuant to Rule 48, Ariz. R. Fam. Law P., in which she explained the circumstances surrounding the couple's dissolution. In 2015, Kennedy had moved with her children to Texas, "fleeing a domestic violence marriage." Six months later, due to "starting over in a new state after years of not working," Kennedy brought her children back to their father in Tucson, because she thought he "was in the more stable position." When she subsequently procured a better paying job and attempted to "get [her] kids back," Xi-Ra reportedly would not allow it. For a six month period, Xi-Ra would only permit her to communicate with the children via video chat and denied her attempts to visit.
¶4 Xi-Ra told her she would "have to return to Tucson and reconcile [with him] to be in [the] children[']s lives," and she "finally agreed because [she] could not go any longer without seeing [her] children." After returning from Texas in December 2016, however, she discovered bruising on the children's bodies, which she immediately reported to child protective services.
¶5 In granting Xi-Ra's petition for dissolution, the trial court had awarded him sole legal decision-making for the children and had ordered that Kennedy pay monthly child support, beginning in April 2016. On Kennedy's motion, the trial court found "'irreparable injury [would] result' to the minor children 'if no order [was] issued before [Xi-Ra was] heard in opposition,'" it granted Kennedy sole legal decision-making and primary caretaking authority over both children, and suspended Xi-Ra's parenting time "in order to protect the minor children from any abuse and/or neglect."
¶6 After a hearing in November 2017 at which both parties were present, the trial court ordered Xi-Ra to pay $1,546.30 in child support each month, pursuant to the Arizona Child Support Guidelines, and to send his payments to the Support Payment Clearinghouse, whereby the funds would be transmitted to Kennedy. On appeal, Xi-Ra asks this court to vacate the child support order. We have jurisdiction over his appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).
Kennedy has not filed an answering brief, which could be construed as a confession of error, but given the nature of the appellant's arguments, in our discretion we consider the appeal on its merits. See Nydam v. Crawford, 181 Ariz. 101, 101 (App. 1994).
Validity of the Order of Support
¶7 In a rambling brief on appeal, Xi-Ra alleges the trial court lacked jurisdiction, violated judicial ethics rules, and its rulings deprived him of numerous civil liberties and his "indefeasible rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the federal and state constitution." He fails, however, to sufficiently raise and argue the majority of his claims. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7). To the extent we can discern any colorable arguments, we address them below. We review a child support award for an abuse of discretion. Sherman, 241 Ariz. 110, ¶ 9.
We note that while Xi-Ra is not represented by counsel, "a party who conducts a case without an attorney is entitled to no more consideration from the court than a party represented by counsel, and is held to the same standards expected of a lawyer." Kelly v. NationsBanc Mortg. Corp., 199 Ariz. 284, ¶ 16 (App. 2000). Accordingly, although we have attempted "to discern and address [his] arguments, . . . we consider waived those arguments not supported by adequate explanation, citations to the record, or authority." In re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62, ¶ 6 (2013). We therefore do not consider Xi-Ra's claims pertaining to procedural due process, separation of powers, or standing. --------
¶8 Xi-Ra first asserts the trial court "had no judicial authority to place any orders called support orders to deprive [him] of any property," because "there is no supporting evidence showing a law on child support orders." He further claims the trial court's rulings "were not judicial in nature[,] they were contractual in nature," because "the Federal government and State of Arizona entered into a contract" to enforce child support orders. To the extent Xi-Ra challenges the trial court's jurisdiction and authority in this matter, the claim is devoid of merit.
¶9 The trial court correctly noted its jurisdiction pursuant to "the Arizona Constitution and . . . the Statutes of this state." Article VI, § 14 of the Arizona Constitution vests original jurisdiction in the superior court for cases "in which exclusive jurisdiction is not vested by law in another court." Section 25-502(A), A.R.S., reads, "The superior court has original jurisdiction in proceedings brought by . . . a party to the case to establish, enforce or modify the duties of [child] support," and A.R.S. § 25-503(A) provides, "[i]n any proceeding in which there is at issue the support of a child, the court may order either or both parents to pay any amount necessary for the support of the child." Further, pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-1221, the trial court had jurisdiction because Xi-Ra "resided with the child[ren]" in Arizona and "asserted parentage of [the children] on [the] birth certificate[s] filed" in Arizona. There is no evidence the trial court acted outside the scope of its authority, nor is there any evidence the court abused its discretion in issuing the order of support. See Sherman, 241 Ariz. 110, ¶ 9.
¶10 Xi-Ra also argues that because judges are "all paid out of [the] State of Arizona's treasury," any judge "who sits itself on a child support case creates a conflict of interest." He cites Rule 2.11(A)(3) of the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires judicial disqualification in any proceeding in which the judge "knows that he . . . has an economic interest . . . in the subject matter in controversy." Xi-Ra thus claims child support payments "are paying the judges['] salaries and pensions which are pecuniary interests" and therefore the trial court judge "had a financial interest in [his] case." This contention too is devoid of merit.
¶11 The Support Payment Clearinghouse, to which Xi-Ra was ordered to send payments, and its disbursements to court-ordered support recipients are prescribed by law. See A.R.S. §§ 25-510 and 46-441(A). Xi-Ra provides no evidence of conflict or ethical violations by the trial court and his argument is specious.
Disposition
¶12 The trial court's order of child support is affirmed.