Summary
listing Connecticut Superior Court cases finding no private cause of action under Section 20
Summary of this case from Monger v. Conn. Dep't of Transp.Opinion
No. CV-06-5006403
April 21, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#142)
The plaintiff, Sidney Wylie, alleges that the defendants, the city of West Haven and members of the West Haven Police Department, denied him medical treatment during his February 16, 2006 arrest for shoplifting and on or about March 8, 2006, failed to investigate his stolen property complaint that he made to them while he was released on bail. The present motion for summary judgment, filed by the defendants on March 10, 2010, addresses the operative complaint, which is comprised of the plaintiff's substitute complaint filed February 28, 2007, with an amendment by the plaintiff's revised complaint filed on March 28, 2007. The claims in the operative complaint are against Officers Garcia, Urrata, Maruottolo and Casman, Sergeant Daniels, Chief Quagliani and Mayor Picard.
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Provencher v. Enfield, 284 Conn. 772, 790-91 (2007).
The plaintiff alleges that on February 16, 2006, he was assaulted by a Shop-Rite Loss Prevention Officer, who caused him to hit his mouth and forehead on a glass door. When Officers Martin Garcia and Robert Urrata arrived on the scene to arrest him for shoplifting, the plaintiff informed them that he wanted to be taken to the hospital or to receive medical care. Instead, Garcia and Urrata took him to the West Haven police station to be booked and processed where Sergeant Daniels, the supervisor in charge, also denied his request for medical treatment.
The plaintiff further alleges that while he was in prison in connection with his February 16, 2006 arrest, he learned that someone had stolen his personal property including a television, DVD player and clothing. On or about March 8, 2006, after being released on bail, he reported his stolen property to the police. Officers Maruottolo and Casman told him that they would conduct an investigation into his stolen property. The plaintiff followed up several times with the police department, but contends that his claim was never properly investigated. The plaintiff also wrote letters to Mayor John Picard and the Chief of Police, Ronald Quagliani, in an effort to follow up on his stolen property claim, which were ignored.
The court will first address the plaintiff's constitutional claims. He claims that in denying him medical treatment, the defendants' conduct violated his rights under the Connecticut constitution Article first, §§ 9 and 20. Article first, § 9 provides that: "No person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly warranted by law." Article first, § 20 provides that: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or mental disability."
In Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23, 49-50 (1998), the Supreme Court found that it possessed the inherent authority to create a cause of action for damages under the Connecticut constitution, Article first, §§ 7 and 9. The Binette court held that "[w]hether to recognize a cause of action for alleged violations of other state constitutional provisions in the future must be determined on a case-by-case basis . . . [T]hat determination will be based upon a multifactor analysis." Id., 48. Decisions of the Superior Court have declined to recognize a private right of action under Article first, § 20. See e.g. Massey v. Town of Branford, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. X10 CV 04 048778 (March 28, 2006, Munro, J.) (granting motion to strike count that alleged violation of Article first, § 20 because the provision did not provide a direct cause of action for damages.); Boudreau v. City of Middletown, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 97 00 83396 (June 9, 1998, Hodgson, J.) ( 22 Conn. L. Rptr. 236, 237-38) (same).
The plaintiff's claim of denial of medical treatment, however, is properly evaluated under the eighth amendment and not under Article first, § 9 of the Connecticut constitution. See Faraday v. Commissioner of Correction, 288 Conn. 326, 338-39 (2008). Given that "[i]t is the policy of Connecticut's courts to be solicitous of parties acting pro se . . . [and] to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically;" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rockwell v. Quintner, 96 Conn.App. 221, 232, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 917 (2006); the court will consider the plaintiff's claim under the eighth amendment.
In Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996), the court determined that the deliberate indifference standard, applicable to convicted inmates, also applied to a pretrial detainee's claim that he was denied medical treatment. "In the context of a convicted prisoner, who has a right under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishments, [a] prison official's deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment, . . . [W]hile the Supreme Court has not precisely limned the duties of a custodial official under the Due Process Clause to provide needed medical treatment to a pretrial detainee, it is plain that an unconvicted detainee's rights are at least as great as those of a convicted prisoner . . . Thus, the official custodian of a pretrial detainee may be found liable for violating the detainee's due process rights if the official denied treatment needed to remedy a serious medical condition and did so because of his deliberate indifference to that need." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Furthermore, "[t]he standard of deliberate indifference includes both subjective and objective components. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, sufficiently serious . . . Second, the [government official] must act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faraday v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 288 Conn. 338. "With respect to the objective component of the deliberate indifference standard, the term `sufficiently serious' has been described as a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 339 n. 12. Finally, "[d]eliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault . . . requiring proof of a state of mind that is the equivalent of criminal recklessness." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 339.
Here, the plaintiff complained of only a split lip and a headache, conditions that the court is satisfied are not sufficiently serious to meet the objective component of the test. Additionally, since the plaintiff only alleges that Garcia and Urrata were negligent, their conduct clearly falls below the subjective component of the test. As for Daniels, despite the fact that the plaintiff alleges that he intentionally and/or maliciously denied the request, there is no evidence to support a finding that he acted with the requisite criminal recklessness.
In regard to his stolen property claim, the plaintiff claims that the officers' conduct violated his rights under the Connecticut constitution, Article first, §§ 14 and 20. Article first, § 14 provides: "The citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government, for redress of grievances, or other proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance." On the basis of the allegations in the plaintiff's operative complaint, this section does not appear to be applicable. Furthermore, there is no recognized private right of action under Article first, § 14. See e.g., Aselton v. Town of East Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. X07 CV 010079187 (December 3, 2002, Sferrazza, J.) (granting summary judgment because no cause of action could be maintained directly against defendant town for violations of the state constitution, including Article first, § 14). Additionally and as previously discussed, there is no private right of action under Article first, § 20.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's constitutional claims.
The court next considers the plaintiff's negligence claims. Here he claims that Garcia, Urrata and Daniels violated West Haven Police Department General Order § 96-01 and were negligent in denying him medical treatment at the time of his arrest. In addition, the plaintiff claims that Maruottolo, Casman, Quagliani and Picard were negligent in failing to investigate his stolen property claim.
General Statutes § 52-557n(a)(1)(A) provides that: "a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by . . . [t]he negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties." The statute also provides, however, that the political subdivision shall not be liable for damages caused by "negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law." See § 52-557n(a)(2)(B).
"Municipal officials are immune from liability for negligence arising out of their discretionary acts in part because of the danger that a more expansive exposure to liability would cramp the exercise of official discretion beyond the limits desirable in our society . . . Discretionary act immunity reflects a value judgment that — despite injury to a member of the public — the broader interest in having government officers and employees free to exercise judgment and discretion in their official functions, unhampered by fear of second guessing and retaliatory lawsuits, outweighs the benefits to be had from imposing liability for that injury." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Petersen, 279 Conn. 607, 614-15 (2006).
Additionally, "it is firmly established that the operation of a police department is a governmental function, and that acts or omissions in connection therewith ordinarily do not give rise to liability on the part of the municipality . . . [T]he failure to provide, or the inadequacy of, police protection usually does not give rise to a cause of action in tort against a city . . . The deployment of officers is particularly a governmental function . . . We conclude that the general deployment of police officers is a discretionary governmental action as a matter of law." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 180 (1988).
As to the plaintiff's denial of medical treatment claim, he points to West Haven Police Department General Order § 96-01, which states: "If, during the period of custody and/or incarceration, it becomes necessary or advisable to obtain a Medical/Mental Evaluation and/or treatment for a prisoner, a Supervisor shall be notified . . . If Medical/Mental Evaluation and/or treatment is required for a prisoner, the prisoner shall be transported to a hospital emergency room after examination by the Fire Department emergency medical personnel, accompanied by a Police Officer." The court is satisfied that the officers' decision as to whether to contact emergency personnel to evaluate the plaintiff was a discretionary function. Furthermore, as previously discussed, the plaintiff did not have an objectively serious medical condition. Finally, as to the plaintiff's stolen property claim, the court is satisfied that the investigation of the plaintiff's complaint was also a discretionary function.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendants are immune from suit and thus, entitled to summary judgment on these claims.
The defendants' motion for summary judgment is hereby granted. The plaintiff's complaint is dismissed in its entirety.