Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC352442, William F. Fahey, Judge.
David Smith Bates and Michael S. Trabish for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Lola M. McAlpin-Grant for Defendants and Respondents.
CROSKEY, Acting P. J.
Meddie Wyatt appeals a judgment dismissing her complaint against Patrick Umeh, Ngozi Umeh, and Edmund Umeh after the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. She alleges that through fraud and undue influence, she was induced to sell real property to Patrick Umeh for less than its actual value. Before the sale, the probate court in a separate action had declared Wyatt to be a constructive trustee of the property for the benefit of her deceased father’s estate. The probate court later determined that Patrick Umeh was a bona fide purchaser for value and quieted title to the property in his favor.
The trial court in the present action concluded that Wyatt as a constructive trustee had no personal interest in the property at the time of sale and lacked standing to sue the defendants. Wyatt contends if she could legally sell the property to Patrick Umeh as the probate court found, she must have standing to prosecute this action. She contends she has standing to sue both as a constructive trustee and as a beneficiary of the estate. We conclude that Wyatt is not the real party in interest and has no standing to sue the defendants in this action, and therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Factual Background
Wyatt and her father, Judge Shehee, held title to two parcels of real property as joint tenants at the time of his death in July 1993. One property was described in a joint tenancy grant deed as “Lots 47, 48, 49 and 50, Block N, of the Starks Palm Tract . . .,” and the other was described in a separate joint tenancy grant deed as a certain portion of “section 35 Township 2 South Range 14 west S.B.B. & M. . . . .” We will refer to the first property as the Starks Palm property and the second as the South Range property. The grant deeds did not indicate street addresses.
Wyatt’s brother Jay Shehee, as the executor of their father’s estate, petitioned the probate court (In re the Estate of Judge Shehee (L.A. Super. Ct., No. BP025011)) to determine title to the two parcels. He alleged that their father had suffered from senile dementia and that Wyatt, through fraud, undue influence, and duress, had caused their father to establish the joint tenancies several months before his death. The petition identified the two parcels as (1) 8854 South Van Ness Avenue, Los Angeles, California, and (2) unimproved property, and provided the legal descriptions of the Starks Palm and South Range properties. The probate court granted the petition and filed an order on July 3, 2002, declaring that Wyatt held both parcels as a constructive trustee for the benefit of the estate. The order provided the legal description for the Starks Palm property and stated that the property was located at 8854 South Van Ness Avenue, and provided the legal description for the South Range property and stated that the property was unimproved.
Wyatt sold real property to Patrick Umeh on April 28, 2004. The written purchase and sale agreement identified the property by stating the legal description of the Starks Palm property, and provided no street address. The grant deed recorded the next day stated the legal description of the South Range property, followed by, “Also described as follows,” and then stated the legal description of the Starks Palm property. The grant deed did not indicate a street address.
The probate court order of July 3, 2002, was not recorded until September 2005. Patrick Umeh and Ngozi Umeh petitioned the probate court to determine title to the Starks Palm property, which they also described as unimproved property located at 9605 1/2 Kalmia Street, Los Angeles, California. They alleged that they were bona fide purchasers for value who had purchased the property without notice of any competing claim to the property. They alleged that the Starks Palm property was the Kalmia Street property and that its legal description was mistakenly included in the probate court order of July 3, 2002. Counsel for the executor of the estate admitted those allegations, stated that the Starks Palm property legal description should not have been included in the order of July 3, 2002, and consented to the granting of the petition. In an order filed on September 14, 2006, the probate court overruled Wyatt’s objections to the petition, granted the petition, and declared that Patrick Umeh and Ngozi Umeh held title to the property as joint tenants. Wyatt appealed the order of September 14, 2006, but she subsequently abandoned the appeal.
We take judicial notice of Wyatt’s notice of appeal and her written abandonment of the appeal in Estate of Judge Shehee, Deceased, No. B197199. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
2. Trial Court Proceedings
Wyatt filed a complaint in May 2006, and filed a second amended complaint against Fred Kelly, Patrick Umeh, Ngozi Umeh, and Edmund Umeh in April 2007. She alleges that the defendants gained Wyatt’s trust and confidence and caused her to sell the Starks Palm property to Patrick Umeh for considerably less than its fair market value. She alleges counts for (1) financial abuse of an elder (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30), against all defendants, (2) intentional misrepresentation, against Patrick Umeh, (3) negligent misrepresentation, against Patrick Umeh, and (4) rescission, against Patrick Umeh and Ngozi Umeh.
The original complaint, first amended complaint, demurrer to the first amended complaint, and order sustaining the demurrer to the first amended complaint with leave to amend are not included in the appellant’s appendix.
Patrick Umeh, Ngozi Umeh, and Edmund Umeh demurred to the second amended complaint. Their principal argument was that because the estate was the rightful owner of the property before the sale, the estate was the only real party in interest and Wyatt had no standing to sue. The trial court agreed and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Wyatt appealed the order sustaining the demurrer. We construe the appeal as from the judgment subsequently entered by the trial court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(e).)
CONTENTIONS
Wyatt contends if she could legally sell the property to Patrick Umeh as the probate court found, she must have standing to sue the defendants in connection with the sale. She contends she has standing to sue both as a constructive trustee and as a beneficiary of the estate.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
We independently review the ruling on a demurrer and determine de novo whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415.) We assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and matters of which judicial notice has been taken. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) We construe the pleading in a reasonable manner and read the allegations in context. (Ibid.) We affirm the judgment if it is correct on any ground stated in the demurrer, regardless of the trial court’s stated reasons. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)
2. Wyatt Has No Standing to Sue
Only a real party in interest has standing to prosecute an action, except as otherwise provided by statute. Code of Civil Procedure section 367 states, “Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute.”
“A real party in interest ordinarily is defined as the person possessing the right sued upon by reason of the substantive law. [Citation.]” (Killian v. Millard (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1601, 1605.) A real party in interest must have an actual, substantial interest in the subject matter of the action. (County of Alameda v. State Bd. of Control (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1103.) A person who has no interest in the subject matter of an action and therefore no right to relief has no standing and cannot state a cause of action, so a general demurrer will be sustained. (Parker v. Bowron (1953) 40 Cal.2d 344, 351.)
A constructive trust is created by operation of law when a person obtains property through wrongful means. The person becomes a constructive trustee for the benefit of the rightful owner. “One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless he or she has some other and better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it.” (Civ. Code, § 2224.)
As a constructive trustee of the Starks Palm property, Wyatt had no personal interest in the property and held title solely for the benefit of the estate. Any cognizable injury arising from the sale of the property to Patrick Umeh was an injury to the estate, and not to Wyatt. Wyatt does not purport to and does not act on behalf of the estate, which acts through its personal representative. (Prob. Code, §§ 9600, 9820.) We conclude that Wyatt as a constructive trustee has no standing to sue to seek redress for an alleged injury to the estate and therefore has no standing to sue the defendants in this action.
Wyatt also lacks standing as a beneficiary. An executor or other appointed personal representative of a probate estate is the person authorized to maintain or defend an action on behalf of the estate. (Prob. Code, § 9820; Code Civ. Proc., § 369, subd. (a).) A beneficiary of the estate has standing to sue a third party to seek redress for an injury to the estate only in limited circumstances, such as where the personal representative acting together with the third party has breached his or her fiduciary duty to the estate and cannot be expected to bring an action against himself or herself (Olson v. Toy (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 818, 823-824; cf. Harnedy v. Whitty (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1341-1342 [trust estate]; Saks v. Damon Raike & Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 419, 427-428 [same]), or where the beneficiary seeks to recover possession of or quiet title to property (Prob. Code, § 9654). Wyatt has not alleged that any of those circumstances are present here and has shown no basis for standing as a beneficiary.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The defendants are entitled to recover their costs on appeal.
We Concur: KITCHING, J., ALDRICH, J.