Summary
holding that "[t]he [mask] mandate neither discriminates against a protected class nor infringes a fundamental right."
Summary of this case from Stewart v. Manchester Cmty. Schs.Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-01560-TWT
2021-05-12
W.S., a minor, BY his mother and next best friend, Caryn SONDERMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Chris RAGSDALE, Superintendent of Cobb County Schools, et al., Defendants.
D. John Skandalakis, Waffle House, Inc., Norcross, GA, Robert Anthony Madayag, III, Lee & Hayes, P.C., Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs. Brandon Moulard, Sherry Hall Culves, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.
D. John Skandalakis, Waffle House, Inc., Norcross, GA, Robert Anthony Madayag, III, Lee & Hayes, P.C., Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs.
Brandon Moulard, Sherry Hall Culves, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.
ORDER
Thomas W. Thrash, Jr., Chief United States District Judge
This matter is before the Court on a motion for temporary restraining order filed by Plaintiffs W.S., B.G., C.G., A.M., E.M., Q.C., C.H., K.H., S.H., and L.H., all minors by their parents and next best friends, against Chris Ragsdale, in his capacity as the superintendent of the Cobb County School District ("CCSD"), and the Cobb County Board of Education ("CCBOE") [Doc. 4]. Plaintiffs challenge a mask mandate implemented by CCSD to slow the spread of the COVID-19 virus in its schools [see id. ]. After considering the parties’ written submissions and arguments, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for temporary restraining order.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs sued Defendant Ragsdale and the individual members of the CCBOE in the Superior Court of Cobb County for injunctive and declaratory relief [Doc. 1-1]. In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that CCSD's rule requiring all students to wear face coverings while on campus, which CCSD implemented to combat the spread of COVID-19 in its schools, violated their rights under the equal protection clauses of the Georgia Constitution and United States Constitution [see id. ]. Plaintiffs incorporated a motion for a temporary restraining order into their complaint [Doc. 1-1 at 15-17].
Defendants properly removed the case to this Court [Doc. 1]. After removal, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to substitute CCBOE for the individual board members [Doc. 3]. Their amended complaint incorporates the same motion for temporary restraining order included in the original. [Id. at 28-31.]
After filing their amended complaint and incorporated motion, Plaintiffs filed another Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 4] ("Plaintiffs’ TRO Motion"). The more recent TRO Motion essentially reiterates Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge to the mask mandate raised in their original motion [see id. ]. Defendants Ragsdale and CCBOE filed a timely response in opposition to Plaintiffs’ TRO Motion [Doc. 5]. Plaintiffs filed a reply in support of their TRO Motion [Doc. 6]. The Court heard oral argument on May 5, 2021. DISCUSSION
A TRO is a drastic remedy that should be granted only in limited circumstances and upon a showing of clear necessity. McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson , 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998). The movant must show that (1) its claims have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) it will suffer irreparable injury absent injunctive relief; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs any potential harm that might result to the opposing party; and (4) granting the injunction will not disserve the public interest. America's Health Ins. Plans v. Hudgens , 742 F.3d 1319, 1329 (11th Cir. 2014). The movant must "clearly establish" all four elements. Cafe 207, Inc. v. St. Johns Cty. , 989 F.2d 1136, 1137 (11th Cir. 1993). Plaintiffs have not met this burden.
A. Substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
Plaintiffs claim that the mask mandate violates the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Georgia Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment states that no state may "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. Similarly, the Georgia Constitution guarantees, "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws." Ga. Const. art. I, § 1, ¶ II. The Georgia equal protection clause is "coextensive with and substantially equivalent to the federal equal protection clause," and so the analysis for an equal protection claim is the same whether it arises under state or federal law. See Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. v. Perdue , 288 Ga. 720, 727–28, 707 S.E.2d 67, 74 (2011) ; see also Womack v. Carroll Cty., Georgia , 840 F. App'x 404, 407 (11th Cir. 2020).
The principle of equal protection requires the government to treat similarly situated persons in like manner. Gary v. City of Warner Robins, Ga. , 311 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002). "When legislation classifies persons in such a way that they receive different treatment under the law, the degree of scrutiny the court applies depends upon the basis for the classification." Leib v. Hillsborough Cty. Pub. Transp. Comm'n , 558 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gary , 311 F.3d at 1337 ). If a law or regulation does not treat individuals differently based on race or another protected trait and does not infringe a fundamental right, it "need only have a rational basis—i.e., it need only be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose." Id. (quoting Eide v. Sarasota Cty. , 908 F.2d 716, 722 (11th Cir. 1990) ).
Rational-basis review is highly deferential to government action and easily met. Jones v. Governor of Fla. , 950 F.3d 795, 809 (11th Cir. 2020) ; Checker Cab Operators, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty. , 899 F.3d 908, 921 (11th Cir. 2018). This test only looks for "the existence of a conceivably rational basis, not whether that basis was actually considered by the legislative body." Id. As the Supreme Court has held, under rational basis review, "a state ‘has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.’ " Leib , 558 F.3d at 1307 (quoting Heller v. Doe by Doe , 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993) ). Rather, a law is presumed constitutional, and the plaintiff must "negate every conceivable basis that might support it, even if that basis has no foundation in the record." Id.
Rational basis is the proper standard of review for the mask mandate. The mandate neither discriminates against a protected class nor infringes a fundamental right. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch. , 487 U.S. 450, 458, 108 S.Ct. 2481, 101 L.Ed.2d 399 (1988) ("Nor have we accepted the proposition that education is a ‘fundamental right,’ ... which should trigger strict scrutiny when government interferes with an individual's access to it."); McDaniel v. Thomas , 248 Ga. 632, 647, 285 S.E.2d 156, 167 (1981) ("we hold that education per se is not a ‘fundamental right’ ").
The mandate passes rational-basis scrutiny. The purpose of the mask mandate is to reduce the spread of COVID-19 among students and school employees. This is a legitimate government purpose. And Defendants presented evidence that CCSD implemented the mandate based on guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Georgia Department of Public Health, and Cobb and Douglas Public Health. The guidance from those public health authorities shows there is a rational connection between the mask mandate and its intended goal of slowing the spread of the virus. Plaintiffs have not met their burden of negating every conceivable rationale that might support the mask mandate.
The mask mandate thus passes constitutional scrutiny. For that reason, Plaintiffs have not established a substantial likelihood of succeeding on their equal protection claims under state or federal law.
B. Irreparable harm.
The second prong of the four-part TRO test requires Plaintiffs to show they will suffer irreparable harm or injury without injunctive relief. America's Health Ins. Plans , 742 F.3d at 1329. "[T]he absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief improper." Siegel v. LePore , 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000). Thus, irreparable harm is "the sine qua non of injunctive relief." Id. (punctuation omitted). Plaintiffs have not demonstrated the threat of a "real and immediate" injury needed to support the extraordinary remedy of a TRO. Church v. City of Huntsville , 30 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1994). Plaintiffs, therefore, have not satisfied this element of the TRO test.
C. Weighing the equities and the public interest.
The last two TRO factors require courts to assess the harm to the opposing party and weigh the public interest. Nken v. Holder , 556 U.S. 418, 435, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009). These factors merge when, as in this case, the government is the opposing party. Id.
These factors weigh against granting a TRO. Defendants have a right to rely on the recommendations given by reputable public health authorities, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Georgia Department of Public Health, when deciding how to combat COVID-19, which has caused the worst public health crisis in a century. Those public authorities have recommended that students should wear masks while on school campus. The Court finds it is not in the best interest of the public to interfere with that guidance.
CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion for temporary restraining order.
SO ORDERED , this 12th day of May, 2021.