Opinion
7:23-cv-02178-MGL-MGB
06-28-2023
Douglas Alexander Wright, Plaintiff, v. Sheriff Chuck Wright; Judge Cole; and Spencer Smith, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Douglas Alexander Wright (“Plaintiff”), a state detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action challenging recent criminal proceedings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other South Carolina state law. (See Dkt. No. 1.) Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is currently detained at the Spartanburg County Detention Center. On November 19, 2019, Plaintiff was arrested for murder; attempted armed, or allegedly armed, robbery; and possession of a weapon during a violent crime (if not also sentenced to life without parole or death).(See Indictment Nos. 2020-GS-42-01397, -01398). The status of these criminal proceedings is somewhat unclear, but Plaintiff seems to suggest that on or around January 23, 2023, he entered into some sort of plea agreement. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 4-6.) Notwithstanding Plaintiff's claim, there is no notation of a guilty plea, final disposition, judgement, or sentence in the current state court docket, and the proceedings appear to be ongoing at this time.
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the records filed in Plaintiff's underlying state criminal proceedings. See https://www.sccourts.org/caseSearch/ (limiting search to Spartanburg County) (last visited June 26, 2023); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts); Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites).
The “status” listed for both the murder and robbery charges is “Deferred Sentence,” while the “status” listed for the weapons charge is “Pending/Trial.”
Plaintiff now brings the instant action against Solicitor Spencer Smith, who he claims “forced” him into the plea agreement; Judge Cole, who is apparently presiding over Plaintiff's ongoing criminal proceedings; and Sheriff Chuck Wright, “whose deputies arrested [Plaintiff].” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff raises only two causes of action in the Complaint: (1) a violation of the Due Process Clause based on the ongoing delay in Plaintiff's sentencing following the entry of his plea agreement in January 2023; and (2) defamation of character based on an unidentified news outlet publicizing Plaintiff's guilty plea. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff asks that the Court order his “release from Spartanburg County Detention Center” and $3 million in damages for “pain and suffering.” (Id. at 6.) This is the extent of Plaintiff's Complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985).
DISCUSSION
I. Due Process Violation
As stated above, the Complaint alleges a violation of Plaintiff's due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an apparent delay in his sentencing proceedings before the Spartanburg County Court of General Sessions. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6.) A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim to relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff's due process claim falls short under § 1983 for several reasons.
First, with respect to Defendant Wright, a person acting under color of state law can be held liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (noting that “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”). Here, there is no indication that Defendant Wright is personally involved in the purported delay in Plaintiff's sentencing or in the pending criminal proceedings generally. To the contrary, the only mention of Defendant Wright in the Complaint is that his deputies arrested Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff intended to include Defendant Wright in his due process claim, his allegations are insufficient under § 1983. See Hamilton v. United States, No. 2:20-cv-1666-RMG-MHC, 2020 WL 7001153, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2020) (dismissing claims where plaintiff failed to include sufficiently clear allegations of any personal conduct or wrongdoing in connection with the alleged federal violations), adopted, 2020 WL 5939235 (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2020); see also Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that while the “liberal pleading requirements” of Rule 8(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., require only a “short and plain” statement of the claim, the plaintiff must “offer more detail . . . than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant”) (internal citations omitted).
With respect to Plaintiff's allegations against Judge Cole, it is well-settled that judges have absolute judicial immunity for their judicial actions. See Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Lepelletier v. Tran, 633 F. App'x. 126, 127 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (holding that absolute judicial immunity is a protection from suit, not just from damages, meaning that “claims seeking injunctive relief against a sitting state court judge for actions taken in his judicial capacity . . . [are] barred by the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983”). Notably, judicial immunity is not pierced by allegations of corruption or bad faith, nor will a judicial officer “be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, “[a] judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.” Id. at 359. Because Plaintiff's claims against Judge Cole appear to arise from the judicial actions taken in his underlying criminal proceedings, Judge Cole-as a judge of the State of South Carolina's unified judicial system, see S.C. Const. art. V, § 1-is entitled to absolute judicial immunity in this case.
Similarly, prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from personal liability under § 1983 for alleged civil rights violations committed in the course of “activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467, 468 (4th Cir. 2000). The Complaint's allegations regarding Defendant Smith's purported involvement in Plaintiff s criminal proceedings are therefore protected and subject to summary dismissal under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. See, e.g., Charley v. Off. of the Atty. Gen., No. 6:10-cv-1204-CMC-WMC, 2010 WL 2571866, at *3 (D.S.C. May 21, 2010) (applying prosecutorial immunity where plaintiff alleged unlawful delay and obstruction of justice during state proceedings), adopted, 2010 WL 2571739 (D.S.C. June 21, 2010), aff'd, 404 Fed.Appx. 739 (4th Cir. 2010); Ballenger v. Norton, No. 6:06-cv-3349-RBH, 2007 WL 1462186, at *2 (D.S.C. May 16, 2007) (applying prosecutorial immunity where the State allegedly employed “dilatory tactics” that led to “inordinate and unjustifiable delay” of criminal proceedings), aff'd, 238 Fed.Appx. 974 (4th Cir. 2007).
Notwithstanding the above, even if Plaintiff had stated an actionable due process violation against Defendants, his claim would still be barred by the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which states that federal courts should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances. See id. at 43-44; see also Victoria v. Bodiford, No. 8:21-cv-1836-JMC, 2021 WL 3726707, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2021) (“What lies behind Younger is the premise that state courts are capable of adequately protecting constitutional rights.”). From Younger and its progeny, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
In the instant case, the first criterion is met because Plaintiff's criminal proceedings have not yet concluded. The second criterion is also met, as the Supreme Court has explained that “States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). Finally, the third criterion is satisfied because Plaintiff can address his claims in his pending criminal proceedings. Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (noting that “ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights”) (referencing Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)). Because Plaintiff's case meets all three criteria for abstention under Younger, federal relief is available under § 1983 only if “special circumstances” justify the provision of federal review. Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224-26 (5th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiff's Complaint does not reflect the type of extreme misconduct or extraordinary circumstances that would warrant federal interference in a pending state criminal case. While “special circumstances” lacks any precise, technical meaning, courts have essentially looked to whether procedures exist which would protect a plaintiff's constitutional rights without pretrial intervention; thus, where a threat to the plaintiff's rights may be remedied by an assertion of an appropriate defense in state court, no special circumstance is shown. See Askins v. Dir. of Florence Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 9:20-cv-2846-DCC-MHC, 2020 WL 7001015, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2020) (referencing Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 449 (3d Cir. 1975)), adopted, 2020 WL 6110960 (D.S.C. Oct. 16, 2020). Further, where the right may be adequately preserved by orderly post-trial relief, special circumstances are likewise nonexistent. Id.
Here, Plaintiff can raise his concerns regarding procedural delay in his underlying criminal case. See, e.g., Westpoint v. Al Cannon, No. 9:17-cv-2137-RMG-BM, 2017 WL 5004812, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 6, 2017) (dismissing federal action pursuant to Younger because detainee was able to raise claims of procedural delay during state court proceedings), adopted, 2017 WL 5027497 (D.S.C. Oct. 30, 2017); Nat'l Home Ins. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Com. of Va., 838 F.Supp. 1104, 1119 (E.D. Va. 1993) (noting that “[m]ere delay . . . in pending state court proceedings” does not demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances or “irreparable injury” that precludes abstention under Younger). Because Plaintiff can pursue his constitutional claims in state court, he cannot demonstrate “special circumstances,” or show that he has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied his requested relief. The undersigned therefore finds that Plaintiff is precluded from federal relief at this time.
To be sure, the undersigned notes that, with respect to Plaintiff's request for immediate release from custody based on the purported unconstitutional delay in his criminal proceedings, such relief is unavailable under § 1983 in any event. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973) (finding that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983).
II. Defamation of Character
Turning to Plaintiff's allegations of defamation, the undersigned notes at the outset that it is unclear as to which of the Defendants the Complaint directs this claim. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6.) Nevertheless, defamation falls under South Carolina common law, such that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim regardless. See Cannon v. Peck, 36 F.4th 547, 559 (4th Cir. 2022) (“At base, defamation is a state-law tort claim.”); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991) (“Defamation, by itself, is a tort actionable under the laws of most states, but not a constitutional deprivation.”).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, meaning they possess only that power authorized by Article III of the United States Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1992). There are two primary bases for exercising original federal jurisdiction: (1) “federal question,” under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and (2) “diversity of citizenship,” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. If a federal district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action, it shall also have supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims that are “so related” to the claims under the court's original jurisdiction “that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
With respect to federal question jurisdiction, the plaintiff must assert a cause of action “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The only federal claim raised in the Complaint is the purported due process violation, which is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons discussed above. Accordingly, the Court cannot consider Plaintiff's defamation claim unless there is complete diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 or supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Blackstock v. Miller, No. 417-cv-1926-RBH-KDW, 2017 WL 3530525, at *2 (D.S.C. July 28, 2017) (“Defamation is a state- law based claim that may be considered by this court under its diversity or supplemental jurisdiction.”), adopted, 2017 WL 3500219 (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2017).
The diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), requires that the plaintiff demonstrate complete diversity of parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000. Complete diversity of parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 (1978). In the instant case, Plaintiff and Defendants appear to be citizens of South Carolina. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3.) The Complaint therefore fails to establish complete diversity for purposes of § 1332, and Plaintiff cannot invoke diversity jurisdiction in the instant case.
With respect to supplemental jurisdiction, the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (stating that “if the federal claims are dismissed . . ., the state claims should be dismissed as well”); see also Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants.”). Because Plaintiff's due process claim is subject to summary dismissal, the Court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claim and must dismiss the same.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the undersigned is of the opinion that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending his Complaint. See Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392 of United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 10 F.3d 1064 (4th Cir. 1993). The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court decline to give Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint and DISMISS this action against Defendants without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to an important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).