Opinion
2:23-cv-02177-MGL-MGB
06-12-2023
Douglas Alexander Wright, Petitioner, v. Sheriff Chuck Wright, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Douglas Alexander Wright (“Petitioner”), a state detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that the petition be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without requiring Respondent to file a return.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is currently detained at the Spartanburg County Detention Center. On November 19, 2019, Petitioner was arrested for murder; attempted armed, or allegedly armed, robbery; and possession of a weapon during a violent crime (if not also sentenced to life without parole or death).(See Indictment Nos. 2020-GS-42-01397, -01398). The status of these criminal proceedings is somewhat unclear, but Petitioner seems to suggest that on or around January 23, 2023, he pled guilty to all three charges pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 8.) Notwithstanding Petitioner's claim, there is no notation of a guilty plea, final disposition, judgement, or sentence in the current state court docket, and the proceedings appear to be ongoing at this time.
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the records filed in Petitioner's underlying state criminal proceedings. See https://www.sccourts.org/caseSearch/ (limiting search to Spartanburg County) (last visited June 12, 2023); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts); Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites).
The “status” listed for both the murder and robbery charges is “Deferred Sentence,” while the “status” listed for the weapons charge is “Pending/Trial.”
Petitioner now brings the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking “immediate release from Spartanburg County Detention Center,” “dismissal of all charges,” or, in the alternative, “a reasonable bond until [the] courts make a decision.”(Dkt. No. 1 at 15.) In support, Petitioner raises four primary grounds for relief. First, Petitioner claims that he was “pressured” into accepting the plea deal and did not receive notice that the robbery charge would be “included” in the agreement until he was “moments” away from signing the document. (Id. at 5.) Second, Petitioner alleges that certain “news outlets” announced his guilty plea the week after he entered the agreement and defamed his character. (Id. at 7.) Next, Petitioner challenges the purported “delay in sentencing.” (Id. at 8.) And finally, Petitioner contends that one of the state court judges involved in his criminal proceedings was prejudiced against him, as he apparently denied Petitioner's requests to be placed on bond but granted those of his codefendants. (Id. at 10.)
On the same day Petitioner filed the instant petition, he commenced a separate action seeking the same relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (See Case No. 2:23-cv-02176-MGL-MGB.) The undersigned notes that the grounds for relief are virtually identical between the two petitions.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Petitioner's pro se petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996; and the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (allowing district courts to apply any or all of these rules to § 2241 petitions).
The narrow question before the Court is whether it “plainly appears” that Petitioner is not entitled to any relief. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. If so, his petition must be dismissed; if not, Respondent must respond. Id. Because Petitioner is a pro se litigant, his petition is accorded liberal construction. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1151. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Court cannot ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
I. Defamation Claim
At the outset, the undersigned clarifies that Petitioner's second ground for relief (“defamation of character”) is not a proper claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Dkt. No. 1 at 7.) Indeed, a habeas corpus petition, at its core, must challenge “the validity of [] confinement” or the “particulars affecting its duration.” Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006) (internal citations omitted); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (explaining that habeas petitions are traditionally brought to challenge “the very fact or duration of [] physical imprisonment, and the relief [] is a determination that [the petitioner] is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment”). Petitioner's claim that certain news outlets defamed his character by publicizing his guilty plea in the media does not fall under the purview of a habeas action.Accordingly, the undersigned does not consider this ground in evaluating whether Petitioner is entitled to any relief pursuant to § 2241.
To the contrary, defamation falls under South Carolina common law. See Cannon v. Peck, 36 F.4th 547, 559 (4th Cir. 2022) (“At base, defamation is a state-law tort claim.”); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991) (“Defamation, by itself, is a tort actionable under the laws of most states, but not a constitutional deprivation.”). In order for a federal district court to consider a state law claim like defamation, there must be complete diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 or supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Neither basis applies here. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (stating that “if the federal claims are dismissed . . ., the state claims should be dismissed as well”); see also Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants.”). Thus, notwithstanding the cursory, nonsensical nature of Petitioner's allegations of defamation, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claim in any event.
II. Habeas Corpus Claims
Under certain circumstances, a pretrial detainee may bring a petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, “which applies to persons in custody regardless of whether final judgment has been rendered and regardless of the present status of the case pending against him.” See United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956 (1987)). However, “[i]t is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases[,] the regular judicial procedure should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial.” Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390, 391-92 (1918). Consequently, a detainee's “attempt to dismiss an indictment or otherwise prevent a prosecution” is generally not attainable through federal habeas corpus and must be addressed as part of the ongoing criminal proceedings. See Miller v. Cannon, No. 2:17-cv-2752-TMC-MGB, 2017 WL 6731503, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2017), adopted, 2018 WL 516438 (D.S.C. Jan. 22, 2018).
To be sure, the United States Supreme Court emphasized this principle in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), finding that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances. 401 U.S. At 43-44; see also Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Specifically, the Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
In the instant case, the first criterion is met because Petitioner's criminal proceedings have not yet concluded. The second criterion is also met, as the Supreme Court has explained that “States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). Finally, the third criterion is satisfied because Petitioner can address his claims in his pending criminal proceedings. Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (noting that “ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights”) (referencing Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)); see also Sparks v. Mitchell Cty., No. 1:21-cv-50-MR, 2021 WL 781508, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Mar. 1, 2021) (“Under the third prong, the scheme for federal habeas review is designed ‘to give the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.”) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). Because Petitioner's case meets all three criteria for abstention under Younger, federal habeas relief is available only if “special circumstances” justify the provision of federal review. Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 224-26 .
Petitioner has not shown the type of extreme misconduct or extraordinary circumstances that would warrant federal interference in a pending state criminal case. While “special circumstances” lacks any precise, technical meaning, courts have essentially looked to whether procedures exist which would protect a petitioner's constitutional rights without pretrial intervention; thus, where a threat to the petitioner's rights may be remedied by an assertion of an appropriate defense in state court, no special circumstance is shown. See Askins v. Dir. of Florence Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 9:20-cv-2846-DCC-MHC, 2020 WL 7001015, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2020) (referencing Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 449 (3d Cir. 1975)), adopted, 2020 WL 6110960 (D.S.C. Oct. 16, 2020). Further, where the right may be adequately preserved by orderly post-trial relief, special circumstances are likewise nonexistent. Id.; see also Victoria v. Bodiford, No. 8:21-cv-1836-JMC, 2021 WL 3726707, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2021) (“If Petitioner has the opportunity to raise his constitutional arguments within the state court proceedings and appeal adverse determinations within the state court system, this court is bound by Younger to abstain from granting Petitioner the relief he requests.”).
Petitioner is plainly able to raise his claims in his underlying criminal case, both during trial and on direct appeal if necessary. See, e.g., Brown v. South Carolina, No. 2:18-cv-2312-RBH-JDA, 2018 WL 5724117, at *6 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 2018) (finding that plaintiff could litigate his federal constitutional claims regarding the judge's purported “bias” in his state court proceedings), adopted, 2018 WL 5717111 (D.S.C. Nov. 1, 2018); Westpoint v. Al Cannon, No. 9:17-cv-2137-RMG-BM, 2017 WL 5004812, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 6, 2017), adopted, 2017 WL 5027497 (D.S.C. Oct. 30, 2017) (dismissing habeas petition pursuant to Younger because detainee was able to raise claims of excessive bond and procedural delays during state court proceedings). Because Petitioner can pursue his claims in state court, he cannot demonstrate “special circumstances,” or show that he has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied his requested relief. The undersigned therefore finds that Petitioner is precluded from federal habeas relief at this time.
It is worth noting that even if Petitioner's criminal proceedings could somehow be construed as disposed (for example, if there has been an administrative delay in updating the state court docket and a judgement was in fact issued), Petitioner would still be denied federal habeas relief at this time. As a threshold matter, the appropriate vehicle to challenge a conviction and/or sentence would be 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which applies to persons “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). See In re Wright, 826 F.3d 774, 779 (4th Cir. 2016). Moreover, state prisoners must exhaust all available state-court avenues for challenging their convictions and/or sentences before they seek habeas relief in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). Thus, § 2254 generally forbids federal courts from granting collateral relief until prisoners have “fairly presented” their claims in each appropriate state court. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 27 (2004); Stewart v. Warden of Lieber Corr. Inst., 701 F.Supp.2d 785, 790 (D.S.C. 2010) (noting that “a federal habeas court may consider only those issues that have been properly presented to the highest state courts with jurisdiction to decide them”). To satisfy this burden, the petitioner must show that both the operative facts and the controlling legal principles were presented to the highest state court. Gordon v. Braxton, 780 F.3d 196, 201 (4th Cir. 2015). Because Petitioner has not yet sought post-conviction relief, his habeas claims have not “been fully considered and addressed by courts of the State of South Carolina.” See Rogers v. Warden, McCormick Corr. Inst., No. 8:06-cv-2724-MBS-BHH, 2006 WL 4017752, at *3-4 (D.S.C. Oct. 5, 2006), adopted, 2007 WL 397370 (D.S.C. Jan. 30, 2007); see also Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437, 448 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that state prisoners must invoke “one complete round of the State's established appellate review process”). Accordingly, Petitioner's habeas claims would still be premature and subject to summary dismissal at this stage.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the undersigned finds that Petitioner cannot cure the deficiencies in his petition by amendment and therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS the petition without prejudice and without requiring Respondent to file a return.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to the Important Notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).