Opinion
Case No.: 4:12-cv-152
04-09-2013
JULIET WRIGHT, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAMSBURG AREA MEDICAL ASSISTANCE CORPORATION (WAMAC), a.k.a. OLDE TOWNE MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant.
ORDER
Before the Court is the pro se Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss counsel for the Defendant based on an apparent conflict of interest and brief in support filed on February 25, 2013. ECF Nos. 12-13. The Defendant filed a brief in opposition on March 8, 2013. ECF No. 17. Although the Plaintiff has not filed a reply brief, the time to do so has lapsed. Therefore, the Motion is ripe for disposition.
In her Motion, the Plaintiff requests the Court remove counsel for the Defendant based on an apparent conflict of interest arising from their representation of James City County ("the County") in a related but separately filed case in this Court, Wright v. James City County, No. 4:12-cv-153 (E.D. Va.). The Plaintiff's Motion is without merit. After reviewing the Complaints in these cases, the Court finds the Plaintiff alleges similar material facts (she claims she was fired from her job and discriminated against because of her disabilities), asserts similar grounds for relief (violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act), and submits the same EEOC charge and right-to-sue letter in both cases. Although the Plaintiff has filed separate actions against distinct Defendants, the essential cause of action is the same and the interests of the Defendants are congruent.
As contended by the Defendant, the ability to move for the disqualification of counsel because of a conflict of interest lies with the Defendant in this case. ECF No. 17 at 3. The Court agrees. The party moving for disqualification must have had or currently have an attorney-client relationship with counsel in question in order to object to the representation. See Hechavarria v. City & County of San Francisco, No. C 10-0525 CRB, 2010 WL 3743651, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2010) (denying for lack of standing plaintiff's request to disqualify City Attorney's office from representing parking control officer and City and County of San Francisco in same case). Here, the Defendant and the County are the only parties that may be affected by a conflict of interest. The Plaintiff lacks standing and may not seek the disqualification of opposing counsel because she is not a party that is affected by the potential or actual conflict.
Notwithstanding, as to the merits, the Court finds no violation of Virginia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a), which prohibits
a lawyer ... [from] represent[ing] a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client.Va. R. Prof'l Conduct 1.7(a). According to defense counsel, the County Attorney's Office has represented the Defendant since July 1, 1992, when it contracted with the County "for the employment and assignment of employees and the provision of personnel, purchasing, financial services[,] and expertise." ECF No. 17 at 2. As part of this contract, whereby the County is the fiscal agent of the Defendant, the Defendant's employees are considered the County's and subject to its "Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual" and general supervision. Id. Additionally, the County covers the Defendant's employees under its general liability and risk programs. In light of this long-standing contractual relationship, the Court finds the interests of the Defendant and the County are mutually aligned, not adverse. The County and the Defendant hold substantially similar positions in their respective cases to achieve the same ends—defending against the Plaintiff's claims—and by so contracting with the County, the Defendant has implicitly authorized the County Attorney's Office to represent it in employment actions. As the Defendants in these cases are effectively the same except in name only, under the present circumstances the Court does not find that defense counsel's concurrent representation of the County will detrimentally affect and materially limit its representation of the Defendant.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion, ECF No. 12, is DENIED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to forward a copy of this Order to the Plaintiff and counsel of record for the Defendant.
It is so ORDERED.
/s/_________
Lawrence R. Leonard
United States Magistrate Judge Norfolk, Virginia
April 9, 2013