243 N.W.2d at 900. In Wright v. State Board of Engineering Examiners, 250 N.W.2d 412 (Iowa 1977), the court found it necessary to note the case was pre-Iowa Administrative Procedure Act after holding alleged illegality in the board's adjudication of a practitioner's misconduct "must be tested against principles governing ordinary certiorari proceedings." 250 N.W.2d at 416.

The statutory language itself supports plaintiffs' position, in that the phrase "pension and profit sharing trust" is coupled with the words "or other financial institution or institutional buyer." Applying the well-recognized principle of noscitur a sociis, which permits the meaning of a particular word to be ascertained in light of those with which it is associated, Wright v. State Board of Engineering Examiners, 250 N.W.2d 412, 413 (Iowa 1977), the Court believes that the legislature intended to exempt only those experienced institutional investors who do not require the safeguards afforded by registration. Such an interpretation is consistent with the Iowa Supreme Court's statement that any ambiguous language contained in the blue sky laws must be construed to effectuate the primary purpose of such laws, which is to protect the public from deceit perpetrated in the sale of securities.

See Wright v. State Bd. of Eng'g Exam'rs, 250 N.W.2d 412, 413 (Iowa 1977) ("[T]he meaning of a word is ascertained in the light of the meaning of words with which it is associated."). Given this shift in language, we agree with the district court that "consulting or contractual relationship" refers to consultants and contractors, whose relationship with governmental bodies is different than the compensation arrangements extended to government employees.

However, we cannot apply this canon if its application thwarts legislative intent or makes the general words meaningless. 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:16, at 355 (7th ed. 2007); accord Wright v. State Bd. of Eng'g Exam'rs, 250 N.W.2d 412, 414 (Iowa 1977). For several reasons, we believe this is one of those occasions when the canon is not applicable.

Support for our conclusion is gained from the application of two settled rules of statutory interpretation. These are the rule of noscitur a sociis, which provides that the meaning of words in a statute are to be ascertained in light of the meaning of the words with which they are associated, Wright v. State Bd. of Eng'g Exam'rs, 250 N.W.2d 412, 413 (Iowa 1977), and the rule of ejusdem generis, which states that general words that follow specific words are tied to the meaning and purpose of the specific word. Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Shell Oil Co., 606 N.W.2d 376, 380 (Iowa 2000). For the reasons stated, we conclude that the court of appeals was correct in upholding the authority of the district court to reconsider Avon's sentence.

Because the legislature granted the trial court a spectrum of discretion in setting the amount of the enhanced fine, we conclude that it intended the same result for the term-of-confinement enhancement appearing in the same Code section. See Wright v. State Bd. of Eng'g Exam'rs, 250 N.W.2d 412, 413 (Iowa 1977) (stating that "the meaning of a word is ascertained in the light of the meaning of the words with which it is associated"). We find further support for our conclusion in the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, the source for Code chapter 124.

A meaning of a word can be ascertained by its context. See Wright v. State Bd. of Eng'g Examiners, 250 N.W.2d 412, 413 (Iowa 1977). With these principles in mind, we think Weiss unnaturally isolates "under the influence of a drug inducing sleep" from the remainder of the phrase in section 709.1(1), "or is otherwise unconscious."

In interpreting statutes, we figure out the meaning of words in part by reference to associated language. Wright v. State Bd. of Eng'g Examiners, 250 N.W.2d 412, 413 (Iowa 1977); State v. Bauer, 236 Iowa 1020, 1022, 20 N.W.2d 431, 432 (1945); 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction §§ 47.16, 47.26 (5th ed. 1992). We apply similar principles in interpreting this insurance contract.

Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 2458, 86 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); Third National Bank v. Impac Limited, Inc., 432 U.S. 312, 97 S.Ct. 2307, 53 L.Ed.2d 368 (1977). See Wright v. State Bd. of Engineering Examiners, 250 N.W.2d 412 (Iowa 1977). Each of the words in the phrase "indecent, lewd, lascivious, or obscene," found in the first prohibition of 28-1310(1)(b), has sexual connotations. Included in the common, everyday meaning of "indecent" is that which tends to be obscene and which is morally indelicate.

Iowa Code § 601A.2(10) (1981). Balanced against these linguistic additions, however, is the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, which provides that the meanings of statutory terms are ascertained in light of the meaning of words with which they are associated. See, e.g., Wright v. State Bd. of Eng'g Examiners, 250 N.W.2d 412, 413-14 (Iowa 1977). In addition, we construe nontechnical words consistent with approved usage.