Opinion
23A-PL-2778
08-09-2024
Alisa K. Wright and BioConvergence LLC, Appellants-Plaintiffs v. LaDonna Snyder, as the Representative of the Estate of Alan Lance Wright, Appellee-Defendant
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS Christopher C. Murray, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. Indianapolis, Indiana. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Jeffrey S. Dible, Maggie L. Smith, Frost Brown Todd LLP Indianapolis, Indiana.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Boone Circuit Court The Honorable Lori N. Schein, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 06C01-1703-PL-239
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS Christopher C. Murray, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. Indianapolis, Indiana.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Jeffrey S. Dible, Maggie L. Smith, Frost Brown Todd LLP Indianapolis, Indiana.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
MATHIAS, JUDGE.
[¶1] Alisa K. Wright and BioConvergence LLC ("BioC") (collectively, "Alisa") appeal the Boone Circuit Court's dismissal of their complaint for failure to prosecute under Trial Rule 41(E). Alisa presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed her complaint.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] In 2004, Alisa started BioC, which is a service provider to the life sciences industry. Alisa's husband, Alan Lance Wright ("Lance"), worked at BioC and later became its Chief Operating Officer. In 2012, Lance filed for a dissolution of his marriage to Alisa. While the dissolution was pending, in 2016 Alisa filed a complaint against Lance, which she amended in 2017 to add BioC as a plaintiff. The amended complaint alleged Lance's breach of fiduciary duty, willful misconduct, fraud, tortious interference with a business relationship, and breach of contract.
For a breakdown of the alleged facts supporting these claims, see our memorandum decision in Snyder v. Wright, 18A-PL-2702, 2019 WL 6885078 (Ind.Ct.App. December 18, 2019). Given that the instant appeal turns on a procedural matter, we need not delve into those underlying factual allegations here.
[¶4] Following discovery, Lance filed a motion for summary judgment in 2017, which the trial court denied. Lance died in January 2019, and LaDonna Snyder, the personal representative of his estate, was substituted as defendant in the case. On interlocutory appeal, in a December 2019 memorandum decision, our Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Lance's motion for summary judgment. On August 27, 2021, Alisa filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint a second time, and the trial court denied that motion in September.
[¶5] On June 16, 2023, after almost two years of Alisa's inactivity in the instant litigation, the trial court sua sponte issued an order for rule to show cause as to why Alisa's complaint should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute under Trial Rule 41(E). In her written response to the court's order, Alisa argued that two other pending cases, which she was vigorously pursuing, were related to the instant case. She asserted that the discovery in those cases was relevant to the instant case. Alisa further stated that "much of the delay in this case" was due to various motions filed by Lance before his death, culminating in his unsuccessful interlocutory appeal in 2019. App. Vol. 4, p. 32.
[¶6] During a hearing on the show cause order, Alisa conceded that, "perhaps [I should have] filed a motion to stay the [instant] case pending the outcome" of the other related litigation. Tr. p. 15. Following the hearing, the trial court dismissed Alisa's complaint for her failure to prosecute. In its order, the court stated that it had considered the factors relevant to a Trial Rule 41(E) determination, and it specifically noted the age of the case, Alisa's failure to take any action for years, the prejudice to Snyder, and the fact that Alisa had only acted now with the threat of dismissal. Alisa filed a motion to correct error, which the court denied. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[¶7] Alisa contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed her complaint for failure to prosecute. Indiana Trial Rule 41(E) provides:
Whenever there has been a failure to comply with these rules or when no action has been taken in a civil case for a period of sixty [60] days, the court, on motion of a party or on its own motion shall order a hearing for the purpose of dismissing such case. The court shall enter an order of dismissal at plaintiff's costs if the plaintiff shall not show sufficient cause at or before such hearing. Dismissal may be withheld or reinstatement of dismissal may be made subject to the condition that the plaintiff comply with these rules and diligently prosecute the action and upon such terms that the court in its discretion determines to be necessary to assure such diligent prosecution.
[¶8] As this Court has stated, "we will reverse a Trial Rule 41(E) dismissal for failure to prosecute only in the event of a clear abuse of discretion, which occurs if the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it." Petrovski v. Neiswinger, 85 N.E.3d 922, 924 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018). "We will affirm if there is any evidence that supports the decision of the trial court." Belcaster v. Miller, 785 N.E.2d 1164, 1167 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003), trans. denied.
[¶9] The purpose of Trial Rule 41(E) is "'to ensure that plaintiffs will diligently pursue their claims. The rule provides an enforcement mechanism whereby a defendant, or the court, can force a recalcitrant plaintiff to push his case to resolution.'" Id. at 1167 (quoting Benton v. Moore, 622 N.E.2d 1002, 1006 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993)). The plaintiff bears the burden of moving the litigation and the trial court has no duty to urge or require counsel to go to trial, even where it would be within the court's power to do so. Lee v. Pugh, 811 N.E.2d 881, 885 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004).
[¶10] In Indiana, courts must balance nine factors when determining whether to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute. Petrovski, 85 N.E.3d at 925. Those factors ("the Belcaster factors") include:
(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the degree of personal responsibility on the part of the plaintiff; (4) the degree to which the plaintiff will be charged for the acts of his attorney; (5) the amount of prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay; (6) the presence or absence of a lengthy history of having deliberately proceeded in a dilatory fashion; (7) the existence and effectiveness of sanctions less drastic than dismissal which fulfill the purposes of the rules and the desire to avoid court congestion; (8) the desirability of deciding the case on the merits; and (9) the extent to which the plaintiff has been stirred into action by a threat of dismissal as opposed to diligence on the plaintiff's part.Id. "'The weight any particular factor has in a particular case appears to depend upon the facts of that case.'" Id. (quoting Belcaster, 785 N.E.2d at 1167). "However, a lengthy period of inactivity may be enough to justify dismissal under the circumstances of a particular case, especially if the plaintiff has no excuse for the delay." Belcaster, 785 N.E.2d at 1167. Although Indiana does not require trial courts to impose lesser sanctions before applying the ultimate sanction of dismissal, we view dismissals with disfavor, and dismissals are considered extreme remedies that should be granted only under limited circumstances. Caruthers v. State, 58 N.E.3d 207, 211 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016).
[¶11] In her brief on appeal, Alisa first contends that the trial court "fail[ed] to consider and weigh all nine of the relevant factors" in Belcaster. Appellants' Br. at 27. In particular, Alisa claims that the trial court "did not even consider the reason for [her] recent delay in prosecuting this case, let alone balance that reason in its analysis." Id. at 29 (italics in original). But the trial court explicitly stated that it had considered each of the relevant factors. In essence, then, Alisa contends that the trial court's failure to make a specific finding regarding her alleged excuse for the delay was clear error. But Alisa does not cite any authority showing that a trial court has to make specific findings on each factor it considers, and we know of no such requirement.
[¶12] Alisa also argues that Snyder did not present evidence of any prejudice to support the trial court's finding that the Estate was prejudiced because "other creditor[s'] claims to the estate remain unresolved due to this litigation[.]" Appellants' App. Vol. 2, p. 28. Alisa concedes that there are two pending claims in the Estate proceeding, but she describes the claims as "small" and argues that the prejudice to her outweighs the prejudice to those claimants. Appellants' Br. at 33. Alisa's argument misses the point. The prejudice to the Estate is only one factor, and the relative weight assigned by the trial court to a single factor is not dispositive.
[¶13] Finally, Alisa argues that the trial court's finding that she was only "stirred into action by threat of dismissal" unfairly ignores her "reasonable efforts to coordinate the prosecution of this case" with the other litigation. Id. She maintains that her "constant, ongoing efforts" in two allegedly related cases "make clear that [she] did not fail to act but for the court's order to show cause." Id. at 34. But Alisa's concession during the hearing that "perhaps" she should have filed a motion to stay the instant litigation while actively pursuing the other cases undermines her argument on appeal. Tr. p. 15. A motion for a stay, if granted, would have precluded the court's sua sponte show cause order.
[¶14] Indiana Trial Rule 41(E) requires only a sixty-day period of inaction before the trial court can dismiss a complaint. Here, Alisa did not take any action for almost two full years, and she did not resume any activity in this case until the trial court issued its show cause order. The burden was on Alisa to prove that there was sufficient cause or excuse for the delay. See Lee, 811 N.E.2d at 886 n.4. The trial court found Alisa's excuse unpersuasive in light of each of the Belcaster factors, and we cannot say that the court's determination is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. See Petrovski, 85 N.E.3d at 924. While we prefer to decide cases on their merits, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed Alisa's complaint for her failure to prosecute.
[¶15] Affirmed.
May, J., and Brown, J., concur.