Opinion
2:23-cv-01635-MGL-MGB
07-14-2023
Douglas Alexander Wright, Plaintiff, v. Allane Roach; Sonya Paz; and Carol Fernandez, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Douglas Alexander Wright (“Plaintiff”), a state detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to medical needs against several nurses at the Spartanburg County Detention Center: Allane Roach; Sonya Paz; and Carol Fernandez (collectively, “Defendants”). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be partially dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The instant case is premised on a series of dental issues Plaintiff experienced while housed at the Spartanburg County Detention Center. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that on May 3, 2022, he developed an “extreme toothache” caused by a hole in one of his wisdom teeth and submitted a grievance seeking “immediate medical attention” for the same. (Dkt. No. 1 at 7.) On May 6, 2022, Plaintiff submitted a second grievance stating, “I have still yet to be seen by the nurse on my wisdom toothache [and] need immediate attention. I haven't slept in three straight nights from pain.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant Roach eventually responded to his grievance stating, “Addressed.” (Id.) Although it is unclear from the face of the Complaint how the dental issue was “addressed,” it seems Plaintiff may have been provided with pain medication as indicated in his next grievance, filed May 16, 2022. Indeed, Plaintiff notified the medical staff that “pain pills” and “oral gel” had not reduced his toothache and that he needed his wisdom tooth pulled. (Id.) Defendant Roach apparently responded to Plaintiff's grievance stating, “Sir, there is nothing we can do. You need oral surgery for your wisdom tooth.” (Id. at 7-8.)
On June 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed a grievance stating that he had developed an abscess on his gums due to a different tooth that broke and began to rot in 2020. (Id. at 8.) Defendant Roach responded to Plaintiff's grievance stating, “Nurse to see.” (Id.) On August 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed another grievance noting the abscess on his gums, and Defendant Roach again responded, “Nurse to see.” (Id.) On November 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed a third grievance regarding the abscess on his gums, and Defendant Paz responded, “I will inform Nurse Carol.” (Id.) While Plaintiff claims that he was “never seen or treated” in response to the November 9th grievance, he also asserts- albeit vaguely-that Defendant Carol Fernandez did see him, but denied him treatment. (See id. at 5.) The Complaint does not specify whether Plaintiff received any medical treatment in relation to the June 13th or August 3rd grievances.
Plaintiff suggests that he broke this tooth biting into the stick inside of a corndog at dinner on February 15, 2020. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) He seems to allege that a fragment of that same tooth remained lodged in his gums thereafter. (Id. at 9.)
The undersigned assumes the Complaint is referring to Defendant Carol Fernandez.
Notwithstanding the grievances above, Plaintiff claims that he was ultimately “denied his wisdom tooth pulled and medication.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff alleges that, as a result, he lost half of his wisdom tooth, and the remaining half continues to cause periodic bleeding and pain, which apparently impact his ability to sleep. (Id.) The Complaint also mentions ongoing gum issues due to Plaintiff's rotten tooth. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in an amount no less than $100,000 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Upon reviewing the initial filings in this case, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his action was not in proper form because he had submitted an incomplete Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and failed to provide a set of service documents for Defendants. (Dkt. No. 5 at 1.) The undersigned also informed Plaintiff that parts of his Complaint were likely subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Id. at 3-4.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the undersigned gave him an opportunity to file the outstanding proper form documents and an amended complaint in twenty-one days. The undersigned warned Plaintiff that failure to comply with the Court's instructions within the time prescribed by the order would result in summary dismissal. (Id. at 2, 4.)
On June 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed a properly completed Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees (Dkt. No. 2-3) and a set of proposed service documents (Dkt. No. 8). Plaintiff did not, however, file an amended complaint. Accordingly, the undersigned issued a second order reminding Plaintiff that he still needed to file an amended pleading that cured the deficiencies identified in his original Complaint; the undersigned emphasized that if Plaintiff failed to comply with these directions, some of his claims may be summarily dismissed. (Dkt. No. 9.) To date, Plaintiff has not filed an amended pleading, and the time to do so has lapsed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also id. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
A civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). Thus, to state a claim to relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A person acting under color of state law can be held liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017).
To that end, the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior generally are not applicable in § 1983 actions. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).
Here, the crux of the Complaint is delayed and/or inadequate medical treatment with respect to Plaintiff's dental issues. Accordingly, the undersigned construes Plaintiff's allegations as raising claims of deliberate indifference to medical needs in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To demonstrate an actionable constitutional violation for inadequate medical treatment, a plaintiff must show that, objectively, he had a serious medical need and that, subjectively, the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to those needs. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225-26 (4th Cir. 2016).
While the Eighth Amendment protects convicted prisoners against cruel and unusual punishment, a detainee cannot be subject to any form of punishment and must therefore bring such claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 300 (4th Cir. 2021); Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2001). Notwithstanding this distinction, the standard for reviewing pretrial detainees' medical claims under the Fourteenth Amendment is essentially the same as that for a convicted prisoner under the Eighth Amendment. See Mays, 992 F.3d at 300 (noting that the Fourth Circuit has “traditionally looked to Eighth Amendment precedents in considering a Fourteenth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs”).
As to the first prong, a “serious medical need” is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). As to the second prong, a claim of deliberate indifference requires a showing that the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate's health. Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014). An assertion of mere negligence or even malpractice is not sufficient to state a constitutional violation, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), such that there must be “more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
Construing the Complaint most liberally, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state a claim to relief under the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendant Roach. With respect to the remaining Defendants, however, the undersigned finds that the Complaint fails to demonstrate deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
This Report and Recommendation makes no determinations regarding the potential success or merits of Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Roach.
Turning first to Defendant Paz, the Complaint's only allegation is that on November 9, 2022, she responded to Plaintiff's grievance concerning the abscess on his gums by stating, “I will inform Nurse Carol.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 8.) Although Plaintiff claims that he “was never seen or treated” in relation to this particular grievance (id. at 5), he does not allege that Defendant Paz was aware of that fact or at fault for the lack of follow-up. To make such an assumption would require this Court to fill in the gaps on Plaintiff's behalf, which it simply cannot do. See Campbell v. StoneMor Partners, LP, No. 3:17-cv-407, 2018 WL 3451390, at *4 (E.D. Va. July 17, 2018) (explaining that the court is not required to “cobble together the facts” that could support the plaintiff's claims, nor is it “empowered to transform itself into an advocate on [the] [plaintiff's behalf'), aff'd, 752 Fed.Appx. 166 (4th Cir. 2019); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”). Moreover, as stated above, Plaintiff's own allegations undermine his claim, as the Complaint acknowledges that Defendant Carol Fernandez did in fact see Plaintiff regarding his medical condition. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) Consequently, Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Paz fall short of deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment and must be summarily dismissed.
With respect to Defendant Fernandez, Plaintiff's only allegation is that she “[saw him] but still denied treatment.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) Beyond this bare assertion, the Complaint does not offer any context or factual allegations whatsoever regarding this apparent examination or Defendant Fernandez's personal involvement in the purported deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional right to adequate medical treatment. Once again, without more, such cursory allegations fall short of an actionable constitutional violation under § 1983. See Trulockv. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that while the “liberal pleading requirements” of Rule 8(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., require only a “short and plain” statement of the claim, the plaintiff must “offer more detail . . . than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant”) (internal citations omitted); Iqbal, 556 at 678 (noting that the federal pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”).
Notwithstanding the vague nature of Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Fernandez, the undersigned further notes that to the extent Plaintiff simply disagrees with her assessment of his medical condition, or the course of treatment offered, his argument still fails to establish deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Alexander v. Parks, No. 7:17-cv-524, 2019 WL 346426, at *4 (W.D. Va. Jan. 28, 2019) (noting that “disagreement with the treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference”); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (explaining that negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid constitutional violation). Accordingly, Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Fernandez are likewise subj ect to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court summarily DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Paz and Fernandez without further leave to amend, as he has already had an opportunity to do so. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).