Opinion
C.A. No.: 02C-12-242-FSS.
Submitted: June 15, 2004.
Decided: August 25, 2004.
ORDER
On May 11, 2004 the Prothonotary issued a Notice under Superior Court Civil Rule 41(e). The Notice recited various reasons why the case was subject to dismissal. The Notice speaks for itself.
On May 25, 2004, Mr. Wright submitted a formal response to the Notice. Mostly, Mr. Wright blames his procedural defaults on his unfamiliarity with Delaware law and the court's rules. Despite the court's rules and orders, Mr. Wright states, "I reasonably believed the matter would just stay coarse to trial." Mr. Wright also blames his defaults on his changing address.
As to the Notice's suggestion that Mr. Wright lacks standing, he simply announces that he "and another brother, Alfred Wright, share equal responsibility in the handling of Victor Wright's estate. As the attached document will show." The only attachment to Mr. Wright's letter on this point is his brother's death certificate. Mr. Wright states he has not read any "case law or rules" that say he cannot represent his brother's estate in court.
The fact that Mr. Wright is the deceased's brother does not make him the estate's personal representative. To stand for the estate, Mr. Wright would have to have the Register of Wills's authorization. The well established rules about this simply reflect common sense. Absent Mr. Wright's having official status as the estate's representative, anyone dealing with the estate cannot be assured that someone else — such as another of the deceased's relatives or a creditor — might not make similar claims. In other words, Mr. Wright's declaration that he and another brother of the deceased are handling the estate, equally, does not assure anyone that no one else has a claim on the estate's behalf.
10 Del. C. § 3704; Reed v. Shallcross, 100 A. (Del.Super.Ct. 1916).
Even if Mr. Wright were the estate's representative, the estate is a separate entity. The court's rules firmly establish that only licensed attorneys may represent others in court. That rule is grounded in the public's protection, which includes the estates of people who have died. By his admissions, Mr. Wright has agreed that he is not familiar enough with the law and court rules to avoid jeopardizing the estate's claim, much less to assure the court and Defendant that they are dealing with a proper claim. Mr. Wright is not allowed to act as a attorney for his brother's estate.
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 90(a).
Finally, the court has carefully reviewed the copy of the April 2003 letter submitted by Mr. Wright from Randy Weiss, D.O. That letter falls short of establishing that the estate has a qualified medical expert, which is required by Delaware statute and case law. First, Weiss, who lists a Pennsylvania address, does not claim to be licensed in Pennsylvania, much less in Delaware. Second, while Weiss suggests that a physician, not Defendant, failed to meet the standard of care for the deceased, Weiss does not state how Defendant's care of the deceased was substandard. Nor does Weiss opine that any breach of the standard of care proximately caused injury to the deceased. For example, Weiss says that an angiography merely "would have identified the exact area of bleeding possibly allowing for an opportunity to stop the patient[']s bleeding." That allegation falls short of actionable medical negligence. Similarly, Mr. Wright's complaint fails to allege that he personally sustained a compensable injury at Defendant's hands. Therefore, even to the extent he can represent himself, as opposed to representing the estate, Mr. Wright has no expert support for his claim.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6853 (1999); Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A.2d 56 (Del. 1991).
The court is sensitive to Mr. Wright's feelings. He has lost a brother and has been told that his brother did not receive proper medical care. Even so, a medical negligence case in Superior Court is not a do-it-yourself project. Experienced attorneys who specialize in the field have trouble establishing medical negligence. A person with no formal, legal training has no realistic chance of making a medical negligence claim, especially with this case's fact pattern.
Meanwhile, this case was filed in December 2002. It went to arbitration in June 2003 and the arbitrator, a practicing attorney, dismissed the case because "Mr. Wright did not have standing" and he could not prove that "Defendant was the true defendant in this matter." Thus, Mr. Wright was on notice about some of the case's problems for almost a year before the Prothonotary's Notice was issued in May. During that period and even after the Notice, Mr. Wright has not addressed the case's problems. Furthermore, the court sees no prospect that a proper Plaintiff, properly represented, will pursue this complicated litigation. Again, the court is sympathetic to Mr. Wright's deep loss and to his feelings. Nevertheless, the court cannot sustain this case on sympathy. The court must obey its own rules.
For the foregoing reasons, the case is DISMISSED under Superior Court Civil Rule 41(e).