Opinion
No. 68-393
Decided December 10, 1969.
Summons — Long-arm statute — Service on Secretary of State — Section 2307.383, Revised Code — Pleading — Petition — Allegations insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction on nonresident — Section 2307.382 (A) (5), Revised Code.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
The plaintiff, a maintenance man, was injured at his place of employment in Ohio when a mold opener on which he was working suddenly activated and crushed two of his fingers. The mold opener was controlled by a valve manufactured in Michigan by the defendant valve manufacturer, a corporation doing business in Michigan.
The plaintiff sued the defendant corporation to recover damages for his injuries and served process on the Secretary of State under Section 2307.383, Revised Code.
The petition included the following allegations:
That the defendant was a manufacturer of valves controlling the operation of a machine located at the plant where the plaintiff was employed; that the injury was caused by the malfunction of the valve manufactured by the defendant which was impliedly warranted by the defendant to be fit for controlling the operation of the mold opener and to keep the mold opener from activating without positive operation of the trigger controlling the valve; that the valve was made outside Ohio; that the defendant reasonably expected the valve to be used by persons in industry; that the defendant reasonably expected maintenance workers in Ohio to be affected by the use of the valve; that the valve was not equipped with a safety device to prevent injury.
The defendant did not answer and a default judgment was taken against it. The defendant then filed a motion to quash the service of process. The Court of Common Pleas sustained the motion, and the plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that jurisdiction of the defendant was authorized by the Ohio long-arm statutes.
The defendant has appealed to this court.
Messrs. Baggott, Logan Gianuglou and Mr. Horace W. Baggott, Sr., for appellee.
Messrs. Pickrel, Schaeffer Ebeling, Messrs. Altick McDaniel and Mr. Francis S. McDaniel, for appellant.
Personal jurisdiction in this state over a nonresident is authorized by statute as to a cause of action arising from the nonresident's causing "injury in this state . . . by breach of warranty . . . made in the sale of goods outside this state when he might reasonably have expected such person to use, consume, or be affected by the goods in this state" if the nonresident "[1] regularly does or solicits business, or [2] engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or [3] derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed . . . in this state." Section 2307.382(A)(5), Revised Code.
The petition sets forth in substantially the statutory language that defendant "might reasonably have expected . . . [the plaintiff] to use, consume, or be affected by the [defendant's] goods in this state." However, it fails to allege specifically one or more of the three additional grounds, as numbered above, which are also prerequisites to jurisdiction of the defendant authorized by statute. Nor does it set forth allegations sufficient to support a reasonable inference that defendant regularly does or solicits business, or engages in a persistent course of conduct in Ohio, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed in Ohio.
Counsel urges, in effect, that, on the facts alleged, the Constitution of the United States does not inhibit the Ohio courts from exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident. Assuming the validity of that proposition, the answer to the argument, so far as it affects this appeal, is that our General Assembly has not exercised the full scope of its constitutional authority to impose jurisdiction upon such a nonresident.
Plaintiff not having pleaded facts sufficient to meet the statutory requirement to obtain jurisdiction of the defendant, the motion to quash was properly sustained by the lower court.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, reversed, and the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment reversed.
TAFT, C.J., MATTHIAS, O'NEILL, SCHNEIDER, HERBERT, DUNCAN and CORRIGAN, JJ., concur.