Opinion
No. 3:97CV126-D-A.
Filed Date: March 1, 1999.
OPINION
Presently before the court is the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the motion, the court finds that it should be granted.
Standard Employed for Motion for Summary Judgment
On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986) ("the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case"). Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden shifts to the non-movant to "go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. That burden is not discharged by "mere allegations or denials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). All legitimate factual inferences must be made in favor of the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986).
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff and Paul Worley were cell-mates at the Marshall County Jail. On June 27, 1994, the two men were playing cards in their jail cell. They decided to purchase some alcoholic beverages by each giving a private citizen $5.00 by passing the money through the jail cell's outside window to the private citizen. This person took their money and later returned with two pints of Heaven Hill bourbon whiskey. Wrenn and Worley then each consumed their respective pint of whiskey within ten to fifteen minutes. See Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B.
After drinking the whiskey, Wrenn and Worley began verbally fighting and a fist fight ensued that lasted several minutes. See Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B C. Following the fight, the two were in the cell together when at least one law enforcement officer, Mike Novey, came to the jail cell and removed Worley from the cell. After a period of time elapsed, Worley was returned to the cell. Plaintiff Wrenn stated that Mr. Novey and Worley shook hands and that Mr. Novey said something to Worley; however, he is not sure exactly what was said. See Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B Later that day, Worley allegedly attacked Wrenn again, and the two fought. Sometime after this fight, Wrenn was taken to the Holly Springs Memorial Hospital. On June 29, 1994, Wrenn was taken to The Regional Medical Center in Memphis, Tennessee, for a follow-up visit. See Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B.
The Plaintiff has filed this lawsuit against Marshall County and Ernest Cunningham and Mike Novey, individually and in their official capacities. The complaint asserts that Mike Novey conspired with Worley for purposes of inflicting harm on the Plaintiff. Furthermore, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent in addressing the Plaintiff's medical needs. Finally, the complaint states that the Defendants Marshall County and Cunningham's policy or procedures in training law enforcement officers on addressing the medical needs of inmates showed a deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the Plaintff.
Discussion
A. Marshall County
The Defendants Cunningham and Novey, sued in their official capacities, and the political subdivision Marshall County, may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts which violated the Plaintiff's constitutional rights if the alleged harmful actions resulted from a policy, custom, or practice which evinces objective deliberate indifference to the Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Grabowski v. Jackson County Public Defenders Office, 79 F.3d 478, 479 (5 th Cir. 1996) ( en banc). Monell v. Department of Social Services holds that local governments may be liable for damages, as well as declaratory or injunctive relief, whenever "the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers. Moreover . . . local governments . . . may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental `custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decision-making channels." 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2035, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). This "policy or custom" may also be created "by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy." Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Whether an official has final policymaking authority is a question of state law. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124, 108 S. Ct. 915, 924, 99 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1988). There are no Fifth Circuit cases out of Mississippi that address whether a sheriff is considered a "policymaker" as to supervision of the county jail. However, Mississippi statutory law empowers the county sheriff to "take into his custody, and safely keep, in the jail of his county, all persons committed . . ." Miss. Code Ann. § 19-25-35. Moreover, in Huddleston v. Shirley, the district court held that Sheriff Jack Shirley of Lee County was a "policymaker" thereby incurring 1983 liability on Lee County. 787 F. Supp. 109, 112 (N.D. Miss. 1992). Also, in Lester v. City of Rosedale, the court held that the marshal or chief of police was a "policymaker" as defined by Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati. 757 F. Supp. 741, 745 (N.D. Miss. 1991) (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. 469 (1986)). Therefore, the "edicts or acts" of Defendant Cunningham could also impose liability on the county.
Monell rejects government liability based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Thus, a government body cannot be held liable under section 1983 merely because it employs a tortfeasor. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92. However, when a plaintiff names a government official in his official capacity, the plaintiff is seeking to recover compensatory damages from the government body itself. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72, 105 S.Ct. 873, 878, 83 L. Ed. 2d 878 (1985). Naming a government official in his official capacity is the equivalent of naming the government entity itself as the defendant, and requires the Plaintiff to make out Monell-type proof of an official policy or custom as the cause of the constitutional violation. Therefore, the court addresses the claims against the county and the two government officials in their official capacities together.
1. Failure to Protect the Plaintiff
The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants failed to properly protect him from the assaults of his cell-mate Worley. The evidence presented to the court indicates that Worley had never been physically aggressive or physically assaulted the Plaintiff or any other inmate. See Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B C. In fact, the Plaintiff and Worley had been playing cards prior to the incident at issue. After the law enforcement officers were notified of the incident, Worley was removed from the cell. He was later returned to the cell, and a second fight occurred between Worley and the Plaintiff. However, the court finds that no reasonable fact finder could find that placing Worley in the cell after a "cooling off" period amounted to deliberate indifference.
2. Adequate Training and Supervision
The Plaintiff also alleges that the County's failure to train and supervise its law enforcement officers amounted to deliberate indifference of the rights of the Plaintiff. Defendant Novey was the officer involved in the alleged events. Defendant Novey was a graduate of two separate training facilities, inclusive of the Mississippi Law Enforcement Officers Training Academy and had approximately thirteen years of commissioned service. The Plaintiff has presented no evidence or response to rebut this assertion.
3. Denial of Medical Care
Finally, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendants showed deliberate indifference by denying him proper medical care and attention. Mere allegations of inadequate treatment or even gross negligence in the provision of medical care does not rise to the level of a constitutional claim. Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 645 (5 th Cir. 1996). The Plaintiff must establish that the Defendants acted with subjective deliberate indifference to the Plaintiff's medical needs. Hare, 74 F.3d at 650. The evidence presented to the court indicates that the Defendant was treated at the Holly Springs Memorial Hospital on the same day that the injuries were incurred. Moreover, the Plaintiff received follow-up treatment at The Regional Medical Center in Memphis, Tennessee. Such evidence establishes that the Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to the Plaintiff's medical needs. The Plaintiff has not presented any evidence or filed a response to rebut the Defendants' arguments. Therefore, based on the evidence before it, this court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to the claims against Marshall County and Defendants Cunningham and Novey, in their official capacities, and that summary judgment should be granted for these defendants as a matter of law.
B. Defendants Ernest Cunningham and Mike Novey, in their Individual Capacities
When a plaintiff names an official in his individual capacity, the plaintiff seeks "to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3104, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985). The defense of qualified immunity is available to an official sued in his personal capacity. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court held that "government officials performing discretionary function[s] generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). "The bifurcated test for qualified immunity is . . . (1) whether the Plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether the Defendant's conduct was objectively unreasonable in the light of the clearly established law at the time of the incident." Hare, 135 F.3d at 328. In light of the court's explanation supra, the court is of the opinion that even if the Plaintiff alleged a violation of clearly established constitutional rights, the acts of the Defendants were objectively reasonable and did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Consequently, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the claims against Defendants Cunningham and Novey, in their individual capacities, should be granted as a matter of law.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (Docket #30) is GRANTED; and
this case is CLOSED.
All memoranda, depositions, declarations, and other materials considered by the court in ruling on these motions are hereby incorporated into and made a part of the record in this action.
SO ORDERED.