Opinion
00 Civ. 6496 (SAS)
July 6, 2001
Diane Word, Plaintiff (Pro Se).
Michele N. Beier, Assistant Attorney General For Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) — (5), seeks relief from a judgment issued by this Court on April 27, 2001, granting summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's Amended Complaint in its entirety. See Word v. Croce, No. 00 Civ. 6496, 2001 WL 434613, at *1 (S.D.N Y Apr. 27, 2001). Plaintiff has made two submissions in support of her motion, one dated April 30, 2001 and one dated June 15, 2001. I have considered both submissions, neither of which contain any arguments that justify the relief requested. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for relief from judgment is denied.
As the bulk of plaintiff's motion challenges the outcome of that ruling, the instant motion should have been brought as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or as a motion for reconsideration or reargument under Local Rule 6.3. However, this mistake is of no legal consequence as plaintiff fails to meet the standard for relief from judgment under any provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Local Rules of this Court, see infra.
Familiarity with this Opinion and Order is assumed for purposes of this motion.
If plaintiff's motion was considered a Rule 59 motion, the June 15 submission would be untimely. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) ("Any motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after the entry of judgment."). To avoid any possible prejudice to plaintiff, I have analyzed her motion under both Rule 59 and Rule 60.
I. PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS
A. April 30, 2001 Motion
In her April 30, 2001 submission, plaintiff makes the following arguments:
1) Defendants may have exhibited deliberate indifference by failing to grant plaintiff a religious exemption from PPD tests and x-rays in accordance with Reynolds v. Goord, 103 F. Supp.2d 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). See ¶ 2(a). Defendants may have also exhibited deliberate indifference by failing to acknowledge that physical examinations and counseling are alternatives to prevent the spread of tuberculosis, citing Reynolds, 103 F. Supp.2d at 322 ("TB may be diagnosed on clinical signs and symptoms alone."); See id.
(2) Defendants may have exhibited deliberate indifference by failing to act on information that the New York State Medicaid Program is designed to pay for outside hospital specialists such as gastroenterologists and orthodontists; See ¶ 2(b)
(3) Defendants may have created a religious non-vegetarian diet program policy under which unconstitutional practices occur by failing to provide a religious exemption from non-vegetarian dietary precepts which are contrary to plaintiff's Christian religious beliefs; See ¶ 2(c).
(4) Defendants may have created a Therapeutic Animal-Based Diet Program under which unconstitutional practices occur by failing to provide a written menu of a Therapeutic High Fiber Bland Non-Animal Non-Wheat Medical Diet to plaintiff who is entitled to a religious exemption from any animal-based diet; See ¶ 2(d).
(5) Defendants may have exhibited deliberate indifference by failing to act on information of a readily available example of alternative correspondence and package mail policies as adopted by the New York City Department of Corrections. See ¶ 2(e).
B. June 15, 2001 Motion
In her June 15, 2001 submission, plaintiff makes the following arguments:
(1) Defendants continue to exhibit deliberate indifference by failing to remove plaintiff from TB hold on the basis of a religious exemption, again citing Reynolds; See ¶ 2(a)
(2) Defendants continue to exhibit deliberate indifference by failing to acknowledge that physical examinations and counseling are alternatives to prevent the spread of tuberculosis, again citing Reynolds; See ¶ 2(b).
(3) There is newly discovered evidence that the defendants are deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's constitutional right to adequate medical care; See ¶ 2(c).
(4) There is newly discovered evidence that defendants are deliberately indifferent by failing to acknowledge that TB hold is not an established and medically accepted practice at any other correctional facility in the United States, citing Reynolds, 103 F. Supp.2d at 338 ("No other correctional system in the United States has found it necessary to institute a program like TB Hold to protect the health of prisoners and guards, . . ."); See ¶ 2(d).
(5) Defendants continue to exhibit deliberate indifference by denying plaintiff a "Religious Vegan-Vegetarian (Non-Animal) Alternate Diet"; See ¶ 2(e).
(6) There is newly discovered evidence that defendants deliberately fail to consult outside gastroenterologists and orthodontists and that defendants do not supervise the physicians employed by the Bedford Hills correctional facility; See ¶ 2(f).
(7) There is newly discovered evidence that defendants do not act on information regarding New York's Medicare/Medicaid Health Services Program which provides for alternative standards for least intrusive medical and dental procedures; See ¶ 2(g).
(8) There is newly discovered evidence that defendants are deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's constitutional right to privacy regarding her mail by failing to abide by the New York City Department of Corrections' mandate that the inmate be present when legal mail is opened. See ¶ 2(h).
II. DISCUSSION
1. Motion for Reconsideration
A. Legal Standards
The standards governing motions to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) and motions for reconsideration or reargument pursuant to Local Rule 6.3 are the same. See 4200 Avenue K LLC v. Fishman, No. 00 Civ. 8814, 2001 WL 498402, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2001) (citing Candelaria v. Coughlin, 155 F.R.D. 486, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)). "Whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration or reargument is in the `sound discretion of a district court judge and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.'" U.S. Titan, Inc. v. Guangzhou Men Hua Shipping Co., Ltd., 182 F.R.D. 97, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 1983)).
References to "Local Rules" are, more specifically, references to the Local Rules of the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, effective April 15, 1997.
A motion for reconsideration or reargument is appropriate when the court overlooked "controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion . . . and which, had they been considered, might have reasonably altered the result before the court." Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90 F. Supp.2d 390, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Alternatively, a motion for reconsideration or reargument may be granted to "correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Petrojam, Ltd., 72 F. Supp.2d 365, 368 (S.D.N Y 1999).
A motion for reconsideration or reargument may not be used to advance new facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the Court. See 4200 Avenue K, 2001 WL 498402, at *1. Nor may it be used as a vehicle for relitigating issues already decided by the Court. See Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[A] motion to reconsider should not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided.").
Local Rule 6.3 "should be narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the Court." Dellefave v. Access Temps., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 6098, 2001 WL 286771, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2001). See also In re Houbigat, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (a Local Rule 6.3 motion "is not a motion to reargue those issues already considered when a party does not like the way the original motion was resolved"); Carolco Pictures, Inc. v. Sirota, 700 F. Supp. 169, 170 (S.D.N Y 1988) (purpose of Local Rule 6.3 is to "ensure the finality of decisions and to prevent the practice of a losing party examining a decision and then plugging the gaps of a lost motion with additional matters").
2. Relief From Judgment
To prevail on a Rule 60(b) motion, a movant must show that one of the six bases outlined in the Rule, such as an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error, applies. See Matura v. United States, 189 F.R.D. 86, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The Second Circuit has stated that "Rule 60(b) is `extraordinary judicial relief' and can be granted `only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.'" Dellefave, 2001 WL 286771, at *2 (quoting Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986)). See also Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Key Pharm., 75 F.3d 815, 824-25 (2d Cir. 1996) ("A movant under Rule 60(b) must demonstrate `exceptional circumstances' justifying the extraordinary relief requested."). As with a motion for reconsideration or reargument, the decision whether to grant a Rule 60(b) motion lies in the discretion of the district court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See Jones v. Trump, 971 F. Supp. 783, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
A Rule 60(b) motion is not a substitute for appeal. See Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 263 n. 7 (1978). Accordingly, Rule 60(b) motions that simply attempt to relitigate issues and thereby circumvent the appellate process are routinely dismissed. See, e.g., Competex, S.A. v. Labow, 783 F.2d 333, 335 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for appeal."); Hernandez v. United States, No. 99 Civ. 4303, 2000 WL 744148, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2000) (denying Rule 60(b) motion where "[t]he vast bulk of [movant's] argument constitutes nothing more than a futile effort to have this Court revisit its Opinion"); Batac Dev. Corp. v. BR Consultants, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 721, 2000 WL 307400, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2000) (holding that a party "may not . . . use Rule 60(b) as a substitute for appeal or to relitigate matters already resolved by the court adversely to that party").
B. Plaintiff's Arguments
1. Plaintiff's Reliance on Reynolds is Misplaced
In Reynolds, the plaintiff, a Rastafarian inmate, refused to submit to a PPD skin test, asserting his First Amendment right to exercise his religion. See Reynolds, 103 F. Supp.2d at 318. Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction barring his placement on TB Hold pending trial. See id. After a detailed recitation of medical facts concerning TB in general and TB in prisons, the court granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. See id. at 345.
Evidence was submitted as to the Rastafarian belief that the body is a holy temple which "must not be defiled or contaminated by any form of artificial chemical injections or drugs." 103 F. Supp.2d at 334, n. 31.
In granting plaintiff's motion, the Reynolds court was required to find both irreparable injury and a likelihood of success on the merits. See id. at 335. With regard to the irreparable injury requirement, the court noted that "plaintiff's placement on TB Hold for the exercise of his religious beliefs is a substantial burden on his constitutional rights that cannot be adequately compensated monetarily." Id. at 337. The court also found a clear likelihood of success in proving, at trial, "that there is no valid or rational connection between placing an inmate who refuses PPD testing [on] TB Hold and the health of DOCS' inmate population and staff." Id. (footnote added) Moreover, the court stated that plaintiff's presence in the general prison population presents no realistic threat of the spread of infectious TB even in the absence of a PPD test result." Id. at 338.
"DOCS" refers to the New York State Department of Correctional Services.
This latter statement, however, was predicated on plaintiff's cooperation with other diagnostic tools such as chest x-rays, sputum testing, and examination for physical symptoms of active TB. See id. With regard to the spread of TB to others, the court noted that "one clear alternative to the regime of TB Hold is the isolation of that inmate until a chest x-ray is given. . . ." Id. at 342. See also id. at 322 (a chest x-ray is a quick and effective way to identify potentially infectious persons). The plaintiff in Reynolds did in fact have a chest x-ray which showed no evidence of TB. See Id. at 335. Accordingly, plaintiff fell within DOCS' practice of exempting from TB Hold those inmates who refuse the PPD test on religious grounds but permit a chest x-ray instead. See id. at 327-28 (December 12, 1991 Memorandum from DOCS' Deputy Commissioner Glenn S. Goord permitting such an exemption).
Plaintiff's reliance on Reynolds in support of a similar exemption to PPD testing is misplaced for two reasons. First, plaintiff did not allege, in her Amended Complaint, that she refused the PPD test on religious grounds. As plaintiff's religious claim was not presented to the Court initially, see infra, it cannot now serve to amend her pleadings to incorporate a First Amendment claim on reconsideration.Second, unlike the plaintiff in Reynolds, plaintiff also refused to have a chest x-ray taken. Reynolds does not support a blanket religious exemption to PPD testing in the absence of alternative diagnostic tools such as chest x-rays. Plaintiff's attempt to cite it for this proposition is simply wrong.
In sum, given the inapplicability of Reynolds, plaintiff has not shown either a change in the controlling law or a controlling decision that this Court overlooked. Accordingly, plaintiff's citation to Reynolds does not support either a motion for reconsideration or reargument or a motion for relief from judgment.
In fact, even if Reynolds were applicable, it would not be controlling. See IBM Credit Corp. v. United Home for Aged Hebrews, 848 F. Supp. 495, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (district court decisions are not binding precedent for other district courts).
2. Plaintiff's Religious Challenges to PPD Testing and Her Diet Were Not Part of Her Initial Complaint
Plaintiff now asserts, for the first time, that her claims regarding TB Hold and her dietary requests are based on her religion. With regard to TB Hold, plaintiff merely claims that she should be granted a religious exemption from PPD testing in light of Reynolds. With regard to her dietary requests, plaintiff now asserts that a non-vegetarian, animal-based diet is contrary to her "Christian religious beliefs" and that a vegan-vegetarian diet would be in accordance with passage 1:29 of the Book of Genesis.
Plaintiff's religious claims can be summarily dismissed without reaching their merits. As stated earlier, Local Rule 6.3 "precludes a party from advancing new facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the court." Dickerson v. USAir, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 8560, 2001 WL 12009, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) Accordingly, plaintiff may bring a separate action alleging First Amendment claims, but she cannot do so through motion practice.
I decline defendants' request to preclude plaintiff from bringing future religious claims on grounds of collateral estoppel. Although Magistrate Judge Carol E. Heckman analyzed plaintiff's claims under the First Amendment in the Western District case, she did so on a theoretical or conjectural basis. See Word v. Wright, 98-CV-220A(H) (Report and Recommendation), at 8 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1999) (analyzing plaintiff's claims under the First Amendment even though "plaintiff did not expressly allege that defendant's conduct constitute[d] a First Amendment violation"). Without any particularized details or specific allegations, the First Amendment claims raised and decided by the court sua sponte in that case cannot foreclose subsequent litigation of issues not yet raised by plaintiff.
3. Plaintiff Fails to Cite Any Newly Discovered Evidence
Under Rule 60(b)(2), a movant must show that "`(1) newly discovered evidence is of facts existing at the time of [the prior decision]; (2) the moving party is excusably ignorant of the facts despite using due diligence to learn about them; (3) the newly discovered evidence is not merely cumulative . . . of evidence already offered.'" Fidelity Partners, Inc. v. Fidelity Trust Co. of New York, 58 F. Supp.2d 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Tufts v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 981 F. Supp. 808, 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), aff'd, 128 F.3d 793 (2d Cir. 1997)). Furthermore, "[t]he newly discovered evidence brought to the Court's attention must be highly convincing." Wolf v. Board of Educ. of the City of New York, No. 93 Civ. 6059, 2001 WL 336832, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Local Rule 6.3 does not even afford the losing party the right to submit new evidence. See First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Interior Demolition Corp., No. 96 Civ. 8243, 1998 WL 567900, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1998) (a Local Rule 6.3 motion "must not advance new facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the court").
In her June 15, 2001 submission, plaintiff states that there is newly discovered evidence to support several of her claims. Plaintiff does not state, however, what this newly discovered evidence is. It appears that plaintiff reflexively used the words "newly discovered evidence" in a vain attempt to meet the requirements of Rule 60(b)(2). Merely stating that there is new evidence is not enough to meet the stringent requirements of Rule 60(b). Accordingly, plaintiff's claims of newly discovered evidence must be dismissed.
4. Plaintiff's Other Arguments Are Attempts to Relitigate Issues Already Decided
The remainder of plaintiff's claims represent a transparent attempt to relitigate issues already decided by this Court or dismissed without prejudice subject to refiling. See Word, 2001 WL 434613, at *8. Neither Rule 60, Rule 59(e) or Local Rule 6.3 permit this. See Morser v. ATT Info. Sys., 715 F. Supp. 516, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Dellefave, 2001 WL 286771, at *2. Therefore, these claims do not support plaintiff's request for relief. As plaintiff has filed a timely Notice of Appeal, these issues will be heard on appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff's motion for relief from judgment, whether decided under Rule 60 or Rule 59(e) and Local Rule 6.3. is denied. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion.
SO ORDERED