Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-2216-H
January 11, 2002
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the District Court's Order of Reference, filed January 2, 2002, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, filed November 7, 2002, has been referred to this Court for recommendation. Having reviewed the pertinent pleadings and evidence submitted, the Court recommends that the motion be GRANTED for the reasons that follow.
I. Background
On January 8, 2001, Plaintiffs Dorothy Woodson and Naomi Petty (collectively, "Plaintiffs") were involved in a motor vehicle collision with a truck owned and operated by Defendant H.D. Copeland International Trucks, Inc. d/b/a Copeland Idealease ("Copeland"). Defendant Dell Roy Babcock ("Babcock") was driving the truck at the time of the collision. (Copeland and Babcock will be referred to collectively as "Defendants.") The collision occurred in Davis, Oklahoma.
On June 13, 2001, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants in the 249th Judicial District Court of Johnson County, Texas, seeking compensatory and exemplary damages for injuries they allegedly sustained as a result of the collision. Defendants timely removed the case to federal court on November 2, 2001, based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Defendants, who are citizens of Oklahoma and Delaware, now seek dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. The parties have briefed the issues and the matter is ripe for determination.
Defendant Copeland is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Oklahoma. Defendant Babcock is an Oklahoma citizen.
II. Analysis
A. Burden of Proof
The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that a nonresident defendant is subject to the court's jurisdiction. Gundle Lining Constr. Corp. v. Adams County Asphalt, Inc., 85 F.3d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1996) . "The Court may determine the jurisdictional issue by receiving affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, or any combination of the recognized methods of discovery." Stuart v. Spademan , 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985) . Where, as here, the court rules on a motion to dismiss based on the parties' submissions in lieu of conducting an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only present facts sufficient to constitute a prima facie case of jurisdiction. Felch v. Transportes Lar-Mex S.A. de C.V., 92 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1996); Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990) . "'[U]ncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff's complaint must be taken as true, and conflicts between the facts contained in the parties' affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor for purposes of determining whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists.'" Felch , 92 F.3d at 327 (quoting Bullion, 895 F.2d at 217) .
B. Standard in a Diversity Suit
In a diversity suit, a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the same extent that a state court in that forum has jurisdiction. Wilson v. Belin , 20 F.3d 644, 646 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Bullion, 895 F.2d at 215) . The reach of this jurisdiction is determined by: (1) the forum state's long-arm statute; and (2) the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 646-47 (citing Bullion, 895 F.2d at 215) . Because the Texas long-arm statute confers jurisdiction to the limits of the federal constitution, U-Anchor Adver., Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977); Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. 1990) , "a nonresident's amenability to personal jurisdiction under the Texas long-arm statute collapses into a federal-style inquiry as to whether jurisdiction comports with federal constitutional guarantees." Bullion, 895 F.2d at 216; Aviles v. Kunkle, 978 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1992) . Thus, this Court must determine whether subjecting Defendants to personal jurisdiction would comport with the due process requirements of the Constitution.
C. Due Process Requirements
The assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with federal constitutional due process when two requirements are met: (1) the defendant must have purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing "minimum contacts" with that state such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant must not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (citing Burger King Corporation v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-77 (1985)); CH Transp. Co. v. Jensen Reynolds Constr. Co., 719 F.2d 1267, 1269 (5th Cir. 1983) . These requirements ensure that persons have "fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) .
1. Mimmum Contacts
To establish minimum contacts, a nonresident defendant must take some action by which he "purposefully avails [him] self of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)) . Two types of personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a nonresident defendant: specific and general. Specific jurisdiction exists if the cause of action is related to, or arises out of, the defendant's contacts with the forum, and those contacts meet the due process standard. Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 9 F.3d 415, 418-19 (5th Cir. 1993); Stuart, 772 F.2d at 1190 . "When a court exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on contacts with the forum related to the particular controversy, the court is exercising "specific jurisdiction.'" Holt Oil Gas Corp. v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773, 777 (5th Cir. 1986) . General jurisdiction, on the other hand, may be found when the claim is unrelated to the nonresident's contacts with the forum but where those contacts are" and systematic." Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984) . Under either a specific or general jurisdiction analysis, however, "the constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in the forum [s]tate." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316) .
a. Specific Jurisdiction
Here, the motor vehicle collision that forms the basis of Plaintiffs' suit occurred in Davis, Oklahoma. Accordingly, the Court finds, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that specific jurisdiction does not exist in this case.
b. General Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs' Complaint contains only conclusory allegations of general jurisdiction, which are insufficient to support jurisdiction. See Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 868-69 (5th Cir. 2001) (court need not credit conclusory allegations when considering a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction) (citing Felch, 92 F.3d at 326 n. 16 (5th Cir. 1996)) . Thus, Plaintiffs must present some evidence of Defendants' contacts with Texas. See Southern Bleacher Co. v. Husco, Inc., No. 7:01-CV-009-R, 2001 WL 497772, at *6 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 2001) ("Although [plaintiff] need only prove jurisdiction by presenting a prima facie case, some evidence is necessary to make this showing.")
The Complaint contains no jurisdictional facts. Rather, it speaks solely in terms of the legal standard:
This Court has jurisdiction over Defendant Copeland . . . because said Defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the state of Texas and established minimum contacts sufficient to confer jurisdiction over said Defendant, and the assumption of jurisdiction over [said Defendant] will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice and is consistent with the constitutional requirements of due process.
( Compl. at ¶ 7.)
In an attempt to show general jurisdiction over Defendant Copeland, the only evidence Plaintiffs offer is a computer print-out showing that Copeland is registered as an interstate carrier with the Department of Transportation ("DOT"). ( Resp. at Exh. 2 .) As Defendants point out, this evidence merely shows that DOT has authorized Copeland to engage in interstate commerce in the United States. It does not show that Copeland has continuously and systematically engaged in commerce in Texas or that Copeland even engages in commerce in Texas.
In fact, Copeland offers evidence, by way of affidavit, showing that: (1) it is not licensed to do business in Texas; (2) it does not employ Texas residents; (3) it does not maintain any offices, records, bank accounts or property in Texas; (4) it does not direct advertisements specifically to Texas or Texas residents; and (5) it has not undertaken to provide any goods, materials or services to Texas. ( Defs.' Mot. at Exh. 1.)
Moreover, Plaintiffs' argument that Copeland "does not deny" that it uses Texas roadways is of no avail. The burden remains on Plaintiffs to prove minimum contacts. Likewise, if Plaintiffs need discovery to support their claim of jurisdiction, the burden is on them to request such discovery. See Revell v. Lidov, No. 3:00-CV-1268-R, 2001 WL 285253, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2001) (district court has discretion to grant a request for jurisdictional discovery) (citing Washington v. Norton Mfg., Inc., 588 F.2d 441, 443 (5th Cir. 1979)) . Plaintiffs, however, have made no such request here. Because Plaintiffs fail to present any evidence regarding Copeland's contacts with Texas, the Court finds that there is no general jurisdiction over Copeland.
Likewise, the Court finds that there is no general jurisdiction over Defendant Babcock. Plaintiffs offer no evidence, present no facts and make no argument regarding Babcock's contacts with Texas. In fact, Plaintiffs' brief "analysis" of personal jurisdiction is devoid of any mention of Babcock. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden.
2. Fair Play and Substantial Justice
The second prong of the due process test requires that the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice. The Court finds that requiring Defendants to be subjected to suit in a forum with which they have no minimum contacts runs counter to the principles of fair play and substantial justice.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction be GRANTED.
SO RECOMMENDED,